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 In terms of world box-office gross, Avatar (2009) was the most successful film 
ever made, outstripping its closest competitor, Titanic (1997), by a handy billion dollars.1 
In short, Avatar was a domestic and international sensation that captured the imagination 
of viewers everywhere. To a large extent, the film moved audiences with its spectacular 
rendering of a utopian, indigenous culture and this culture’s martial and moral victory 
over a neo-colonial military-industrial complex. However, because the film was regarded 
as a technological advance, and because the film features the spiritual progress of a white 
male who literally possesses an indigenous body, we may observe that Avatar’s attitude 
toward the colonial encounter is thematically ambiguous. At the very least, Avatar is 
haunted by the very legacy of colonial desire it would disavow with its utopian resolution 
of colonial conflict. 
 Avatar is an indication of the contemporary, global preeminence of primitivism, a 
mode of cinema preoccupied with representations of the colonial encounter. More 
specifically, primitivism manages representations of the colonial encounter through the 
construction of a primitive : modern binary. This primitive : modern binary is not value-
neutral: it privileges the modern while disparaging the primitive. In the analysis of four 
texts, Avatar (2009), The Last Samurai (2003), Dances with Wolves (1990), and The 
Gods Must Be Crazy (1980), I advance an understanding of how primitivism promotes a 
Eurocentric worldview through the construction of a primitive : modern binary. I list 
these films here in reverse chronological order to highlight the importance of Avatar as a 
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global cultural phenomenon, and to argue for the rereading of these other films in light of 
the current preeminence of cinematic fantasies of the Primitive Other.  
 The motivation for this project is simple. Through a close reading of the aesthetics 
and contexts of primitivist cinema over the last thirty-five years, I hope to perform a 
deconstruction of settler colonial ideology. This deconstruction is motivated by my 
concern that these films all reproduce a way of thinking that naturalizes and reaffirms the 
real-world history and ongoing practices of settler colonialism. As Edward Said writes in 
Culture and Imperialism, the process by which European powers came to dominate the 
globe, its peoples, and its natural resources, depended on the “the idea of having an 
empire” (11). As Said writes more expansively:  
There was a commitment to [imperialism and colonialism] over and above profit, 
a commitment in constant circulation and recirculation, which, on the one hand, 
allowed decent men and women to accept the notion that distant territories and 
their native peoples should be subjugated, and, on the other, replenish 
metropolitan energies so that these decent people could think of the imperium as a 
protracted, almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior, or less 
advantaged peoples. (10) 
Said argues that the 19th-century novel manufactured consent to the imperial project 
through its persistent construction of empire as the self-evident infrastructure of domestic 
European space. Building on Said’s thesis, I say that artifacts of cinematic primitivism 
encourage intellectual investment in colonialism. 
While primitivism is current in contemporary popular culture, it has manufactured 
the imperative to colonial domination since the Enlightenment.2 In brief, Enlightenment 
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philosophy conceived human history as a cumulative, linear effort of civilizational 
progress. This civilizational progress was conceived as the unfolding of rational, human 
social knowledge commensurate to the revelation of God’s will.3 Mark Moberg, a scholar 
of the history of anthropological theory, identifies the Scottish historian Adam Ferguson 
as the first purveyor of the Eurocentric historical model that I will refer to throughout this 
dissertation as primitivism: 
In his 1767 Essay on the History of Civil Society the Scottish historian Adam 
Ferguson … first attempted to place all known human societies on a three-stage 
scale of savagery, barbarism, and civilization. Ferguson’s model was specifically 
developed with respect to the North American Indian cultures then being 
documented by French Jesuits in Canada. Ferguson assumed that all human 
societies passed through the same three states of development, and that all could 
be assigned a particular place on that sequence depending on their livelihoods, 
cultural practices, political systems and technology. Ferguson’s was the first 
known use of the comparative method, the assumption that contemporary 
“primitive” societies represent the early stages of cultural evolution. In other 
words, members of a civilized society can understand their own distant past by 
studying existing primitive societies. (Moberg 60) 
As Moberg observes, Ferguson’s model privileged whiteness with a Eurocentric 
temporality: 
Ferguson suggested that rationality was the prime mover of history. In the process 
of cultural evolution people literally thought themselves out of a primitive state. 
Rational thought would lead to more and more reasonable institutions, customs, 
  
4 
and subsistence practices. Hence the civilizations of Europe were believed to have 
left behind “superstitions” in favor of a worldview based on science. Although 
Ferguson believed, like Locke, that all people had the same intellectual potential, 
“savages” had not mastered the potential to the extent of Europeans. (60-61) 
Because Enlightenment philosophy conceived of civilizational progress as a self-
evident good, and because the colonial encounter provided a convenient map for 
temporal and civilizational difference, this thinking constructed colonial domination as 
the exertion of a benevolent force on a primitive object. As Roy Harvey Pearce writes in 
Savagism and Civilization, this logic of civilizational progress had a direct impact on the 
idea of empire and the manufacture of its imperative. Specifically, Enlightenment models 
of history allowed for the resolution of European settler colonists’ moral quandaries over 
the destruction of native cultures because primitivism allowed American settlers to 
believe that “men in becoming civilized had gained much more than they had lost; and 
that civilization, the act of civilizing, for all of its destruction of primitive cultures, put 
something higher and greater in place” (85).4  
 In the 19th century, the discipline of anthropology would entrench Enlightenment 
primitivism in the scientific academic establishment through the misapplication of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Building on the developmental model of Adam Ferguson, 
the anthropologists Lewis Henry Morgan and Edward Burnett Tylor infused evolution 
with the Enlightenment ideology of progressive time, an intellectual model known as 
“Victorian unilineal evolution” (Moore, 1997 4).5 While the study of culture(s) had 
lacked a scientific rationale in the pre-Darwinian period, anthropology found itself 
legitimized as a scientific discipline in the post-Darwinian moment (Moore, 1997 16). 
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Even though Victorian evolutionists would erroneously lend Darwinian theory a 
progressive arrow, these anthropologists were able to scientifically produce indigenous 
people as primitive, backward, and atavistic.6  
While theories of unilineal evolution were rejected by Franz Boaz in the first 
decades of the 20th century, the trend was “resurrected in the mid-twentieth century by 
contemporary anthropologists” (Moberg 60).7 As Johannes Fabian argues in Time and the 
Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, anthropology remains predicated on 
assumptions of temporal difference inherited from Enlightenment historiography. To wit, 
the subject/object relationship of anthropology is one in which a contemporary subject 
(the anthropologist) observes an anachronistic object (the ethnographic specimen). Fabian 
calls this structure the denial of coevalness. The resurrection of evolutionary thinking by 
mid-twentieth century anthropologists is so disturbing because the denial of coevalness 
stands to manufacture the imperative to empire after the fashion of Enlightenment 
historiography. In sum, the denial of coevalness reproduces the Enlightenment imperative 
to empire because it preserves progress, futurity, and subjectivity as the exclusive 
privileges of a European observer while simultaneously constructing the Primitive Other 
as a temporally contained object of the colonizer’s gaze.  
To a great extent, the evolutionary models of Enlightenment historiography and 
Victorian anthropology shaped European and American film culture in the early-20th 
century. Following Fabian, Fatimah Tobing Rony writes that early ethnographic films 
such as Nanook of the North (1922), Tabu: A Story of the South Seas (1931), and King 
Kong (1933), were instrumental in establishing the denial of coevalness in the popular 
cinematic consciousness of Europe and North America in the early-20th century. As an 
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“ethnographic time machine,” this early-20th-century cinema produced images of 
anachronistic objects for a contemporary, colonizer’s subject position. Specifically, the 
denial of coevalness came to structure the viewing position of classical ethnographic 
cinema in such a way as to locate the cinematic primitive in the long-ago-and-far-away of 
the colonial imaginary.  
In Fabian’s analysis of anthropological constructions of time, and in Rony’s 
critique of the denial of coevalness in early 20th-century film, these authors perform the 
postcolonial critique of modern time consciousness. As Bliss Cua Lim writes in 
Translating Time, modern time consciousness is that way of thinking time as linear, 
mechanical, homogenous and progressive. This way of thinking time emerged in Europe 
and North America as a result of the industrial revolution, the preeminence of the 
railroads, and the advent of geological and Darwinian models of time. In its attainment of 
global hegemony at the turn of the 20th century, modern time consciousness subsumed or 
devoured local, indigenous, non-industrial ways of being and living in time. As such, 
modern time consciousness justifies colonial domination because it is predicated on 
scientific constructions of universality and progress. As a Eurocentric model of time 
which depends on colonial difference, modern time consciousness encourages the denial 
of coevalness and temporal elitism (Lim 69-88). Modern time consciousness is the broad 
conceptual framework within which colonizing subjects may deny coevalness to 
colonized objects, and temporal elitism is the ontological privilege attained through the 
denial of coevalness. 
In the contemporary primitivist cinema here under review, the colonizer’s gaze 
manages cinematic aesthetics in such a way as to produce the denial of coevalness. This 
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denial allows the colonial viewing position to assume the privilege of temporal elitism. 
Whereas Rony addresses the manner in which classical ethnographic film produced the 
denial of coevalness in the early-20th century, no book-length work examines how 
contemporary popular cinema constructs its particular form of temporal elitism. I hope to 
address a deficit in postcolonial cinema studies by advancing an understanding of how 
contemporary, popular cinema produces the denial of coevalness. In particular, this 
dissertation is concerned with how cinematic aesthetics work within cultural contexts to 
produce temporal elitism. 
Chapter II is an aesthetic and historical analysis of the slapstick comedy The 
Gods Must Be Crazy. Directed by the South African apartheid regime’s most trusted 
propagandist, Jamie Uys (pronounced “ace”), the film was the culminating effort of 
twenty years’ work to legitimize, naturalize, or dream away the violence of white 
minority rule. The film tells the story of the collaboration between an Afrikaner biologist 
and his !Kung retainer in their quest to rescue a white damsel in distress from a band of 
black African revolutionaries. Academic criticism has condemned the film for its 
representations of black Africans who are either incapable of governing themselves or 
else hopelessly ill-equipped to navigate modernity, constructions which naturalize white 
paternalism and foreclose the possibility of indigenous futurity. In spite of the film’s 
disturbing relationship to the apartheid regime, The Gods is historically significant as the 
highest grossing foreign film at the American box office. Also a hit in France and Japan, 
the film spawned two South African sequels, The Gods Must Be Crazy II (1989) and The 
Jewel of the Gods (1989), as well as three unlicensed, Hong Kong-produced sequels: 
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Crazy Safari (1991), Crazy Hong Kong (1993), and The Gods Must Be Funny In China 
(1994).  
While scholarship has observed that The Gods Must Be Crazy served apartheid 
through the denial of coevalness, previous treatments have ignored how the film 
constructs temporal elitism through its affinity with the lingering forms of classical 
Hollywood aesthetics. To address this deficit, the methodology of Chapter II harmonizes 
the critical theory of temporal elitism with an aesthetic analysis of cinematic time. By 
juxtaposing The Gods with early American films such as The Birth of a Nation (1915) 
and King Kong (1933), I hope to demonstrate that The Gods’s temporal elitism takes 
shape in ways which are particular to tropes of classical Hollywood cinema. Like films of 
the classical Hollywood style, The Gods promotes temporal elitism through its use of 
linear storytelling, a romantic subplot, and an omnipotent spectator. Because it manages a 
primitive : modern binary with an aesthetic of spectatorial mastery, The Gods fuses the 
colonizer’s gaze with the omnipotent gaze characteristic of the classical Hollywood style. 
This sense of spectatorial mastery, in turn, presides over a linear narrative trajectory 
which serves as a metaphor for the global trajectory of Enlightenment historiography.  
While my analysis of The Gods Must Be Crazy is a departure from an otherwise 
uniform corpus of North American films, its inclusion here serves to expand and 
complicate my understanding of contemporary American primitivism. In my reading of 
The Gods Must Be Crazy, I invoke South African film culture to highlight how two 
different structural contexts, the industrial model of Hollywood cinema and the apartheid 
cinema of South Africa, demonstrate representational and aesthetic overlaps in the 
exhibition of primitivism.  Specifically, The Gods constructs the denial of coevalness in 
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terms which echo constructions of race and time in The Birth of a Nation and King Kong. 
Therefore, The Gods Must Be Crazy is a text which allows for the easy legibility of the 
classical Hollywood style in the context of apartheid cinema. The easy transposition of 
the Hollywood style into an apartheid context is a strong indication of the racial 
unconscious of classical Hollywood style. In other terms, this transposition indicates how 
the legacy of Hollywood cinema is harmonious with the racial ideology of apartheid 
South Africa.   
Like in The Birth of a Nation, the omniscient narrator and linear storytelling of 
The Gods manage a narrative of race told from a white point of view. Therefore, The 
Gods is an example of how a film culture outside of the United States has expressed its 
own ideology of race through a reiteration of the classical Hollywood style. The 
recognition of the legacy of classical Hollywood aesthetics in The Gods serves two 
critical purposes. First, it demonstrates that American ideologies of race and time have 
achieved global circulation through an aesthetic vector. Second, it suggests that 
contemporary American primitivism has great ideological affinities with the racial 
ideology of apartheid, especially considering that Dances with Wolves, The Last Samurai, 
and Avatar construct the denial of coevalness much after the fashion of The Gods Must 
Be Crazy. In Chapter II, I will explain how the aesthetic form of The Gods represents a 
confluence of classical Hollywood aesthetics and the ideological and industrial structures 
of South African apartheid. While a similar structural and historical analysis of the 
classical Hollywood studio era is beyond the scope of this project, my analysis builds on 
the work of scholars who have observed the racial politics of the Hollywood production 
system and the racial constitution of the classical Hollywood style.8 
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Beyond considerations for the influence of Hollywood aesthetics, accounting for 
the particular form of The Gods Must Be Crazy requires a consideration of South Africa’s 
own, indigenous film culture. To a great extent, The Gods Must Be Crazy owes its form 
to South Africa’s state subsidy scheme. This scheme dominated the funding and 
production of films in South Africa in the 1960s and 70s. As a tool of South African 
apartheid, the subsidy scheme supported only those films which propagated an Afrikaner 
worldview and the racism incumbent to that worldview. Released in 1980, The Gods 
catered to the expectations of a local film culture that had been absolutely dictated by the 
Afrikaner worldview for over 20 years. 
If I have included a review of The Gods’s production context in a way that I have 
not in this dissertation’s other chapters, it is for a few reasons. First, it is to acknowledge 
that The Gods was not simply a function of the lingering influence of classical 
Hollywood aesthetics. Quite to the contrary, South African film culture in the second half 
of the twentieth century was dominated by the politics of apartheid, and, in particular, the 
generic and narrative conventions that had been encouraged by the apartheid state’s 
subsidy scheme. To not have accounted for these local factors in my assessment of The 
Gods Must Be Crazy would have been to give too much credit to the influence of 
Hollywood aesthetics. Second, I have included a brief history of South Africa and its film 
industry because these elements were a salient aspect of The Gods’s own scholarly 
literature. More often than not, treatments of the film dealt with the film’s place in South 
African film history. Similarly, there was almost no discussion of the film that did not 
place it in the context of South African economic and social history. My treatment of The 
Gods in this dissertation is a reflection of this pattern.  
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Finally, my purpose here is to demonstrate the synergy between the aesthetic 
legacy of the classical Hollywood studio system and the industrial and structural norms 
of South African film culture in the era of apartheid. Any understanding of The Gods 
Must Be Crazy would be incomplete if it did not account for the fact that the primitivist 
ideology of South African cinema was the selfsame ideology that structured the racial 
logic of the classical Hollywood film. Indeed, the affinity shared by the temporal logic of 
South African apartheid and the racial logic of the classical Hollywood style accounts for 
the uncanny synergy of these forms in The Gods Must Be Crazy. 
In Chapter III, I move from a discussion of The Gods Must Be Crazy to an 
analysis of Dances with Wolves. In this movement from an artifact of South African 
apartheid to the revisionist western of 1990s America, I argue that both The Gods and 
Dances with Wolves do similar ideological work. Whereas The Gods utterly disavows the 
colonial violence of the apartheid regime, Dances with Wolves disavows the ongoing 
structure of settler-colonial relations through its construction of Native American 
genocide as a historical event.9 This construction of colonial genocide as a historical 
event is a settler move to innocence.10 This move to innocence functions through the 
activation of that most American of film genres, the western. Whereas the classical 
western was an endorsement of manifest destiny, and whereas the revisionist western saw 
the deflation of the white male hero with whom manifest destiny was associated in the 
western’s classical period, Dances with Wolves works for the redemption of the classical 
western and its hero by the means of a melodramatic adoption narrative.11 In brief, DWW 
mobilizes melodramatic sympathy for its white hero by allowing him to appropriate the 
righteous suffering of indigenous Americans. This appropriation and its melodramatic 
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force depend on imperialist nostalgia for a lost, utopian, indigenous culture. Because it 
constructs the suffering of Native Americans as a historical event, DWW preserves 
futurity and progressive time as the exclusive privileges of the settler colonist.12 At the 
same time, the appropriation of this historical suffering serves as a distraction from white 
complicity in indigenous genocide, allowing for the moral redemption of the classical 
western hero. By reading settler moves to innocence and imperialist nostalgia in terms of 
the melodramatic mode and the western genre, I hope to demonstrate that colonial 
ideology works through aesthetic forms which are distinctly characteristic of American 
popular cinema. Just as colonial time consciousness finds expression in the legacy of 
classical Hollywood aesthetics in The Gods Must Be Crazy, the settler move to innocence 
in Dance with Wolves has everything to do with the manner in which the film activates 
the western genre and the melodramatic mode.   
In Chapter IV, I use the concept of imperialist nostalgia to explore how The Last 
Samurai interacted with the discourse of primitivism in The War on Terror. Taking The 
Last Samurai as a psychic screen for the colonial encounter in post-9/11 conflict, I argue 
that both the film and the discourse of The War on Terror bifurcate the signifier of the 
colonial other into the good and bad Oriental. In each case, the bifurcation of the colonial 
other is managed by the denial of coevalness. After 9/11, American and British 
discourses constructed “the terrorist” as the bad Oriental. As barbaric and techno-
sophisticated, primitive and modern, “the terrorist” was a threat to the temporal 
exceptionalism claimed by the proponents of The War on Terror. In The Last Samurai, 
the bad Oriental is he who adopts western clothes and weaponry: the good Oriental is that 
samurai who remains unambiguously anachronistic. Like the “terrorist” of The War on 
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Terror, the bad Oriental of The Last Samurai threatens the temporal exceptionalism of 
the settler-colonial subject position: he is a contemporary rival. In contrast, the samurai 
restore the privilege of settler-colonial futurity because The Last Samurai constructs them 
as vanishing Indians. 
 In this analysis of The Last Samurai, I should make a methodological distinction 
regarding my use of the term “oriental.” At first, one might think that The Last Samurai 
operates according to the terms of orientalism as defined by Edward Said, particularly 
regarding the film’s lavish, pleasurable rendering of an Asian culture. While these 
dynamics are certainly at play, I find that the film’s construction of Japanese masculinity 
has as much to do with the denial of coevalness and the construction of Enlightenment 
historiography as it has to do with constructions of despotism, sexuality, or religiosity, 
characteristics so important to Said’s critique of orientalism. Thus, I am supplementing 
the orientalist reading of The Last Samurai with a primitivist one.  While the binary of 
classical orientalism functions according to the logic of the European self and the 
Oriental other, the logic of primitivism depends on a self : other binary which is managed 
according to a temporal opposition of the “primitive” with the “modern.” 
Finally, by reading The Last Samurai as an analogical cipher for The War on 
Terror, I hope to highlight the manner in which popular cinema reflects a discourse of 
primitivism that extends beyond the boundaries of cinematic fiction. The structural 
affinity of The Last Samurai with The War on Terror suggests that the notions of colonial 
time which structure recent popular cinema also saturate popular understandings of 
United States’ foreign policy. As such, the vanishing Indian and the bad Oriental are not 
just the hoary, cinematic hangovers of a defunct colonial project; rather, they are 
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signifiers which constitute and structure the United States in relation to its real-world 
others.  
While Chapters II, III, and IV analyze the interaction of film aesthetics with 
cultural and historical contexts, Chapter V examines how Avatar’s temporal elitism was a 
function of the film’s interaction with its own popular and scholarly reception discourse. 
In a stunning chorus of evolutionary rhetoric, popular and academic critics celebrated 
Avatar’s 3D exhibition technology as a dialectical leap into the future of film aesthetics. 
Because motion picture audiences were invited to celebrate this technology as a tool for 
exploring the film’s diegetic world as a virtual colonial space, I argue that the film’s 
exhibition technology moves into a dialectical opposition with the film’s diegetic, 
indigenous people. As a result, the film’s discourse and viewing position collude to 
preserve futurity as the exclusive privilege of the cinematic spectator: Avatar’s 3D 
exhibition technology was an ethnographic time machine. 
While The Gods, DWW, and TLS all produce temporal elitism through the 
interplay of their aesthetics with particular historical contexts, the production of temporal 
elitism in Avatar is far more global. The motivation for the methodological shift of 
Chapter V is to demonstrate that Avatar’s colonial viewing position and its evolutionary 
reception discourse are part of a broader tradition of cinematic temporal elitism. This 
tradition originated in the earliest of ethnographic films, and finds expression in seminal 
writings of film theory. Throughout this tradition, cinema has been regarded as an 
emblem of technological progress in possession of its own aesthetic destiny. If celebrated 
as an expression of such, Avatar becomes emblematic of a broad exigency in popular 
cinema, the process by which civilizational difference and the colonial encounter are 
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always already managed by a discourse of cinema which is constructed according to 
paradigms of progressive time and the futurity of cinema itself. 
With the cinematic management of the primitive in mind, it is worth taking a 
moment to explain how I will use the terms “primitive” and “primitivism” in each of the 
following chapters. In Chapter II, “primitivism” will refer to the way in which The Gods 
Must Be Crazy performs the denial of coevalness with its construction of South Africa’s 
indigenous people. This same primitivism was active across the apartheid culture of 
South Africa throughout the 20th century. Indeed, the denial of coevalness was one of the 
preeminent means by which apartheid authorities of the South African state justified the 
segregation, discrimination, and disenfranchisement of South Africa’s indigenous people.  
In Chapter III, “primitivism” will designate the manner in which the Lakota 
Indians of the United States are denied coevalness in Dances with Wolves. As idealized, 
anachronistic people, the Lakota Indians are a spiritual and emotional resource for the 
film’s white protagonist. It is important to note that primitivism in Dances with Wolves 
works in the same way as The Gods, while achieving slightly different ends. Whereas the 
denial of coevalness in The Gods justifies discrimination and disenfranchisement under 
the logic of South African apartheid, the denial of coevalness in Dances with Wolves has 
the effect of historically containing the ongoing violence of settler colonialism in the 
United States. Primitivism allows Dances with Wolves to imagine that violence against 
indigenous Americans is a thing of the past, rather than an ongoing political reality. 
In Chapter IV, “primitivism” describes the manner in which the samurai of The 
Last Samurai conform to the myth of the vanishing Indian. The uncompromised 
anachronism of the samurai ensures that their disappearance is a matter of historical 
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inevitability, rather than colonial culpability. Moreover, their location in the past serves 
as a therapeutic counterpoint to the liminal temporality of the radical jihadi as constructed 
in The War on Terror. As such, primitivism in The Last Samurai is a therapeutic 
construction that liberates the colonizer from the guilt of colonial violence while 
simultaneously assuaging fears over a liminal other.  
Finally, “primitivism” in Chapter V refers to the manner in which Avatar and its 
reception discourse installed the film’s indigenous characters in a primitive : modern 
binary. This binary manages the relationship of the film’s indigenous characters to the 
film’s diegetic and extra-diegetic technologies. Primitivism in Avatar allows the 
cinematic spectator to enjoy temporal privilege over the film’s indigenous people because 
the film harmonizes the colonizer’s gaze with the technological sophistication of the 
film’s own 3D exhibition technology.  
I am particularly interested in the films of this dissertation because they 
demonstrate the endurance of a particular mode of primitivism which we may trace 
through the writings of Adam Ferguson, Lewis Henry Morgan, early ethnographic film, 
and contemporary anthropology. In spite of the fact that we live in an ostensibly 
“postcolonial” world, I hope to show that these films construct the Primitive Other as an 
atavistic remnant of primordial man, and, in doing so, that contemporary popular cinema 
continues to reproduce the imperative to empire with a trope which has endured since the 
late-18th century. In focusing on films which span the last thirty-five years, I hope to 
demonstrate two things. First, I want to show that popular cinema of the 21st century 
continues to reiterate the colonial temporality of the late-18th century. Second, in 
choosing a body of films which spans the last thirty-five years, I hope to demonstrate that 
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this Enlightenment temporality has enjoyed currency during the entire period of recent 
history. Rather than functioning as an isolated resurgence in the period of Avatar, 
Enlightenment primitivism has thrived in popular films from at least 1980.   
The films here under review are far from a random selection from the cultural 
archive. First and foremost, I have defined my corpus backwards from Avatar. As one of 
the most widely screened films of all time, I take it as axiomatic that Avatar is an artifact 
worthy of scholarly analysis. Regardless of whether the film promotes colonial ideology, 
motivates anti-imperial resistance, or displaces the reparation of indigenous land and 
sovereignty with a utopian resolution of colonial conflict, the film is worth understanding 
because of its global readership. Because of its wide audience and great popularity, it 
stands to reason that the film’s regard for time may have had broad influence on popular 
understandings of colonial conflict. It is as Richard Dyer writes in White: “how anything 
is represented is the means by which we think and feel about a thing, by which we 
apprehend it. The study of representation is more limited than the study of reality and yet 
it is also the study of one of the prime means by which we have knowledge of reality” 
(xiii). Avatar is all the more worthy of study if it can be shown to enlist global support for 
a colonizer’s worldview while simultaneously posturing as a text of anti-colonial 
resistance, as it was often received. Specifically, I say the film encourages its spectator to 
think and feel in sympathy with white, settler futurity vis-à-vis indigenous people as 
objects of the colonizer’s gaze. We cannot allow this structure to remain unconscious, 
unspoken, or uncontested.  
Working backward from the present, The Last Samurai and Dances with Wolves 
present themselves as two very natural inter-texts for understanding Avatar. First and 
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foremost, these three films demonstrate great formal and aesthetic affinities: in all of the 
films, a disenchanted westerner plays Indian as a means of redeeming his masculinity, 
and, in the process, engages in imperialist nostalgia over an anachronistic, utopian culture 
in such a way as to mask his complicity in colonial violence. As such, I say that the 
nearly unstoppable success of Avatar more or less automatically calls out for a rereading 
of these previous films. Avatar’s popularity means that Dances with Wolves and The Last 
Samurai have been part of a recent history of the motion picture that is still unfolding. 
After Avatar, Dances with Wolves and The Last Samurai mean something that they could 
not have meant had Avatar never been released. At the very least, these films gain 
significance because they may now be observed as part of an enduring trend in American 
cinema culture which, now more than ever, has captured the imagination of a global 
audience. Finally, Dances with Wolves, perhaps more so than The Last Samurai, was a 
film celebrated as a work of art. The winner of seven Academy Awards, including Best 
Picture, the film is an example of an entry in the cultural archive that stands to invest 
aesthetic and emotional energy in the denial of coevalness. 
Finally, these films are just as interesting for the qualities that differentiate them. 
Specifically, the uniformity of temporal elitism across the films’ diversity of locations 
and historical periods suggests that primitivism is a profoundly flexible trope. When 
taken as a set, these films demand that the primitive is everywhere, and everywhen, even 
as the primitive is always long ago and far away. While Avatar projects primitivism into 
the future and onto a distant planet, The Last Samurai projects primitivism into Victorian 
Japan. While DWW projects primitivism into the American frontier (which is always a 
place and a time), The Gods imagines primitivism in present-day South Africa. That the 
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Primitive Other should populate Africa, America, Asia, and the colonial frontiers of an 
interstellar future, is a reassurance that the impulse to empire shall be valid in all places 
and in all times. As this body of films suggests the self-evidence and ubiquity of the 
Primitive Other across a diegetic, intertextual timespan of several hundred years, this 
corpus works as a cinematic metaphor for the actual historical endurance of primitivism 
and its temporal elitism from the late-18th century through to the 21st.   
Notes
 
1 Avatar’s global gross was $2,787,000,000; Titanic’s was $1,835,400,000. Adjusted for inflation, Gone 
With the Wind is the all-time American domestic box office champion, at over $3,000,000,000 (Quigley 16-
18).  
 
2 While the temporal dimension of modern European racism dates to the Enlightenment, the European 
perception that non-Europeans are somehow less than fully human is an ancient attitude dating to the 
writings of Pliny the Elder, a Roman naturalist writing in the first century C.E. As Mark Moberg writes in 
Engaging Anthropological Theory, Plinian attitudes persisted in Europe into the 19th century, and would 
serve as justification of the colonial project:  
The result [of Pliny’s racial speculation] was a conception of non-Europeans that has become 
known as the Plinian races…The Plinian races exhibited often grotesque, part-human, part-animal 
characteristics and were responsible for a lasting belief that non-Europeans were in some physical 
and behavioral sense less than fully human. These ideas persisted for centuries after Pliny devised 
them. The fact that they lasted into the period of European colonization of the Americas and 
Africa suggests that such beliefs may have served as convenient rationales for colonial endeavors 
that deprived native people of their labor and resources. After all, if the natives of the colonized 
world are not fully human, what inherent rights do they enjoy more than, say, livestock or any 
other useful species? (Moberg 47-48).  
  
3  As Roy Harvey Pearce writes of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers: 
The Scots held that it might be conjectured back from empirical evidence how God was revealing 
His Word to modern man slowly but surely, how modern man was thus slowly but surely 
progressing to high civilization, how he had left behind him forever his savage, primitive state. 
This was the grand Christian civilized Idea of Progress. (82)  
 
4 For a review of the ideology of Enlightenment progress regarding representations of American Indians, 
see Berkhofer 40-48.  
 
5 As Mark Moberg observes, Morgan followed Ferguson but “is often erroneously credited with devising 
the savagery-barbarism-civilization evolutionary model” (Moberg 60). 
 
6 As Tylor writes: 
[Civilization] may be looked upon as the general improvement of mankind by higher organization 
of the individual and society, to the end of promoting at once man’s goodness, power and 
happiness. This theoretical civilization does in no small measure correspond with actual 
civilization, as traced by comparing savagery with barbarism, and barbarism with modern 




especially true. Acquaintance with the physical laws of the world, and the accompanying power of 
adapting nature to man’s own ends, are, on the whole, lowest among savages, mean among 
barbarians, and highest among modern educated nations. (Quoted in Moore, 1997 24-25) 
 
For his part, Lewis Henry Morgan writes: 
The latest investigations respecting the early condition of the human race are tending to the 
conclusion that mankind commenced their career at the bottom of the scale and worked their way 
up from savagery to civilization through the slow accumulation of experimental knowledge.  
As it is undeniable that portions of the human family have existed in a state of savagery, other 
portions in a state of barbarism, and still other portion in a state of civilization, it seems equally so 
that these three distinct conditions are connected with each other in a natural as well as necessary 
sequence of progress. (Quoted in Moore, 1977 35) 
 
7 Moberg writes that Boas’s influential form of cultural relativism had “consigned to academic oblivion 
[the] ethnocentrism and speculative nature of unilinear evolution” (Moberg 234). An anthropologist intent 
on reviving the evolutionary model, and an anthropologist with an explicit intellectual affinity for Lewis 
Henry Morgan, was the Marxist Leslie White. White argued for a progressive model of cultural evolution 
in which the state of technological advancement was positively correlated to cultural complexity and 
achievement (Moberg 234-241). Whereas White was a proponent of unilineal evolution, his contemporary 
and adversary Julian Steward was a proponent of multilinear evolution, the “specific forms of adaptation 
that arose within particular environmental contexts and subsistence traditions” (Moberg 240). While these 
two anthropologists remained in somewhat heated antagonism, their dispute “signal[ed] evolution’s 
rehabilitation in anthropology … From being virtually banned as a topic of academic discourse in the 
1930s, social evolution moved to the center of anthropological theory in the US by the 1960s” (Moberg 
240).   
 
8 For several analyses of the racial constitution of the classical Hollywood aesthetic, see  Courtney 1-50, 
Doane 172-205, Lim 1-43, Shohat 19-68, and Rony 157-192. 
 
9  For an explanation of colonial genocide as an ongoing structure, see Wolfe 387-409.  
 
10 I take this terminology from Tuck and Yang 1-40. 
 
11 For an explanation of my use of the term melodrama, see Brooks 1-23, and Williams 42-88. 
 






THE GODS MUST BE CRAZY AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF  
POSTCOLONIAL HOLLYWOOD 
 If, in the erotic regime of the colonizer’s gaze, native is to metropole as woman is 
to man, then it should be no surprise that the ethnographic has always been the racialized 
theater of the pornographic. With the advent of Avatar (2009), modernity’s erotic dreams 
of its primitive other have never been so popular or lucrative. While a google search for 
images of Avatar almost immediately assails the hapless viewer with pornographic fan-
fiction, the film itself is explicitly erotic, and is structured according to the imperatives of 
a white, modern gaze on the primitive female other. While Avatar received nearly 
ecstatic popular and critical acclaim for its technological progress, the film’s primitive : 
modern / female : male gazing relations are at least as old as the scopic regime that 
managed images of Sarah Saartjie Baartman (a.k.a. the Hottentot Venus), a Khoisan 
woman of colonial South Africa brought to England for exhibition as a primitive, sexual 
fetish object at the turn of the 19th century (Figure 1) (La Venus Hottentote). Avatar, an 
ostensibly anti-colonial text, perpetuates an asymmetrical, erotic viewing relationship 
endemic to the voyeurism of anthropology, what we may as well call The National 
Geographic effect. Indeed, this effect operates in that other great blockbuster of 
primitivist voyeurism, that ultimate triumph of South African apartheid propaganda, The 
Gods Must Be Crazy (1980) (hereafter The Gods). Like the voyeurism of Saartjie 
Baartman and Avatar, visual pleasure in The Gods depends on the interpellation of the 
cinematic spectator into a genre convention of visual anthropology, the nakedness of the 
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non-white body as revealed to the unrestricted voyeurism of a contemporary subject 
position, a relationship between the voyeur and his primitive object that Bill Nichols calls 
“Ethnotopia” (220).     
   While Avatar was guilty of its share 
of Hollywood stereotypes regarding 
indigenous people (read: dreadlocks and 
bows and arrows), no one would consider 
the film as an overt justification of colonial 
aggression. Rather, the film is heavy-handed 
in its postcolonial logic: the American 
military-industrial complex is an exploitative 
force of unqualified evil; the film’s 
indigenous victors are an unqualified icon of 
ecological and social harmony. So goes the 
Manichean, civilizational dualism of many 
films of the last 25 years: Dances with 
Wolves (1990), Ferngully (1992), 
Pocahontas (1995), and The Last Samurai 
(2004). However, following The Gods Must 
Be Crazy, these films cannot be understood as simply postcolonial: rather, they constitute 
a culturally dominant yet politically ambivalent mode of American screen culture: 
cinematic primitivism. 
Figure 1. Avatar, The Hottentot Venus, 
and The Gods Must Be Crazy. 
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In his recent essay on primitivist tourism in Papua New Guinea, Anthropologist 
Rupert Stasch defines primitivism as 
any ideological formation about human variety in which one kind of humanity is 
identified as embodying originalness in time, and correlative primordialness or 
archetypicality of being. … But a particularly important primitivist framework of 
the present era is the mainly European-originating one that envisions human 
variation in the crucible of a Manichaean contrast between two radically 
contrastive and incompatible types – the ‘modern’ or ‘civilized’ versus the 
‘tribal’, ‘indigenous’ or ‘primitive’, with the further Romantic twist that civilized 
humanity is superior in technological and economic power but tribal humanity is 
superior in some aspects of spirit, social ethos, bodily aesthetics, or relation to 
nature. A small indicator of this primitivism’s vast sway was the global 
commercial success of the 2009 movie Avatar, now known as the highest 
grossing film of the cinema era, a market success dependent on the allure of its 
highly recognizable primitivist plot repeated from earlier Hollywood blockbusters 
such as Pocahontas and Dances with Wolves. (Stasch 195) 
Like Avatar, Dances with Wolves, and The Last Samurai, The Gods juxtaposes the utopia 
of indigenous life with the discontent of civilization. It is the construction of these poles 
as incompatible by which The Gods would justify apartheid segregation. In its 
construction of indigenous people as anachronistic, the film naturalizes apart-ness, the 
ideology that justified the establishment and maintenance of the apartheid homelands and 
the migrant labor which sustained the South African economy; “in order to legitimate the 
movement of black labor from the country to the city and back, the apartheid regime had 
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to remind everyone that, though African bodies could visit the city, the mind of the 
African … always stayed put in the bush” (Johns 223).  
While the relevance of The Gods to American primitivist cinema has been left 
unexplored, the apprehension of these films as a discernible mode stands to satisfy a 
political and critical exigency, the fact that ostensibly postcolonial films of the present 
era, films which are in fact celebratory in their liberationist politics, are structured with 
Eurocentric temporal binaries that have worked to naturalize European colonial 
domination. The central problematic of contemporary primitivism is the anachronism of 
these films’ non-white characters and the pleasure with which the colonizer’s gaze 
regards this anachronism. My purpose in rereading The Gods in light of its affinities with 
American cinema is to note the ideological resonance of apartheid propaganda with 
contemporary American film. Primitivism is the formation by which these later American 
films unwittingly perpetuate the colonial ideology of The Gods.  
 Since its release in 1980, The Gods has been an extraordinary financial and 
popular success in its native South Africa and in France, China, and Japan, where it has 
been among the highest grossing films of all time (Tomaselli, Cinema 46; Gugler 71). 
Moreover, The Gods has maintained its status as the biggest foreign box-office success 
ever released in the United States (Gordon and Douglas 259; Gugler 76). In response to 
its popularity, film critics and academics have excoriated the film as Afrikaner 
propaganda. In fact, The Gods has been the most politically dissected film of the 
apartheid era (Tomaselli, Cinema 10).  Critics have argued that The Gods functioned as a 
comic erasure of the systematic disenfranchisement of southern Africa’s indigenous 
people that had been taking place for several hundred years, and by 1980 had reached the 
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level of a humanitarian crisis (Marshall; Gordon and Douglas 1-12, Gugler 73-78). The 
film presents a world in which the Bushmen live an idyllic, pre-contact existence of 
primitive affluence, in which whites exercise a benevolent, peaceful mastery, in which a 
utopian racial harmony is only threatened by communism and “the bad African.” The 
Gods is an artifact of Afrikaner cinema that reflects the fantasies of the apartheid ideal 
while simultaneously dreaming away political oppression (M. Botha 12-13; Gugler 71-
79; Gordon, 1-12, 259; Davis 81-94; Tomaselli, Cinema 1; Tomasselli, Annoying 75-80; 
Tomaselli, Rereading 174-181; Johns, 211-223). 
  In considering The Gods as a member of an otherwise American set, I note that 
previous scholarly treatments have ignored the film’s aesthetics. These aesthetics are a 
combination of temporal elitism, the colonizer’s gaze, and the aesthetic and narrative 
legacy of classical Hollywood style. The Gods constructs the denial of coevalness by 
means of its affinities with classical Hollywood style and the editing technique of 
convergent montage. Most globally, the film’s primitive : modern binary is structured by 
Enlightenment progress narratives that had managed representations of the Bushmen in 
southern Africa since the late 18th century. A British government proclamation regarding 
the Bushmen in 1798 held that “the reclamation of these Boshiesmen from their present 
savage and deplorable state, is not only of the greatest importance in the colony, but 
highly interesting to humanity” (Quoted in Moran 4). As an expression of Enlightenment 
ideology, the primitive : modern binary is a Eurocentric racial fantasy that clings to the 
structure of a progressive temporal axis. This binary and its axis result in the denial of 
coevalness and temporal elitism, the processes by which European anthropologists and 
their fellow travelers relegate their racial others to previous stages in human evolution 
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(Fabian 31).  This is The Gods’s global, abstract, colonial time structure. This global 
structure subtends the film’s local structure of time, the white hero’s quest and this 
quest’s romantic subplot, which characterize the classical Hollywood paradigm. Because 
this local plot is teleological, it reinforces, and is reinforced by, the film’s global sense of 
historical progress. But it is not that The Gods superimposes just any narrative trajectory 
over an abstract teleology of racial progress. Rather, the film’s local progress narrative 
takes the form of the racial chase film, employing a trope standardized by D.W. Griffith 
in The Birth of A Nation (1915) wherein white men save white women from black men.  
In her analysis of early-20th-century cinema, Fatimah Rony writes that film 
ethnography constructed human history as a spatial and temporal competition between 
different races of people; “History was a race: those who did not vanquish would 
vanish[.] … Film would inscribe race through the body (human difference) and would be 
evidence of history (which was also a race)” (28). Emerging from this context, the racial 
chase film is an explicit solicitation of the cinematic spectator to consider racial 
difference as a competition which can be managed by aesthetic conventions of space and 
time. Because the conventions of the racial chase film were managed by a white viewing 
position, they maintain the foregone conclusion of a white victor (Rony 10, 28).  In Birth 
of a Nation, King Kong (1933, 2005), and The Gods, this race is managed by the 
technique of convergent montage, a variant of parallel editing.1 With convergent 
montage, the intercutting of Shot A with Shot B signifies simultaneity of time across two 
locations. Convergent montage establishes a narrative vector through the anticipation of 
the confluence of threat and salvation. This is the editing technique and narrative 
structure of the last-minute rescue by the Ku Klux Klan in Birth of a Nation. Because The 
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Gods manages its racial rescue narrative with the same convergent montage as The Birth 
of a Nation, I argue that the film’s racial and narrative tropes support global models of 
temporal elitism. 
The primitivism and classical Hollywood aesthetic so central to The Gods are also 
crucial to American primitivist cinema from 1990 to the present: these films also infuse 
the classical Hollywood plot with an abstract, Eurocentric history. The result is the 
impossibility of a postcolonial Hollywood.  With a new close reading of The Gods, I will 
outline the contours of American primitivist cinema with regard to this impossibility. 
First, I will situate The Gods as a paradigm of Afrikaner apartheid cinema. Then, I will 
survey one of the film’s local historical contexts, the crisis of white masculinity in the 
Afrikaner regime of the late 1970s. Lastly, I will consider how the film is a management 
of the crisis of white masculinity, arguing that conventions of ethnographic gazing and 
the paradigms of the classical Hollywood style work for the redemption of the white, 
male ego.  
Apartheid and Its Cinema  
 While The Gods was a stunning global success, it did not emerge ex nihilo: rather, 
it was the most popular artifact of an ideology that had influenced South African cinema 
throughout the 20th century.2 Since the 1910s, South African authorities had regulated 
domestic film production in an effort to maintain class and racial hierarchies. In 1910, 
South Africa banned screenings of the Johnson-Jeffries Fight under the rationale that 
they would foment racial hatred and unrest among black viewers (Tomaselli, Cinema 13-
14).3 This colonial anxiety led to the Cinamatograph Film Ordinance of 1917, which 
prohibited the representation of “antagonistic relations between Capitol and Labor; 
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pugilistic encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans [and] scenes tending to 
disparage public characters or create public alarm” (Tomaselli, Cinema 14).  
 There is no understanding the repression of social conflict in South African film 
without an understanding of apartheid. Apartheid finds its legislative origin in the 
Natives’ Land Act of 1913, which limited African landownership to seven percent of 
South Africa’s land area. Of this small portion, white farmers and miners held legal claim 
to the most productive tracts of land (Beck 113).  Because the law shunted them onto the 
least productive land, it transformed black South Africans into “wage or tenant laborers 
for white farmers, and ensured white dominance of the industrial cities[.] … [This type of 
law] played a crucial role in expanding the capitalist order under white control and 
reducing the black population to a proletariat status under that order” (Thompson 163). 
With the collapse of agriculture due to overcrowding, the reserves became “reservoirs of 
cheap, unskilled labor for white farmers and industrialists” (Thompson 164).  
The idea of “apartness” was the ideological kernel that justified this economic 
structure. “Apartness” was a style of thinking which emphasized the incompatibility of 
different cultures within South Africa while also stressing the imperative of racial and 
ethnic purity: as Prime Minister Smuts declared, “everybody [meaning, every white 
person] (sic) in this country is agreed that European and African should live apart and 
preserve their respective cultures” (Quoted in Thompson 182). In the 1960s and 70s, the 
Afrikaner-dominated parliament partitioned the African reserves into ten territories, or 
“homelands,” in which each “African ‘nation’ was to ‘develop along its own lines’” 
(Thompson 191).  
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 While the Afrikaner administration masked its economic motives with notions of 
ethnic incompatibility, an understanding of “apartness” is incomplete without a survey of 
its anthropological inflection: temporal elitism. The profitability of South African mines 
depended on itineracy, the prerogative of capital to opportunistically dismiss its reserve 
of exploited labor (Johns 223). Temporal elitism was the ideology that managed the 
mining industry’s policies of labor itineracy. In its brutal crackdown on black protests 
over mining conditions in August of 1946, the Chamber of Mines released the following 
statement: “the Gold Mining Industry considers that trade-unionism as practiced by 
Europeans is still beyond the understanding of the tribal Native. … A trade union 
organization … would not only be useless, but detrimental to the ordinary mine Native in 
his present stage of development” (Quoted in Thompson 180). Thus, the mining industry 
used the denial of coevalness to justify its discriminatory policies. 
In an effort to repress the organization of black labor in the 1940s, the 
government-commissioned Cilliers Committee advocated for a South African film 
culture that would “[discourage] modernist tendencies among black audiences” 
(Maingard 9). The cinematic effort to maintain an ideology of temporal difference served 
the various tactics of white minority rule. When justifying the reservation of skilled jobs 
for white laborers and the repressed wages of blacks, Prime Minister Hertzog claimed to 
be making a civilizational rather than a racial distinction. As Hertzog would have it, 
South African labor laws justly discriminated in favor of “persons whose standard of 
living conforms to the standard generally recognized as tolerable from the usual 
European standpoint,” while giving short shrift to “persons whose aim is restricted to the 
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bare requirements of the necessities of life as understood by barbarous and undeveloped 
peoples” (Quoted in Thompson 168).  
By the 1940s, state and private economic interests conceived of cinema as a 
means for recruiting migrant labor, naturalizing the exploitation of the pass system, and 
justifying apartheid segregation. Pondo Story (1948) constructed the “homeland” as the 
migrant laborer’s natural environment. Such films characterized labor in the mines as 
voluntary, productive, and temporary (Tomaselli, Cinema 55).  As Timothy Johns argues, 
the fantasy of the childlike black worked in concert with the myth of the migrant laborer 
to buttress the ideology of the anachronistic primitive. These mid-century tropes came to 
structure the Bushmen of The Gods: 
By presenting a quixotic impression of the African naïf, a “country bumpkin” 
utterly dumbfounded by bright lights and the big city, [The Gods] creates a lasting 
impression that Africans are “essentially rural creatures,” which is to say, too raw 
to feel at home on the metropolitan stage. … African migrants from the provinces 
needed to appear overly fragile in a metropolitan milieu, naturally requiring 
caretakers, overseers, mangers, bosses—in sum, a white hand to guide them 
through the daunting labyrinth before being returned to the provincial places 
where they felt truly at ease. After the African migrant was no longer demanded 
in the mines, it was necessary to send him back to his original, pre-colonial 
environment, in the bush, in the supposed “homelands and “locations.” (Johns 
215)  
The Gods is a microcosm of the geographical, temporal, racial, and economic cosmology 
of South African apartheid. Released in 1980, the film demonstrates the tenacity of an 
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economic and ideological model that emerged in the 1910s. To better understand The 
Gods’s participation in the South African propaganda machine, let us examine its 
relationship to its historical cinematic context, South African screen culture from the 50s, 
60s, and 70s.  
South African Screen Culture: 1950-1980 
As a means of talking back to apartheid and its cinema, two major films of the 
1950s expressed the hardships of the black migrant laborer: Cry, the Beloved Country 
(1951) and Come Back, Africa (1959). 
Cry, the Beloved Country is politically ambivalent. It tells the story of a rural 
black preacher who visits Johannesburg only to find that his son has murdered a white 
activist intent on advancing racial equality. Some critics argue that the film portrays the 
suffering of black South Africans as a function of their victimization under the conditions 
of migrant labor (Maingard 109). Others critics are politically ambiguous, writing only 
that “the film depicts the social and moral degradation of black South Africans in a way 
never done before” (M. Botha 37). Others regard the film as politically reactionary: 
 [In Cry, the Beloved Country] no blame is put on the sociopolitical system of 
apartheid. The fiction is maintained that African migration did not stem from dire 
economic need but was voluntary and, consequently, that there was no need for 
Africans to remain in the city. This was in line with apartheid doctrine which 
maintained that Africans were temporary sojourners in the “white man’s cities.” 
(Bains 186)  
The film’s pathos depends on the Manichean rural : urban binary central to the ideology 
of apartness. Further, the film sources the suffering of the migrant worker to the depravity 
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of the city: “in the world of Cry, the Beloved Country, the organs of state are impartial, 
not malevolent” (Davis 40). The rural is represented as a pastoral ideal while the city is a 
“metaphor for the decay of modern society” (Bains 186). The danger of Cry, the Beloved 
Country is that it sources suffering to the incapacity of the rural native to cope with the 
challenges and hardships of modernity. In the film’s final scenes, the black priest returns 
to the tranquility of the rural under the financial and moral protection of a white farmer, 
the very father of the murdered activist. In this politically amnesiac return to the pastoral 
ideal, Cry prefigures the ‘back to the homelands’ genre of the state subsidy scheme which 
I will discuss in more detail below, a problematic taken up in the film’s successor, Come 
Back, Africa.   
Like Cry, the Beloved Country, Come Back, Africa portrays the hardships 
experienced by millions of Africans as they migrated to the urban centers of colonial and 
postcolonial Africa (Davis 51). Unlike Cry, Come Back, Africa blames the suffering of 
the worker on the draconian injustices of the apartheid pass laws (M. Botha 39). 
Furthermore, the film challenges “the official definition of Africans as migrants who 
were out of place in the city” (Davis 52; Baines 187). Come Back, Africa “made it 
abundantly clear that blacks could find themselves very much at home in the city, both in 
mind and body” (Johns 224). The most progressive scene in Come Back, Africa features a 
cadre of black, urban intellectuals who openly critique the urban : rural binary of Cry, the 
Beloved Country. These characters decry the “urban incompetence” of the black 
characters in Cry, observing that whites in South Africa want nothing more than an 
“African from the country, from his natural environment, unspoilt,” “pure,” and 
“uncontaminated” (Quoted in Maingard 115). As on-screen representatives of the 
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intellectual activity associated with Drum magazine, these characters represented “new 
ideas of a modern, urbanized, African culture” which “explicitly reject[ed] the atavistic 
tribal fantasies of apartheid” (Quoted in Johns 224).  
The Subsidy Scheme  
The subsidy scheme of 1956 dominated South African cinema for 30 years, 
eliminated the possibility of a black national cinema, and openly promoted pro-apartheid 
films: “Any film that managed to be made which in any way reflected the South African 
society in turmoil was banned by the state, and thus did not qualify for any film subsidy” 
(M. Botha 116). Originally, the subsidy scheme was designed to protect the South 
African film industry from Hollywood, whose omnipotence was dramatized by 20th 
Century Fox’s purchase of the Schlesinger Organization’s entertainment interests in the 
1950s (Tomaselli, Cinema 30). However, the subsidy scheme quickly molded South 
African cinema into an apartheid propaganda machine (Maingard 125).  
 The first successful appeal for state subsidy came from the South African Motion 
Picture Producers Association, chaired by Jamie Uys, in 1956 (Maingard 126; Tomaselli, 
Cinema 32). The scheme favored Afrikaner cinema, and was part of a backlash amongst 
Afrikaner legislators who anxiously perceived the erosion of Afrikaner privilege and 
influence. Awarded as a percentage of a film’s box-office gross, the scheme subsidized 
English language films at a rate of 44%, and Afrikaans films at a rate of 55% (Tomaselli, 
Cinema 35). Afrikaner preponderance in the South African film industry was further 
consolidated when SANLAM, the Afrikaner insurance giant, acquired 20th Century Fox 
in South Africa (Tomaselli, Cinema 35). By the early 1970s, Afrikaner capital 
“controlled 60 percent of exhibition revenue. A system of vertical integration ensured the 
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exhibition of local Afrikaans product” (Maingard 126). These events privileged 
filmmakers like Jamie Uys, whose Afrikaans films reflected the Afrikaner worldview. 
Discussing the relationship of the subsidy to South African politics, Martin Botha writes:  
Afrikaners wanted their ideals visualized in these films. This idealistic 
conservatism was characterized by an attachment to the (pastoral) past, to ideals 
of linguistic and racial purity and to religious and moral norms. The films had to 
subscribe to these conservative expectations to be successful at the box office 
[and thus to earn a subsidy]. The films seldom attempted to explore a national 
psyche. As such, they were a closed form, made by Afrikaners for Afrikaners, 
with little or no attention to the potential to say something important about their 
society to an international audience. The type of realism that could have analyzed 
Afrikaner culture in a critical manner was avoided. Instead use was made of folk 
stereotypes that showed the Afrikaner as chatty, heartwarming and loveable in a 
comedy tradition or as beset by emotional problems that had little to do with 
society but much to do with the mainsprings of western melodrama about 
mismatched couples overcoming obstacles on the path to true love. (52)  
Back to the Homelands 
Subsidy films were more than ideological echo chambers for Afrikaner 
consciousness. Starting in the 1970s, subsidy films targeted black audiences. Like the 
industrial mining cinema of the 20s, 30s and 40s, this state-funded cinema was designed 
for the maintenance of white hegemony, and was explicitly designed to moralize the 
leisure time of black audiences (Maingard 127). This moralization had two salient 
components: apartheid political amnesia and the denial of coevalness. As Maingard 
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writes; “one of the key representational strategies was to create an enclosed black world, 
where whites were absent and where the film’s context was denuded of political realities 
thereby creating and naturalizing a mythical social space” (Maingard 128). 
This enclosed black world, in concert with the economic imperative to justify 
migrant labor, spawned the “back to the homelands” genre. These films buttressed the 
myth of the independent homeland and the migrant laborer by juxtaposing the iniquity of 
the urban space with the unspoiled integrity of the native homeland (M. Botha 115; 
Tomaselli, Cinema 71). Moreover, the films emphasized the incompatibility of modernity 
with Afrikanerdom’s vision of the “unsophisticated and raw rural dweller” (Tomaselli, 
Cinema 71). Maingard writes; “in these films the city is a space of temporary sojourn, 
from which the black hero retreats ‘back to the homelands,’ discarding his western attire 
and readopting ‘tribal’ tradition” (129). A slew of these films preceded The Gods’s 
release in 1980: Nogomopho (1974), Iziduphunga (1977), Wazenga (1977), Vuma (1978), 
and Maloyi (Witchdoctor) (1978). Social scientist Ted Matsetela writes; “these films are 
subtle custodians of the back to the country move envisaged in homeland policy. Like the 
government, these pictures continually stress that city life is foreign to the black way of 
life: ‘the urban setting is not your home; you belong in the homelands’” (Quoted in 
Tomaselli, Cinema 72).  
The Border War Film 
 Whereas the subsidy films targeted black audiences with “back to the 
homelands” mythology, they enlisted white support for apartheid rule with “the border 
war film.” These films were the cinematic expression of a paranoid Afrikaner 
nationalism, a worldview articulated by Prime Minister P.W. Botha as the “total 
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onslaught” against South Africa (Tomaselli, Cinema 20). In these films, “white conscripts 
fought to sustain apartheid, against what was presented as the insurgence of communist 
‘terrorists’ intent on revolution in Southern Africa” (Maingard 134). These border films 
seamlessly blended nationalist anxiety regarding communist takeover with racial anxiety 
over black African liberation. In Kaptein Caprivi (1972), “black recruits parade with Mao 
Zedong’s ‘Little Red Book’ in their hands” (Maingard 134). With this and similar 
imagery, the state subsidy scheme supported a film culture that pandered to Afrikaner 
fears of black insurrection. In turn, this film culture fed seamlessly into the “total 
onslaught” mentality of Prime Minister Botha and the paranoia of state propaganda 
(Maingard 134). 
Prefiguring the narrative grammar of The Gods, border war cinema solicited white 
audiences with its portrayals of racial violence. Specifically, this genre depicted black 
Africans as threats to the white home, the white nuclear family, and white women. The 
melodramatic core of Die Voortrekkers (1973) is the assault on an Afrikaner family by a 
band of Zulu warriors. While father and child escape, the white woman is left to endure 
the full terror of the Zulu attack. As Maingard suggests, this scene takes the form of an 
allegorical rape reminiscent of The Birth of a Nation (135). Other films in the genre were 
even more explicit in their racial pedagogy. According to Grensbasis 13 (1979), the sole 
duty of the white conscript is the protection of women and children from black terrorists 
(Maingard 135).  
The border-war film, the back-to-the-homelands genre, and the broader ideology 
of apartheid are constitutive precedents for The Gods Must Be Crazy. In this film, an 
Afrikaner biologist temporarily employs a migrant native from the primordial past in his 
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quest to save a white female from a band of communist-led, black terrorists. Not only 
does the film blend elements of these two genres, but, in its representation of pre-contact 
Bushmen, it demonstrates the political amnesia of the Afrikaner worldview. As a function 
of its genre conventions and political amnesia, the film presents the confrontation of the 
primitive rural subject with the absurdity of modernity while simultaneously idealizing a 
pure, primordial rural space to which the native happily returns.  
Jamie Uys’s Oeuvre  
 The Afrikaner worldview depended on white supremacy, apartness, and the total 
disavowal of the violence and exploitation of white minority rule. In his production of 
films committed to this political amnesia, Jamie Uys was typical of the contemporary 
South African film industry. Uys’s coevals “aim[ed] to provide escapist cinema on the 
assumption that audiences ‘don’t want to see things that depress you’” (Tomaselli, 
Cinema 68). Regarding black-targeted films, a spokesman for Igoli Films was politically 
explicit; “As with white films you shouldn’t make the government look bad” (Quoted in 
Tomaselli, Cinema 69). Another filmmaker observed; “the trouble is that black awareness 
causes some people a lot of discomfort. It is easier to ignore it” (Tomaselli, Cinema 69).  
After directing a series of propaganda pictures for the Department of Information, 
Uys would emerge in the 1970s as the consummate entertainer of apartheid cinema.4 His 
transition to popular entertainment notwithstanding, his films still retained their 
propagandistic function. Indeed, The Gods is the perfect hybrid of the back-to-the- 
homelands  and border-war genres of the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, in its reiteration of 
the temporary sojourn in The Fox Has Four Eyes and the political erasure of The 
Condemned Are Happy, The Gods is very much an extension of these earlier projects. 
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Moreover, while Uys’s propaganda films are didactic, they cloak their instruction in the 
aesthetics of continuity editing, character, and narrative. In turning to a review of Uys’s 
entertainment cinema, I make no clear distinction between propaganda and entertainment 
because both bodies of work are equally adept at soliciting their viewers with the 
Afrikaner worldview. 
While Dirkie (1969) prefigures The Gods in important ways, the two films which 
launched Uys to stardom were Beautiful People (1974) and Funny People (1976).5 Both 
films earned the highest possible return under the terms of the state subsidy scheme. 
Beautiful People was the first South African film to gross one million Rand domestic, 
while Funny People was the highest domestic box-office earner in South Africa up to that 
time (Tomaselli, Cinema 36, 42, 174). 
Beautiful People, for which Uys won the Hollywood Foreign Press Association’s 
Golden Globe Award for best documentary, is an “impressionistic kaleidoscope of 
images of animals and landscapes.” The film invokes the natural appeal of pastoral 
beauty “which has been a part of Afrikaans cinema since the 1930s” (M. Botha 46-47).  
And yet, the film relies as much on slapstick anthropomorphism as it does on the sublime 
landscapes of the Kalahari, and is narrated by the same Oxbridge-accented lecturer who 
narrates The Gods. In fact, The Gods’s opening sequence is a remake of a similar scene in 
Beautiful People. In both instances, Paddy O’Byrne lectures authoritatively over images 
of San or !Kung people in the Kalahari Desert in such a manner as to replicate the 
temporal elitism of the anthropologist’s gaze. The Bushmen of these films live in a state 
of primitive affluence, removed from the violence of apartheid South Africa in such a 
way as to disavow this violence altogether.  
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Funny People (1976) is shot in the style of a hidden-camera reality show. Funny 
People is ethnographic in that it purports to capture real scenes of real people (Tomaselli, 
Cinema 42). The film has an infantile, slapstick premise: Uys and company play a series 
of practical jokes on unwitting victims and roll camera as hilarity ensues. While lacking 
any narrative or geo-political cohesion with Uys’s other films, Funny People establishes 
Uys as a purveyor of the comic, and in particular, the sort of slapstick, physical comedy 
central to The Gods. Like The Gods, Funny People relies on the comedy of emasculation. 
The film features men who struggle with malfunctioning cars in the presence of women, 
a recurring slapstick set piece in The Gods.  
To a large extent, the success of The Gods was a function of its similarity to these 
previous films. The Gods’s stock in trade was its slapstick comedy and a cinematography 
which capitalized on the natural beauty of southern Africa. The film’s marketing 
campaign explicitly emphasizes The Gods’s similarity to Uys’s previous films. One 
advertisement reads; “first the magical camera of Jamie Uys turned animals into the most 
beautiful people on earth [Beautiful People]. Then his people became the funniest 
animals around [Funny People]. And now, in his craziest movie ever, people are people 
and animals are animals, but there’s no telling whose side the gods are on” (Jamie Uys 
Delighted 33) (Figures 2 and 3).  Of course, by the time of The Gods’s release, Uys’s 
popularity and financial success would have freed him from any aesthetic or generic 
fidelity to his previous work:  
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Jamie Uys has become something of a legend in his own lifetime with an 
unbroken run of 22 consecutive hits. After 20 years of local success he suddenly 
came to the fore with hits such as “Beautiful People”, “Funny People” and “The 
Gods Must Be Crazy”. His innate ability to provide audiences with what they 
enjoy is a rare talent. Today it is sufficient to sell a Jamie Uys film purely with his 





But The Gods did not just happen to ride the coattails of Uys’s previous hits; 
rather, the film is a hybridization of successful elements from Funny People and 
Beautiful People, featuring slapstick antics on a stage of “striking widescreen visuals” 
(Lor 18). Moreover, the film incorporates elements of the back-to-the-homelands genre 
and the border-war films of the state subsidy scheme. It is no surprise that The Gods was 
a domestic smash in South Africa, as it played to every possible convention of 
Figure 2. Advertisement for The 
Gods. 
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mainstream South African film culture while also synthesizing the popular elements of 
Uys’s previous films.  
The Gods in Its Cultural Context: The Masculine State in Crisis 
It is ironic that apartheid’s most successful filmmaker should have experienced 
his greatest success at the peak of apartheid’s political crisis. In 1960, British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillian proclaimed that Britain would not support South Africa if it 
tried to resist black African nationalism. Between 1960 and 1975, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Angola and Mozambique won 
independence. In 1973, the United Nations declared apartheid a crime against humanity 
(Thompson 213- 214). By the mid-1970s, South Africa was an isolated, white-minority 
ruled anomaly on the tip of an otherwise liberated continent. After global decolonization 
and the civil rights movement in the United States, “the ways had parted between South 
Africa and the rest of the world” (Thompson 223). 
The nation’s churches had organized against apartheid since 1948 (Thompson 
204). The National Union of South African Students organized in 1959, publicly 
garnering Robert Kennedy’s condemnation of the regime in 1966 (Thompson 205). By 
the late 1960s, English and Afrikaner industrial leaders had criticized discrimination in 
the workplace and the education system (Thompson 207). After the deaths of hundreds of 
black students in the Soweto uprising of 1976, a culture of protest would “pervade the 
black population of South Africa. Students and workers, children and adults, men and 
women, the educated and the uneducated became involved in efforts to liberate the 
country from apartheid” (Thompson 228). 
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In 1977, the Afrikaner regime responded to this international and domestic 
pressure with the imposition of mandatory military service. However, conscription into 
the armed forces flagged under the demographic reality of a declining white birthrate and 
white emigration. These pressures were so acute that in 1977, for the first time, South 
Africa experienced a net loss of white citizens (Beck 162-163). According to 
demographers at the time, this was the beginning of a larger historical trend in which the 
black population would vastly out-reproduce the white (Thompson 221). 
The rhetoric and policies with which the Afrikaner regime responded to these 
exigencies were extraordinary: The Gods is an equally extraordinary cinematic rendering 
of Afrikaner ideology. My claim is that The Gods is the resolution of a crisis in white 
masculinity: the film was a projection of the crisis of the Afrikaner regime. The apartheid 
regime of the 1970s and 80s construed itself as heroic, hetero-reproductive, white and 
male. Each element of Afrikaner identity produced an evil twin as a function of Afrikaner 
paranoia: its whiteness was racist; its heterosexuality was homophobic. Taken together, 
these elements manifested in an anxiety of white death in the face of a reproductive racial 
other: “political and military leaders represented the South African polity in bodily terms. 
South Africa … could be killed and destroyed” (Conway 429).6  As a reflection of the 
very real threats which challenged the regime, and as a function of white, reproductive 
paranoia, the Afrikaner state created a chimera of homosexuality, miscegenation, black 
reproduction, and international communism (Conway 422-429; Elder 56-62; Kaufman 
105; Jones 398). 
The sexual politics of apartheid paranoia were complicated by an internal threat to 
the Afrikaner regime: the conscientious objector. Due to the demographic pressures 
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already plaguing the South African Defense Force, the state considered conscientious 
objectors to be an existential threat. The state’s response to this threat was a reflection of 
the reproductive anxieties which had motivated conscription in the first place: it alienated 
objectors from the political community through allegations of homosexuality, finding this 
to be its most effective strategy for combating the peace movement (Conway 423).  In the 
McCarthy-style persecution of conscientious objectors after 1977, national party agents 
argued that objectors’ deviant sexuality would lead to a debilitating deterioration of the 
nation’s masculine character, especially in the face of a similar moral attack from black 
communism. Most fantastically, this heterosexist persecution allowed for the conflation 
of homosexuality with martial dissent. In turn, homosexuality, martial dissent, and 
communism would become indistinguishable in Afrikaner discourse during the high-
noon of South African apartheid (Conway 422-439; Retief 100; Botha and Cameron 20-
24). 
The regime’s political deployment of homophobia was a direct response to the 
reproductive paranoia of the Afrikaner regime. As David Conway writes, this discourse 
invoked images of bodily death: 
whites themselves were responsible for the survival of the body politic; therefore, 
they were capable of provoking its “suicide.” The death of the body politic was 
something that men who refused to serve in the army could supposedly provoke 
and it served as a justification for the repressive and punitive response of the state. 
(Conway 429) 
In sum, homosexuality and other non-reproductive sexual behaviors were policed by the 
psychiatric and disciplinary institutions of the state. The rationale for this persecution was 
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that such acts threatened the reproductive purity and moral courage necessary for the 
survival of minority white rule (Jones 401-405).   
 This cultural context is foundational for an understanding of The Gods, as the film 
is preoccupied with the vicissitudes of white reproduction. Specifically, the film’s 
heterosexual romantic subplot presupposes a consummation which is deferred until the 
film’s final scene. The two causes of this deferral are the male character’s lack of 
romantic prowess, which I will argue is a function of latent homosexuality, and the 
abduction of his female counterpart by a band of black communist thugs, an extension of 
the threat to the white nuclear family which was so prominent in the border-war film of 
the previous 20 years. Thus, the film’s deferrals of white heterosexual closure reflect 
exactly the confluence of anxieties which haunted the Afrikaner regime after 1977. 
Inasmuch as the film is about the reproduction of white people in South Africa, it is also 
about the threats to this reproduction which plagued the Afrikaner imagination during the 
same period. 
The Gods personifies the national crisis of white masculinity in its protagonist, the 
sexually inept Andrew Steyn. The film is explicit, even redundant, in its articulation of 
Andrew’s sexual incompetence: a majority of the film’s gags involve Andrew’s inability 
to impress his love object, Kate Thompson. In scene after scene, Andrew falls in the mud, 
loses his jeep up a tree, or stumbles on his underwear. The pleasure taken in these scenes 
is a mix of sympathy and contempt derived from the discrepancy between Andrew and a 
romantic ideal. However, Andrew’s sexual failure involves more than a case of two left 
feet: rather, his condition is pathological. As Andrew speculates, his heterosexual 
blockage is “an interesting psychological phenomenon: perhaps it’s some Freudian 
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syndrome.” His syndrome’s primary symptom is his motor incompetence, his problems 
with mobility.     
Andrew’s compromised physicality makes him an icon of Afrikaner anxiety, as 
Afrikaner masculinity defined itself as martial, heroic, and athletic. This conception of 
Afrikaner nationality had been central to constructions of British colonial masculinity 
since the late-19th century. John Beyon writes: 
Not every man in Britain at the time strictly conformed to the parameters of 
Imperial masculinity. Rather it provided, from a variety of sources, a powerful set 
of influences towards a hegemonic masculinity to which all ‘proper’ men should, 
as least, aspire for the future well-being of the empire and even the British race. 
(28 [emphasis in original])  
Just as the discourse of Afrikaner masculinity held that all proper men should engage in 
the military defense of minority white rule, British imperial culture held out conquest as 
an exalted form of masculinity. This masculinity was defined as a muscular, Christian 
identity set against the weakness of females, homosexuals, and the effeminacy of native 
peoples (Beyon 28-34). In British boarding-school culture of the turn of the 20th century, 
“a direct link is made between all-male games and sport on the one hand and patriotism 
and Empire-building on the other” (Beyon 33). In sum, imperial masculinity is a function 
of mobility (Beyon 35). In a sense, male mobility is a metaphor for the entire imperial 
project, the history of European colonialism being the history of the mobility of the white 
male body, the power of the white male to penetrate colonial space.  
Andrew Steyn is the antithesis of athletic, colonial man. Indeed, he is overly 
cerebral, a biologist collecting manure for his doctoral thesis. Further, his motor 
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inhibition signifies an existential, colonial, reproductive crisis because his immobility is 
triggered by the presence of a female love object. In the context of South African 
apartheid after 1977, when the very survival of white minority rule was threatened by a 
declining birth rate, Andrew’s reproductive troubles are an expression of an anxiety about 
the death of the white body in South Africa. When Andrew refers to his sexual troubles 
as “some Freudian syndrome,” he asks to be taken as a symptom of the reproductive 
paranoia of the Afrikaner regime. Paradoxically, Andrew’s distance from the hetero-
normative masculine ideal is a key strategy of The Gods’s hegemonic masculinity. 
In Masculinity, R.W. Connell writes: 
At any given time, one form of masculinity rather than others is culturally exalted. 
Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice 
which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of 
patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of 
men and the subordination of women. (77)  
In Gender and Power, Connell extends this thesis: he argues that hegemonic masculinity 
is constituted by those practices and configurations which guarantee the dominant 
position of a culture’s exalted form of masculinity over other masculinities (167-172). In 
South Africa of the 1980s, this would have meant the dominance of heterosexual white 
men over homosexual white men and non-white men of any sexual orientation. In this 
regard, hegemonic masculinity would have been almost indistinguishable from 
hegemonic whiteness, “that system of thinking, discourse and cultural production which 
answers the question of the legitimacy of white supremacy and manages a hierarchy 
within whiteness” (Hughey 1297).   If, in the 70s and 80s, the exalted masculinity of 
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Afrikaner discourse was the muscular, virile hero, Andrew represents that non-
reproductive man perceived as a threat to the white nation. He is a poster child of 
Afrikaner paranoia.7  
 And yet, Andrew’s crisis in masculinity actually legitimizes white patriarchy. 
Moreover, his crisis in masculinity is a salient location of The Gods’s ideological and 
aesthetic resonance with contemporary American primitivism. In Dances with Wolves 
(1990), a wounded white male finds physical and spiritual redemption among the 
disappearing Indians of the American West. In The Last Samurai (2004), an emotionally-
crippled veteran finds solace with the vanishing samurai of fin-de-siècle Japan. In Avatar 
(2009), a white, paraplegic soldier regains the use of his legs by going native. In all of 
these films, the white, male body is the primary location of suffering. As Sally Robinson 
argues in Marked Men, the white man as victim in popular culture is a manifestation of 
anxieties about the erosion of white patriarchy in the wake of the civil rights and 
liberationist movements of the 1960s. As Robinson argues, white male privilege has 
masked its continued dominance through an ironic misappropriation of victimhood. In the 
substitution of vulnerability for dominance, the misappropriation of victimhood dismisses 
challenges to white patriarchy (Robinson 6-11). Moreover, because crisis structures 
masculinity as something to be achieved through heroic struggle, these texts all privilege 
white masculinity by making its crisis central to narrative. The Gods Must Be Crazy and 
the other films of this dissertation take their narrative trajectories from the crisis and 
transcendence of white masculinity. This is the manner in which Andrew Steyn works for 
hegemonic whiteness and hegemonic masculinity. In sum, any text which recenters white 
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masculinity as its preeminent narrative concern will forfeit its capacity to do postcolonial 
work (Yekani 36-40).   
In her discussion of masculinity in American culture after the 1960s, Robinson 
argues that the figure of the physically wounded or castrated male is an embodiment of 
“what is felt to be the real condition of white masculinity in post-liberationist culture” 
(6). Thus, in the United States and South Africa after the 1960s, the image of the white 
male victim became a powerful technique of hegemonic masculinity because it played to 
public beliefs about real social conditions. If Andrew doesn’t live up to an exalted form 
of apartheid masculinity, he expresses the Afrikaner paranoia that whiteness is under 
assault. Andrew’s kindness, benevolence, and timidity all put him in a relationship to the 
masculine ideal that dismisses challenges to white minority rule. In The Gods, concern 
over colonial violence towards indigenous people is displaced by anxiety over hetero-
reproductive masculinity and the consummation of a white sexual relationship, exactly 
those concerns which plagued the Afrikaner regime in the 1970s and 1980s.      
Aesthetics of the Omnipotent Male: Classical Hollywood Style and Ethnotopia 
 And yet, the utter emasculation of the white male is too much pressure for The 
Gods to bear. Indeed, the film recuperates symptoms of castration through a threefold 
aesthetic and narrative disavowal which depends on 1) the aesthetics of an omnipotent 
gaze, 2) classical Hollywood style, and 3) the logic of the racial chase film. 
In the voiceover of its introductory sequence, The Gods immediately constructs an 
omnipotent, white, masculine viewing position as a British anthropologist lectures 
authoritatively over footage of the Kalahari Desert. The structuring of this panoptical, 
colonial viewer depends on the invisibility of the off-screen anthropologist vis-à-vis the 
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visible black bodies of the colonizer’s gaze. The invisibility of the British narrator 
establishes white, masculine hegemony through the construction of white masculinity as 
an invisible norm. The invisibility of whiteness locates difference in non-white others 
because these others bear the mark of visible race. Finally, the invisibility of whiteness 
harmonizes the ideal of Enlightenment objectivity with the colonizer’s gaze: the 
disembodiedness of whiteness allows its regard for embodied others to attain an 
otherwise impossible objectivity (Robinson 1-8; Dyer 1-3, 38-39).  
And yet, disembodiedness haunts whiteness because it threatens corporeal 
disappearance. The aspiration of whiteness to masquerade as a lack of race is realized in 
the literal invisibility of the disembodied narrator throughout the film. In 
contradistinction to this disembodiment, the film tacitly affirms that blackness is the 
proper color of carnality. As such, the film affirms that the black body is the proper 
object of the cinematic gaze and ethnographic knowledge. Like the one-way mirror of an 
interrogation room, the invisibility of whiteness in The Gods is the symbol and facilitator 
of an asymmetrical power and gazing relationship: “invisibility [is] a privilege enjoyed 
by social groups who do not, thus, attract modes of surveillance and discipline” 
(Robinson 3).  
It is from an omnipotent point of view that the film’s first image, a map of 
Southern Africa as seen from outer space, reiterates the narrative and aesthetic tropes of 
colonialism and Eurocentrism (Figure 4). The image of the map foregrounds a 
Eurocentric perspective of global geography through the reiteration of a polar orientation 
that subordinates South to North. This type of map privileges England as a geographic 
center, while exaggerating the size of more northerly countries relative to their equatorial 
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counterparts. The God’s initial image establishes 
the primordial technology of colonial knowledge 
power, the map, while conflating the colonial 
technology of the map with the power of the 
cinematic gaze 
In turn, The Gods constructs the cinematic 
viewing position as an omnipotent, masculine 
whiteness.8  In The Gods, the cinema grants the 
final satisfaction of the colonial ambition for 
visual omnipresence. As Jean-Louis Baudry writes 
in regard to the moving camera; “if the eye which 
moves is no longer fettered by a body, by the laws 
of matter and time, if there are no more assignable 
limits to its displacement – conditions fulfilled by 
the possibilities of shooting and of film – the 
world will be constituted not only by this eye but 
for it” (350). In the regime of the colonizer’s gaze, 
the world will be constituted for the white male 
eye, exactly the ideological effect of The Gods’s 
opening sequence. 
 The transcendental mobility of the 
colonizer’s gaze is emphasized in the film’s first 




cinematic spectator from twenty five miles above the earth to a long shot of grazing 
ungulates in the Kalahari Desert. This reframing shot is the paradigmatic nucleus of the 
film’s ideological and aesthetic mode. 9 First, the omnipotence of the camera’s 
movement, in conjunction with its identification with the white male gaze, works as a 
preemptive redemption of Andrew’s compromised masculinity, and, in particular, his 
compromised mobility. Second, the identification of the radically mobile camera with 
colonial masculinity means that the film’s editing structure of convergent montage is 
continuously surveyed by a panoptical white masculinity. The colonizer’s gaze redeems 
white masculinity through the management of a heteronormative, classical Hollywood 
aesthetic.      
After descending from the heavens, the film’s voice-of-god narrator lectures for a 
presumably Anglo-European audience. Throughout, the narrator genders this colonial 
encounter through the masculinization of the camera’s gaze and the feminization of 
colonial space and people. The land is harsh, beautiful, empty, and virginal. The narration 
carries the implication that this land is available for the exertion of male effort. This is the 
standard gendering of the colonial encounter (Shohat 20-23; McClintlock 22-30; Dyer 
153-165). As an extension of this gendering, the narrator uses a series of emasculating 
adjectives to characterize the Bushmen of the Kalahari. As the narrator intones the 
adjectives “pretty, dainty, small and graceful,” two prepubescent boys wander into the 
field of the camera’s gaze. The boys are nude except for the straps of their loincloths. In 
the next shot, the boys walk between two adult male Bushmen crouched in labor. As the 
boys pass between the men, the men’s gaze tracks the boys’ passage across the expanse 
of the frame, doubling the gaze of the camera and signifying the primitive male body’s 
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to-be-looked-at-ness.10 This on-screen doubling of the colonizer’s gaze highlights the 
racial discrepancy of cinematic gazing. Whereas the black eye performs an embodied 
look located in time and space, the white eye is disembodied and omnipotent.11  
 The most astounding shot of the introductory sequence involves the intersection 
of overtly erotic cinematography with the rhapsodic primitivism of the lecturer. As he 
exclaims that these must be “the most contented people in the world: they have no crime, 
no punishment, no violence no laws, no police, judges, rulers, or bosses,” the camera cuts 
to a medium shot of the band of Bushmen in single file, walking away from the camera 
(Figure 5).12 Because this shot decapitates the non-white body, truncating the human 
form at the shoulder, it evacuates these characters of their personhood while objectifying 
the black body. Having deprived the ethnographic object of its organs of vision, the gaze 
of the camera lingers on the buttocks of the primitive as the Bushmen peacefully traverse 
the desiccated landscape.  
Figure 5. Erotic Gazing in The Gods. 
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This combination of images and narration establishes the colonial, phallocentric 
viewing position which presides over the film’s classical Hollywood style. If Andrew 
struggles to attain his sexual goals, his masculinity is buttressed by 1) the omnipotence of 
the colonizer’s gaze and 2) the totality of information offered to the cinematic spectator 
through the techniques of classical Hollywood style, here harmonized with the mastery of 
the colonizer’s gaze. 
While it may seem far removed from Bringing Up Baby (1938) or Casablanca 
(1942), The Gods’s co-construction of race, sexuality, and masculinity depends on the 
film’s affinities with classical Hollywood style. As typified in The Gods, this style 
presupposes an omnipotent viewer, capable of total knowledge, who presides over a 
world where mastery is guaranteed by the conventions of the style. David Bordwell’s 
conception of the classical style is a natural model for The Gods: “most important is the 
tendency of the classical film to render narrational omniscience through spatial 
omnipresence” (24 [emphasis in original]). The classical Hollywood viewing position is 
structurally homologous with the colonizer’s gaze because the ethnographic viewing 
position carries a similar guarantee of optical mastery, what Bill Nichols calls 
“ethnotopia” (220). Within the codes of classical Hollywood style, the audience identifies 
with an omnipotent subject, represses the lack of the editorial cut, and fantasizes totality 
by means of the sutures of continuity editing. This fantasy of mastery is made possible by 
the convention that the audience is always in the best position to see what happens next, 
and always sees the most significant part of a narrative’s action. Similarly, in Bill 
Nichol’s analysis of filmic ethnography, the colonial viewing position enjoys the 
pleasures of an uninhibited fantasia, the total satisfaction of its colonial scopophilia 
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(Nichols 201-229). This optical mastery is The Gods’s first strategy for the recuperation 
of the castrated male.  
Its second strategy involves another of the norms of classical Hollywood style: the 
means by which a romantic subplot manages cinematic time.13 The Gods’s narrative and 
aesthetic conceit is that !Xi’s quest to dispose of a malevolent Coke bottle and Andrew’s 
pursuit of Kate Thompson eventually coalesce when Kate is abducted by communist 
revolutionaries, Andrew rescues !Xi from the horrors of modernity, and Andrew and !Xi 
collaborate in Kate Thompson’s rescue. In concert with the aesthetics of optical mastery, 
this narrative and cinematic structure has a striking ideological consequence: the film’s 
transcendental white viewing position presides over a racially coded convergent montage. 
In turn, the logic of the racial chase film manages the narrative’s diegetic time, and the 
heteronormative vector of this diegetic time serves as a local microcosm of a global, 
Eurocentric progress narrative. In short, white heterosexual resolution and the linear 
progress of the racial chase film work as a classical Hollywood variant of Johannes 
Fabian’s denial of coevalness: the anthropologist’s refusal to accept his racial other as 
anything but an anachronistic remnant of a previous era in human development (Fabian 
31). 
Heterosexism, Convergent Montage, and the Racial Chase  
After the somewhat plotless establishment of Andrew’s sexual inadequacy, the 
film supplements the abstract axis of its primitive : modern binary with the local, linear 
time of the racial chase film. This sequence begins with an utterly abhorrent distortion of 
the 1977 Soweto student uprising, in which hundreds of student protesters were 
mercilessly slaughtered by an unprovoked South African police force. In The Gods it is 
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not the apartheid regime which threatens schoolchildren, but, predictably, the specter of 
black international communism (Davis 85-87). The abduction of Kate Thompson and her 
schoolchildren transforms the film’s parallel editing into the convergent montage of the 
racial chase film while simultaneously equating the consummation of the film’s 
heteronormative romantic trajectory with the victory of whiteness over black 
communism, themes which preoccupied Afrikaner public discourse in the 1970s and 80s.  
In managing the racial chase film with the heterosexual vector of the romantic 
quest, The Gods follows The Birth of a Nation (1915) and King Kong (1933).  As Susan 
Courtney argues in Hollywood Fantasies of Miscegenation, continuity editing and the 
chase film emerged simultaneously as cinematic norms. More importantly, she writes that 
these aesthetic norms came to be managed almost immediately by a distinctly racial 
grammar. In her analysis, the racial chase film was at the very origin of narrative cinema 
and continuity editing; “Just as the chase is suited to the elaboration of narrative filmic 
forms – in particular here continuity editing, which joins a series of spaces to create the 
narrative unfolding of events – stories of interracial abduction and captivity are suited to 
the chase” (Courtney 28).  
Taking The Birth of a Nation as a specific example of how miscegenation 
narratives were foundational to the emergence of classical Hollywood style, Courtney 
observes that the film mapped the time management of convergent montage onto the 
recently standardized  grammar of the chase film: white men saving white women from 
black men. The great ideological work of this scheme is that it occludes the history of the 
sexual exploitation of black women under slavery while simultaneously using the myth of 
the black rapist to justify the violence and oppression of white supremacy (Courtney 63). 
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I extend Courtney’s thesis to a reading of King Kong (1933). King Kong’s diegetic time is 
managed with the same racially mapped convergent montage as The Birth of a Nation 
when the film’s proper sexual relationship is threatened by the overwhelming masculinity 
of its great black antagonist. Moreover, the film reinforces the local narrative of the 
miscegenation rescue with the global time of the primitive : modern binary. In doing so, 
Kong superimposes two indirect images of time as theorized by Gilles Deleuze. In 
Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Deleuze juxtaposes the American montage of D.W. 
Griffith with the Soviet montage of Sergei Eisenstein, observing that American montage 
is essentially a montage of time management. He writes that what emerges from the 
American aesthetic is not a direct image of time, but instead “a necessarily indirect 
image. … Montage … is the indirect image of time, of duration” (29). Finding the origin 
of this aesthetic mode in Griffith, Deleuze writes that montage may create two indirect 
images of time: the global time of human progress, and the time of the last-minute rescue, 
that structure of diegetic time which defines the convergent montage of The Birth of a 
Nation (29-30). Like King Kong, The Gods uses the convergent montage of the racial 
chase film to superimpose both of these indirect images of time.   
Of course, given the demands of hegemonic masculinity, hegemonic whiteness, 
and the denial of coevalness, this cinematic management of time is anything but value 
free. In King Kong (1933), Carl Denham inflects the primitive : modern binary with 
evaluative metaphors of space and height when he explains that the natives’ protective 
wall was “built so long ago that the people who lived there have slipped back and 
forgotten the higher civilization that built it.” Indeed, the victory of high modernity over 
low primitivism is dramatized in Kong’s crucifixion on that catharsis of modern, phallic 
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emotion, the Empire State Building.14 In Peter Jackson’s remake of King Kong (2005), 
the racial chase film, its convergent montage, and the verbal discourse of temporal elitism 
reappear: as Denham and company discover the ruins of Skull Island, the ship’s mate 
narrates these famous lines from Heart of Darkness; “We could not understand because 
we were too far and could not remember, because we were travelling in the night of first 
ages, of those ages that are gone, leaving hardly a sign – and no memories” (Quoted in 
Kong).  Thus, King Kong’s racial chase is managed by heteronormative vectors of white 
romance. Moreover, these vectors are superimposed on global narratives of the primitive: 
modern binary. Both in King Kong (1933) and its 2005 remake, Kong’s defeat by 
modernity is co-terminal with the consummation of a heterosexual whiteness. This 
temporal confluence is crucial to the ideology of The Gods. 
However, in turning to the heterosexual terminus of The Gods’s classical 
Hollywood trajectory, we must observe that Andrew Steyn and his primitive retainer 
engage in a scene of veiled homoeroticism in the service of heterosexual closure. First, 
Andrew contrives a plot to free Kate and her students by anesthetizing their captors with 
a tiny bow and tranquilizer-laden needles. Having attired his Bushman in the clothes of 
an escaped female student, Steyn proffers his buttocks as a test target for !Xi’s dart. In 
this three-quarters medium shot, !Xi appears in drag on the left of the screen. Gazing 
intently at his target, he successfully launches his diminutive shaft. In the background, 
Andrew’s Arabic mechanic looks on, doubling the gaze of the cinematic spectator while 
also reiterating the embodiment of a non-white gaze. To the far right of the screen we see 
only Andrew’s bent back, his bent knee, and the curve of his buttocks in his tight grey 
trousers. The instant before the dart finds its target, the camera cuts to an extreme close-
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up of Andrew’s backside (Figure 6). This extreme close-up is maintained for a fraction of 
a second and immediately disavowed with a medium shot in which Steyn rubs his stuck 
flesh and stands erect.   
Given the use of women’s clothing, phallic imagery, and the allusion to anal 
penetration, this scene manifests Freudian notions of sexuality vis-à-vis the primitive. 
David Eng writes that, in colonial discourse, masculinity, heterosexuality, and whiteness 
connote one another in a hierarchy of racial difference which denies non-white males full 
access to normative masculinity. For the ur-text of his cultural analysis, Eng draws on the 
armchair anthropology of Totem and Taboo. Here, Freud writes that primitive people 
represent a stage from the history of civilization’s psychic past, and that this stage is 
characterized by a pathological, narcissistic homosexuality (Eng 6-10). As uncanny as it 
may seem, South African psychologists were explicit in their use of Freud’s theories of 
sexual and racial evolution. Within the heterosexist and racist orthodoxies of South 
African psychology during the era of high-apartheid, psychiatrists explicitly invoked 
Freud’s theory of pathological narcissism to argue for the arrested development of white 
homosexuals (Jones 406; Freed 1022-1023).  




In contrast to the pathology of white homosexuality, same-sex relations among 
black Africans were considered a natural expression of Africans’ regressive evolutionary 
character, and enjoyed a history of relatively lenient regulation by the South African 
authorities (Jones 407; Botha and Cameron 8). In fact, the Afrikaner regime encouraged 
sexual relations between black laborers as a method by which the threats of black 
sexuality, interracial sexual relations, and African fecundity could be conveniently 
assuaged (Elder 56-62).  
In a striking example of The Gods’s ideological affinities with contemporary 
American primitivism, nearly identical models of evolutionary psychology manage the 
denial of coevalness in Avatar (2009). In The Uncanny, Freud writes that omnipotence of 
consciousness, a state in which the infant believes his thoughts to saturate his 
environment, characterizes the mental state of civilized children and adult primitives; “it 
appears that we have all, in the course of our individual development, been through a 
phase corresponding to the animistic phase in the development of primitive peoples, that 
this phase did not pass without leaving behind in us traces that can still make themselves 
felt." This phase of omnipotence of thought is characterized by "the old animistic view of 
the universe, by the omnipotence of thought and the technique of magic that relied on it” 
(Freud, Uncanny 147). According to Avatar’s primitive : modern binary, the 
protagonist’s journey from a civilized to a primitive state precipitates his experience of 
omnipotence of thought and cosmic consciousness (Norton 4-5).  
The juxtaposition of the homo- and hetero-erotic in the The Gods’s denouement 
activates the anxieties which beset white power in 1970s South Africa.  In the defense of 
white heterosexuality against the clutches of black communism, our white hero finds 
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himself compromised by the threat of his latent, pathological homosexuality.  As a 
response to these anxieties, the film activates an implicit global narrative by means of the 
vehicle of its classical Hollywood vector: the Freudian teleology of psycho-sexual 
development is advanced in the same moment as the satisfaction of the hetero-romantic 
quest and the miscegenation rescue. If healthy human development means the 
abandonment of a narcissistic love object for the assumption of a heterosexual one, The 
Gods reinforces the notion of primitive anachronism because its romantic narrative gives 
time a heteronormative vector. In The Gods, heterosexist diegetic time mirrors the 
heterosexual trajectories of Freud and the apartheid regime. 
 In the scenes preceding this homoerotic detour to heterosexual closure, !Xi spots 
the communists and their hostages on their cross-country trek. Having already set up a 
base of operations to telescopically observe the valley through which Kate and her 
captors walk, Andrew and company are free to scrutinize the rebels and their hostages 
through a large white telescope, a phallic signifier of white scopophilia par excellence. 
Andrew’s observation of the communists and their hostages is framed as a point of view 
shot through Andrew’s telescope. The shots of this sequence alternate clearly enough: 
Shot A is a long shot of the hostage scenario, Shot B is a medium shot of Andrew and his 
retainers at the telescope (Figure 7). 
Theorizing the motivation and effect of parallel editing, Mary Ann Doane writes 
that such splits represent the desire to overcome physical separation:  
suspense is predicated on absence or separation and driven by an external threat to 






constitutive of desire. … in parallel editing, when shot B is on the screen its 
legibility is saturated by the absent presence of shot A, and vice versa. (195)   
When Andrew telescopically investigates his others, the shots of him at the telescope 
signify the absence of what is off screen, a white woman in the clutches of black men. It 
is in this context of the miscegenation plot that convergent montage transforms the film’s 
mundane real time (the homogenous, empty time of the long shot) into the cinematically 
managed time of the rescue, exemplified in early examples of classical continuity editing 
such as The Birth of a Nation (Doane 192-194). 
Thus, Andrew Steyn, like the voice-of-god narrator, engages in an omnipotent 
surveillance which harmonizes his look with the cross-cutting look of convergent 
montage. The gap between shots and the anticipation of its closure manage the time of 
the film through the aesthetic code of the convergent montage. Separation, the look 
Figure 7. Convergent Montage. 
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which bridges it, and the suspension of romantic closure, express and manage racial and 
sexual threats. For Andrew, it is the threat of a regressive homosexuality; for Kate 
Thompson, the threat of miscegenation. For the white couple, it is the threat of failing to 
reproduce their whiteness in a land of black fecundity, communism, and homosexuality. 
Writing that the temporality of cinema is figured by the teleology of death, and that this 
death is often metonymically represented by the figure of the imperiled female, Doane 
argues that “it is the mechanism of heterosexuality which ensures her salvation” (196). 
As we have seen from a review of the discourse of Afrikaner nationalism, it was exactly 
the mechanism of white heterosexuality which the apartheid regime constructed as a 
bulwark against the onslaught of communism, blackness, and homosexual degeneracy. 
If considered in conjunction with the South African psychiatric orthodoxy of 
homosexuality, the romantic union in The Gods is a heterosexual salvation predicated on 
a temporal structure which manages race. Consider Doane: 
The compulsive replaying of the scenario of the heterosexual union exploits its 
mishaps and potential misses, energizing time and giving it direction. Anxieties 
about the rationalization of time in modernity, about the confrontation of racial 
otherness, about emerging instability of gender identity, can be allayed by the 
insistent repetition of an imperative, normative, and fully realizable 
heterosexuality that overcomes division itself. (196) 
In The Gods, the union of parallel narratives does not simply overcome the gap between 
white lovers, it disavows the desires and anxieties of the white psyche vis-à-vis its racial 
other. The “mishaps and potential misses” of The Gods are threats of miscegenation and 
homosexuality which, because they are figured within the narrative structure of 
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convergent montage, doubly energize time and give it direction. Whereas Andrew 
transcends his latent homosexuality and achieves the progress assured by the norms of 
classical Hollywood style, his primitive counterpart achieves no such progress, returning 
instead to a state of primitive affluence, returning indeed to the static, eternal Eden of 
apartheid mythology. Andrew’s great crisis, as an Afrikaner male, is that his desire to 
return to a previous state, what Afrikaner discourse defined as a regressive 
homosexuality, represents an existential threat in the political and demographic context of 
South Africa in the late 1970s. As a response to this threat, The Gods employs classical 
Hollywood style to bind the traumas of miscegenation anxiety and homosexuality with 
the vector of heterosexual progress. In doing so, The Gods secures the primitive in a 
Western past while allowing for the viability of a white reproductive future in South 
Africa. 
Mobility, Whiteness, and the Temporal Axis of the Colonial Imaginary 
Richard Dyer writes that Western representations take whiteness as a human 
universal through the construal of whiteness as a lack of racial specificity. In turn, this 
lack of racial specificity means that white bodies are less corporeal than their non-white 
others because the racial mark is a mark of the body. Rather than denoting a bodily 
quality, whiteness denotes a special quality of spirit, that which is beyond the body (Dyer 
21). Because whiteness is essentially spiritual, rather than bodily, the quality of white 
enterprise is haunted by the anxiety that whiteness is a sign of death. While non-white 
people are more fully embodied, they are confined to the corporeal. Within such a 
schema, whites are conceived as less embodied than other races, less corporeal. This 
schema is dramatized in The Gods by both the immateriality of the omnipresent white 
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gaze and Andrew Steyn’s motor inhibition.  As Andrew’s sexual problems suggest, 
schemes of whiteness that assume disembodiedness may figure white people as having 
less facility with sex than their non-white counterparts. As such, white people are 
threatened with white death: 
Inter-racial (non-white on white rape) is represented as bestiality storming the 
citadel of civilization – but this often implies that sexuality itself is bestial and 
antithetical to civilization, itself achieved and embodied by whites. What is 
disclosed by this is the conundrum of sexuality for whites, the difficulty they have 
over the very mechanism that ensures their racial survival and purity, heterosexual 
reproduction. To ensure the survival of the race, they have to have sex – but 
having sex, and sexual desire, are not very white: the means of reproducing 
whiteness are not themselves pure white. This is the logic behind the commonly 
found anxiety that the white race will fade away. (Dyer 26) 
Dyer may as well be describing Afrikanerdom’s reproductive paranoia and the expression 
of this paranoia in the miscegenation rescue in The Gods. Let me suggest that Dyer’s 
analysis also has a lot to tell us about the temporal axis of the colonial imaginary (Figure 
8).  
This temporal axis is an elaboration of the analogical dictum with which I started 
this chapter: “man is to woman as white is to black.” My schematic visualizes the 




Second, this graphic is meant to highlight the fact that the polar terms of these 
complimentary axes are interchangeable and co-significatory. As such, it represents the 
structure of race, sexuality, and time which manages the redemption of white masculinity 
in The Gods. Most importantly, I want to use the ambiguous location of mobility and 
immobility as a means for harmonizing psychoanalytic and colonial temporalities with 
Richard Dyer’s understanding of race and embodiment. 
As Dyer would predict, sex is not a spontaneous possibility for Andrew Steyn and 
Kate Thompson because sexuality belongs to the body and the body is black. Seeing as 
Andrew ascribes his motor incompetence to “some Freudian syndrome,” and seeing as 
we can implicate him, by the text’s logic, in a regressive homosexual relationship with 
his primitive other, I posit that Andrew’s neurotic motor incompetence is an expression 
of a desire to return to a previous state of sexual and racial potency. It is also, 
paradoxically, a desire to regress to the infantile state of Lacan’s mirror stage and the 
Figure 8. The Temporal Axis of the Colonial Imaginary.  
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physical incompetence of that earlier state.15 In the case of The Gods, the alienating 
gestalt in the apartheid mirror is the racial other, the sublimely embodied Bushman of the 
Kalahari. Of course, Andrew’s neurotic motor inhibition is expressed in moments of 
heterosexual threat, a neurotic timing which indicates the regressive character of his 
primitive homosexuality. 
 In considering Andrew’s regressive crisis, it may help to consider the co-
signifying terms of the colonial temporal axis in a more properly psychoanalytic way. In 
classical psychoanalysis, the association of objects in the unconscious allows for the free 
transferal of desire from one term to the next. When the desire for any object is forbidden 
or repressed, the psyche compensates with the substitution of an associated object. As 
Dyer observes, pre-occupation with non-white on white rape implies that “sexuality is 
bestial and antithetical to civilization” (26). As Sandra Gilman suggests, “projection of 
sexuality onto dark races was a means for whites to represent yet dissociate themselves 
from their own desires” (Quoted in Dyer 28). In The Gods, sex between white people is 
deferred and displaced by a sexual encounter with the primitive because sex is not the 
proper province of white people. Within a psychic regime of whiteness, desire for the 
white woman must be repressed and displaced onto the primitive male because white 
reproduction requires the satisfaction of a desire that is not properly white.  
Alternatively, male colonial desire manifests in ways which actively associate the 
feminine with the land-to-be-conquered, a process demonstrated in the engraving of 
Theodore Galle after a drawing by Jan Van Der Straet (ca. 1575) (Figure 9) (Farber).  
This too is at play in The Gods. If white is to black as male is to female, we might predict 
that the primitive male would be the target of a homoerotic attraction, especially given 
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that black otherness is analogous to sexual otherness and blackness is the proper domain 
of the body and sexual pleasure. When Freud finds the primitive to be the proper domain 
of the homoerotic, it is not that he tells us something of the human condition; rather, he 
signals the co-signifying pole of the temporal axis of the colonial imaginary. The Gods’s 
great symptom of this co-signification is the absence of a primitive female body. 
Andrew’s two ‘others’ are an explicitly feminized primitive male and a white female. It is 
telling that the ‘other’ with whom the 
colonizer’s gaze does not interact, except 
in the briefest of clips, is the black female 
body. The absence of the feminine 
primitive in The Gods suggests that any 
erotic energy the white gaze may usually 
invest in this figure will instead be 
invested in the primitive masculine, here 
distinctly coded as a feminized object vis-à-vis a white male gaze.  
While this homoeroticism seems a natural result of the co-signifying structure of 
colonial desire, the film explicitly encourages us to take a Freudian view of Andrew’s 
blocked heterosexuality. Freud would have it that the film’s homoerotic desire is 
pathological. And yet, this pathological desire is the device by which The Gods privileges 
a narrative of whiteness and white masculinity. Specifically, The Gods grants a white 
male the privilege of a dark, sexual pathology. As Richard Dyer writes, the archetypal 
structure of white masculinity involves a narrative of darkness and white transcendence: 




Dark desires are part of the story of whiteness, but as what the whiteness of 
whiteness has to struggle against. Thus it is that the whiteness of white men 
resides in the tragic quality of their giving way to darkness and the heroism of 
their channeling or resisting it. The really white man’s destiny is that he has 
further to fall (into darkness) but can aspire higher (towards the light). There is a 
further twist. Not to be sexually driven is liable to cast a question mark over a 
man’s masculinity – the darkness is a sign of his true masculinity, just as his 
ability to control it is a sign of his whiteness – but there can be occasions when 
either side discredits the other, the white man’s masculinity ‘tainting’ his 
whiteness or his whiteness emasculating him. These contradictions constitute the 
fertile ground for the production of stories and images of a white masculinity seen 
as exemplary of the human condition. (28)  
In running the risk of a dark, black, or primitive homosexuality, Andrew validates his 
manliness by borrowing the sexual potency and embodiment imparted to blacks by the 
colonial imaginary. Moreover, the threat of black homosexuality gives the white male a 
darkness to overcome, a bestial sexuality to transcend. In his affliction, Andrew walks 
through the valley of the shadow of a passionate darkness: this is his crisis of whiteness.  
Indeed, Andrew’s surname, “Steyn,” suggests that he must overcome a dark stain on his 
heterosexual whiteness. 
This aspirational structure is The Gods’s greatest slight to its black characters, for 
it locates the true threat to white survival within the split condition of the white hero. As 
Dyer observes, and as The Gods makes clear, the greatest threat to white reproduction is 
never black people, for this would accord them “qualities of will and skill, of exercising 
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spirit, which would make them the equivalent of white people” (Dyer 35). It is for this 
reason that fixation on the crisis of white masculinity is such a great ideological coup. 
Like in Avatar, the struggle is not really a matter of indigenous people vs whites, but of 
white people against themselves and against one another. While white protagonists in 
cinematic primitivism struggle against their internal demons and transcend internal 
struggles, victory over the non-white, or the inevitability of the vanishing native, is a 
matter of course: it is merely the cruel but inevitable historical progress of manifest 
destiny. In like manner, The Gods is not really about a white man saving a white woman 
from black men. This is simply a generic narrative structure of colonial fiction, a familiar 
plot device we may as well take for granted, scaffolding for another story. The story is 
really about the transcendence of masculine whiteness and the crisis of white male 
sexuality.           
 The Gods compulsively repeats the centrality of the white male crisis with a 
seemingly nonsensical, repetitive phrase. In the moments of his grossest motor 
incompetence, Andrew utters the helpless refrain “eye-yie-yie-yie-eye-yie-yie.” 
Andrew’s refrain rhymes with the first person singular pronoun “I,” practically insisting 
on white narcissism. Andrew first utters this phrase on his first trip to meet Kate 
Thompson when his vehicle bogs down in the muck. Andrew utters the phrase, matter-of-
factly clambers behind his vehicle, and pushes the still-running jeep out of the mud. In 
the course of his effort, Andrew falls face first into the wet brown muck, launches his 
jeep out of the sinkhole, and is compelled to chase the autonomously traveling car. In this 
scene, we are treated to a mélange of images, narrative, and text which mark Andrew’s 
regressive character. First, the scene is a paroxysm of motor incompetence motivated by 
  
70 
the first intimations of a romantic subplot. Indeed, when Andrew is asked by the reverend 
(played by Jamie Uys) to retrieve Kate, Andrew insists, “Ooohh reverend I’m very 
awkward around women. When I’m in the presence of a lady my brain switches off or 
something. I turn into a complete idiot.” Second, this is the moment in The Gods when 
Andrew is at his least white: his whiteness is literally besmirched or obscured by mud 
(Figure 10). In his pursuit of a heterosexual effort, Andrew is regressive both in his motor 
ability, his capacity for articulate speech, and in his color: in his neurotic avoidance of 
heterosexual reproductive success, Andrew is at his most primitive. After regaining 
control of his truck, Andrew is shown in close-medium profile, reduced to a primitive, 
pre-lingual state, or what we might recognize as Lacan’s infant: he is one without 
language. Once more reiterating his infantile refrain, positively shouting the phrase into 
the wilderness, Andrew can only affirm his helplessness, while simultaneously drawing 
attention to himself.   
In the following scene, Andrew’s first rendezvous with Kate, his filthy, clumsy 
masculinity is met with the horror and skepticism of a notably white Kate Thompson. 
Figure 10. Andrew Steyn in Blackface. 
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Indeed, the male : female binary of their confrontation  may as well be coded along the 
same axis as the colonial temporal imaginary. Her whiteness and the whiteness of her 
dress signify not only the matrimonial, but, in contrast with Andrew, the very absence of 
the carnal sexuality which the colonial imaginary locates in the bestial, the primitive, and 
the masculine. Kate, as immaculate woman, is that custodian of the properly white –
whiteness free of the filth of the body (Figure 11). Regarding dirt, whiteness, and white 
sexuality, Richard Dyer builds on the work of Joel Kovel, who argues that white people’s 
attitudes toward race and dirt were an extension of Martin Luther’s emphasis on the split 
between God and those parts of humanity which are worthless for their embodiedness: 
‘the body is dirty; what comes out of the body is especially dirty; the material 
world corresponds to what comes out of the body, and hence is also especially 
dirty.’ … It is in this context that Kovel makes his most vivid argument about 
race. Non-white people are associated in various ways with the dirt that comes out 
of the body, notably in the repeated racist perception that they smell. … To be 
white is to have expunged all dirt, faecal or otherwise, from oneself: to look white 
is to look clean. Whiteness … shows the dirt of the body. This is why it has such a 
privileged place in relation to things which are kept close to the body – bed sheets 
and clothes, especially underwear and shirts. … Bridal wear is a symbolically 
explicit case: it bespeaks the absence of sex, a dirt that is at once literal (sweat, 
semen, secretions and, in fantasies about virgins, blood) and moral; it also 
bespeaks the cleanliness of the wifely endeavor. … The importance of white 
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for men’s underwear and shirts may have to do with a sense that men are less 
clean than women and thus must strive more to be clean (as they must strive to be 
white), to show that they are clean, not to be discovered (in the proverbial rode 
accident) to be unclean. ( Dyer 76-77) 
The Gods makes explicit the relationship of white masculinity to feces; our first 
introduction to Andrew is a scene of him at work in the backcountry, collecting manure 
for his doctoral thesis on the wildlife of southern Africa. Indeed, Andrew’s is a whiteness 
variously compromised, a whiteness tainted with a racial and a fecal darkness. Indeed, the 
first several scenes of Andrew and Kate’s relationship revolve around an obsession with 
cleanliness which assumes a gendered axis of filth. At the moment of their first touch, a 
still-muddy Andrew thinks twice before transferring his earthy non-whiteness to Kate’s 
immaculate hand. Andrew subsequently drops his hat, runs awkwardly back to maintain 
the flagging operations of his jeep, and returns to shake hands with Kate, a greeting 
which only succeeds after several excruciating fits and starts. This sexual dynamic will 
define Andrew and Kate’s relationship throughout the film, and is typical of 
representations of whiteness and sexuality. 
 Whereas Andrew is preoccupied by heterosexual longing and suffers neurotically 
for his dark desires, Kate is stereotypically aloof, devoid of desire. In her lack of desire, 
Figure 11. Andrew and Kate Meet. 
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she is immaculately clean: she is the proper woman. As a version of the Virgin Mary, 
Kate Thompson is so purely white that she has no crisis of darkness to transcend, no 
narrative arc. Rather, her pristine virginity, her whiteness, is the preoccupation of both 
characters, as evinced in their journey from the rendezvous to Kate’s station at the 
mission school. When their jeep stalls in the middle of a river, Andrew offers to carry 
Kate in an effort to preserve the very whiteness of her hair, face, and costume. This effort 
is a failure of erotic pleasure: Kate gets wet. In a slapstick sequence rife with sexual 
innuendo and dominated by images of Kate in her now-transparent gown, Kate exhorts 
Andrew to “Watch it, Buster!”  It is as if Andrew’s sexuality can only find expression in 
acts of motor incompetence, for, having successfully forded the river, it is only then that 
Andrew inadvertently pushes Kate and himself into the water. It is as if he were impelled 
by some unconscious impulse, not only to fail at whiteness, but to pursue his 
heterosexuality through a primitive baptismal, a ritual of dirt. For Kate to become an 
acceptable erotic object, she must do more than get wet, she must also be dirty, less 
perfectly white.   
Finally, Andrew’s pathological utterance takes its full meaning in the film’s 
penultimate scene, Andrew and Kate’s much-deferred kiss in close-up. However, 
Andrew’s response to this kiss is the final indicator of his repressed homosexuality. 
Having resolved to explain his Freudian syndrome to Kate, Andrew stumbles helplessly 
over an array of baking supplies. In the course of this final neurotic spasm, Andrew is 
splashed across the face with pure white flower as if to insist on his whiteness, or his 
darkness, or his motor inhibition. After hearing Andrew’s hypothesis that his clumsiness 
is an interesting psychological phenomenon, Kate modifies his assertion; “Yes, you are 
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an interesting psychological phenomenon, and I think you’re very sweet.” In her 
expansion of Andrew’s hypothesis, Kate practically begs the viewer to read Andrew as a 
symptom of Afrikaner anxiety over white reproduction in South Africa. Particularly 
considering the imbrication of dirt and white powder as functions of the couple’s sexual 
problems, the summary of my psychoanalytic reading follows the analysis of Dyer; “To 
relinquish dirt and stains, corporeality and thingness, is also to relinquish both the 
pleasures of the flesh and the reproduction upon which whiteness as racial power 
depends” (81).   
But why, in this moment, should Kate find Andrew so very sweet?  Perhaps she 
finds him so attractive in this moment because he wears a whiteface which is a result of 
his whiteness. The very immobility which caused his face to be powdered signifies his 
lack of embodiment, his failure to move and dance as only the black body can. This white 
immobility is a signal that Andrew is the proper object of Kate’s affection. As such, 
immobility ceases to be a signifier of a regressive pathology, becoming instead a signifier 
of whiteness. Andrew’s immobility signals an internal contradiction, it is a signifier of 
whiteness and primitive regression. This contradiction takes an inverse form in an image 
of John Travolta which haunts the film in a throwaway image on a t-shirt in a colorful 
bazaar (Figure 12).  Dressed in his white 
leisure suit, Travolta is that supremely 
mobile sexual dynamo of the masculine 
sublime. But is he white? With his slick 
black hair and Italian heritage, he may be an 
affront to American puritanism, its 
Figure 12. John Travolta. 
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whiteness, and its ideals of sexual and bodily restraint. All the while, his white leisure 
suit seems to either insist on, or point up the contrast to, his relationship with whiteness. 
For Travolta, mobility is a signifier of sexual mastery, and of a liminal racial status 
associated with the disco underworld. Like Travolta’s character in Saturday Night Fever, 
Andrew Steyn has a relationship with mobility which allows him the privilege of 
participation in blackness and whiteness, which is really the broader privilege of mobility 
itself. As if to signal this privilege, Andrew’s motor problems literally stain him black 
and white. In turn, these obvious color signs indicate a racial temporality which allows 
Andrew, at least unconsciously, the privilege of a mobile racial identity. Stiffness and 
awkwardness in the white body, the inability to move and dance, are the stuff of 
proverbial racial humor – see Elaine Benes of Seinfeld, whose awkward dancing is 
juxtaposed with the smooth, rhythmic melodies of a world music ensemble and the 
incredulous scrutiny of its black flutist (Figure 13) (“The Little Kicks”). Of course, this 
humor is never truly at whites’ expense (Elaine is a corporate executive, her black 
watcher a street musician), because it always suggests that whiteness is not essentially of 
the body; rather, whiteness is a transcendental quality of spirit, ambition, intellect and 
enterprise. The crisis of whiteness, which is 
also its greatest privilege, is that it must 
transcend the body: white immobility is one 
signifier of that crisis and its transcendence. 
And yet, Andrew’s immobility is also a 
signal of a primitive, infantile, regressive 
character, as visualized in the scene of Andrew’s earthy blackface. Thus, Andrew’s 
Figure 13. “The Little Kicks.” 
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immobility signifies that whiteness is a human universal: the white body’s fits of 
immobility are atavistic remnants of the black body from which the white body is thought 
to evolve.  
The scene of Andrew and Kate’s kiss is a veritable tableau of white love and the 
dark desire it must transcend. Indeed, Andrew’s partial whiteface evokes the internal 
struggle between bodily darkness and white transcendence which we may trace to Jesus 
Christ, a man both transcendent and embodied.16 As an expression of this masculine 
archetype, Andrew’s powdering dramatizes the conflicted nature of white masculinity 
much after the fashion of the half-lit face. Even in his whiteface, Andrew is several 
shades darker than his romantic partner. Unlike Andrew, Kate is shot in the fullness of 
the light. Her entire face enjoys the unbroken glow of white light. Moreover, while 
Marius Weyers and Sandra Prinsloo are attired for visual symmetry, Prinsloo’s blouse is 
a lighter shade of blue. Finally, Prinsloo’s whiteness is neurotically insisted upon by her 
ivory-white neckless and sky blue eyes, while Weyers’s whiteness is undermined by 
grime on his upper lip, his cheek, and his jawline (Figure 14).17  
Figure 14. White Love. 
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The dialogue following the kiss, the film’s final line, is a breathy rendition of 
Andrew’s regressive exclamation: “I-yie-yei-yei-yei!” It is strange that this phrase, 
having been previously associated with Andrew’s blackface, motor incompetence, and 
linguistic regression, should now be his response to white heterosexuality. The repetition 
of this phrase suggests that sexuality and white masculinity endure a tenuous coexistence. 
Too much sexuality is a threat to whiteness, while too little is a threat to masculinity. 
Given the film’s political and demographic context, Andrew’s exclamation may simply 
indicate the horror with which Afrikaners regarded the link between white reproduction 
and white power. Let us accept that white reproduction, which depends on the 
confrontation of the masculine with the feminine, was a threat to the masculinist state. 
Andrew’s homoerotic detour is this masculinity’s disavowal of sexual difference for the 
fetish of the anachronistic primitive. Because The God’s so easily absorbs the racial other 
into the schema of colonial time, it displaces the threat of sexual difference with the 
domestication of a racial other.  
In making this claim, I follow Homi K. Bhabha’s psychoanalytic analysis of the 
white experience of racial difference. For the white ego, the apprehension of the racial 
other is a moment of profound anxiety. In the colonial encounter, the white ego must 
admit to an identity constituted by difference and lack (Bhabha 110). In The Gods, the 
difference of the white woman is too much for the white ego to bear. As a response to 
this threat, the white male ego activates the defense mechanism of the stereotype. 
According to Bhabha, the stereotype domesticates racial difference like the sexual fetish 
object denies sexual difference and the threat of castration (104-110). The foundational 
fetish of primitivism is the totalizing schema of colonial time. Within this schema, the 
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racial other is domesticated as an anachronistic same. It is this enlistment of history for 
the justification of colonialism which is the topic of Robert Young’s White Mythologies: 
Writing History and the West: 
Hegel articulates a philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a 
form of knowledge which uncannily simulates the project of 19th-century 
imperialism; the construction of knowledges which all operate through forms of 
expropriation and incorporation of the other mimics at a conceptual level the 
geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West. 
(3)  
Like the fetish objects of unilineal evolution or Hegelian dialectics, The Gods functions 
to remediate white anxiety of the racial other through its construction of a panoptical 
regime and primitive anachronism. The immobility of the white man vis-à-vis the 
mobility of the primitive body is only the first term of a paranoiac, Hegelian structure. 
Within the discourse of cinematic primitivism, the final ideal-ego is no on-screen 
character. Rather, he is that white masculine viewing position which presides over the 
ethnotopic and classical Hollywood styles.  
Finally, the colonizer’s gaze resolves the seeming contradiction of Andrew’s 
mobility. While Andrew’s immobility figures him sometimes in blackface, sometimes in 
white, an omnipotent mobility is reserved for the white eye which presides over all 
things. Indeed, this eye presides over the fixity of the primitive. The God’s final shot, an 
example now of divergent montage, is the return of !Xi to his primordial paradise, his 
land before time. Having sojourned successfully in the land of the gods, !Xi returns to a 
















1 For the original appearance of the term “convergent montage,” see Deleuze 29-32. 
 
2  As Keyan Tomaselli’s writes:  
A second source of the debates [about South African film] was, ironically, the international 
financial success of Jamie Uys’s The Gods Must Be Crazy. While the film itself drew attention to 
South African cinema, world interest was heightened by the campaign of anti-apartheid 
organizations to boycott the film. More column inches discussed the political character of this film 
than any other film ever made in South Africa: was it politics or entertainment? White South 
African audiences and critics, not surprisingly, saw the film as entertiainment, and few shared the 
overseas critique, from which they were, in any case, shielded. (Cinema 10) 
 
3 For a similar discussion of censorship of the Johnson-Jeffries Fight in the United States, see Courtney 50-
61.  
 
4 Ignoring and distorting black consciousness is what Uys would do best. Before turning to his wildly 
popular entertainment films of the 1970s, Uys wrote and directed two  propaganda films in the late 1950s: 
The Condemned are Happy (1958), and The Fox Has Four Eyes (1959). Produced by the Department of 
Information, these films demonstrate great narrative affinities with apartheid ideology and The Gods. The 
Fox Has Four Eyes reiterates the story of a tribal African’s temporary sojourn to the city. In this case, a 
man travels to the city to avenge the death of his daughter, the victim of a blood sacrifice motivated by the 
advice of the tribal medicine man. Once jailed for the attempted murder of the man he believes killed his 
daughter, the film’s protagonist comes under the benevolent tutelage of a white warden who teaches him 
the errors of tribal justice. In the film’s closing sequence, the protagonist dreams of returning to his tribe as 
the bearer of modern wisdom:  




I am learning many things, and I know that I will be a good farmer when I go home … I will teach 
my son the things I am learning in this prison, and we will have fat cattle and good crops. … And I 
will tell the men of my tribe that witch doctors are liars and robbers and murderers, but they will 
not believe me. 
Completely obscuring the political and economic realities of migrant labor, the film replaces economic 
necessity with African savagery. Moreover, white discipline and punishment are all to the good of the black 
sojourner, and eventually see him back to his tribe a better, more productive citizen.  
The Condemned Are Happy reiterates similar themes. Its narrative follows an impoverished tribal 
family who is forced to abandon its homeland due to severe drought. By the simple presence of drought, 
the film obscures the reality that the homelands experienced environmental degradation as a result of 
overcrowding and overuse after the Natives’ Land Act. The slummy township which accommodates these 
migrant workers when they do reach the city is treated as a spontaneous problem of overcrowding. Like 
Cry, The Beloved Country, the film addresses the slum dwellers’ moral degradation, but ignores the fact 
that the slum is a product of the legal segregation of metropolitan space. The film’s protagonist muses; 
“when people live so close together, the badness spreads from one man to all the men around him. Like a 
flame where the trees stand too close together.” The source of this “badness” is unclear, but it is certainly 
not apartheid oppression. In fact, the film’s white characters are a benevolent, liberating force, constructing 
proper homes on healthy plots of land. It is only when their slum plots are “condemned” by the white 
authorities that the black families of the film are moved to these more livable homes. Thus, the condemned 
are happy, and they have white rulers to thank.    
 
5 Dirkie’s premise is that a father sends his son to the wilderness as a remedy for his chronic respiratory 
ailment. Accompanied by his uncle, the young boy is left marooned in the Kalahari when his uncle’s 
sudden death results in the crash landing of their single-engine plane. Over sweeping aerial shots of the 
metropolis from which the young man and uncle initially fly, the uncle exhorts the young boy to consider 
the toxicity of the air and the profound corruption of the urban landscape which are the genesis of the boy’s 
malady. As they fly over the desert, these shots of the city give way to images of a sublime, primordial 
landscape: the proper arena for the actualization of masculine health. Thus, in its reiteration of a classic 
trope of the romantic colonial tradition, the unspoiled wilderness is that location of redemption for the 
white male adventurer. In establishing the rural : urban binary as an axis of masculine crisis and 
redemption, Dirkie prefigures The Gods in several important respects. First, the rural : urban binary is the 
spatialization of The Gods’s primitive : modern binary, as well as a crucial geographical axis in the broader 
ideology of apartheid’s migrant labor scheme, in which rural is to urban as primitive is to modern. Second, 
the film eschews any political commentary on the nature of apartheid in its representation of Bushmen as 
anachronistic savages, who, while not the cartoonish, pre-contact primitives of The Gods, seem to have 
avoided the displacement and disenfranchisement which had plagued the Bushmen for hundreds of years. 
This political amnesia is crucial because, like a similar dynamic in The Gods, it allows the film to focus its 
narrative on the crises of white masculinity: the survival of a young boy and the torment of a father who is 
forced to acknowledge that he may have never loved his son.  
 
6  For an in-depth analysis of white death, see Dyer chapters 1 and 6. 
 
7 As Conway writes; “As much as [Afrikaner] identity was construed as virile and strong, it was co-
dependent on a fear of being weak, compromising, and feminine” (428). 
 
8 For a similar analysis of the gendering of the colonizer’s gaze, see Shohat 27-29.  
 
9  As an indicator of this technique’s typicality, I point out that Uys uses the technique of the telescopic 
zoom several times in Animals Are Beautiful People. In many respects, the opening sequence of The Gods 
is a direct aesthetic and narrative extension of Uys’s work in this previous film. To the extent that The Gods 
would have worked as an erasure of colonial violence and the disenfranchisement of the Bushmen, I think 




American critics, while hostile to the politics of The Gods, often praised the film for its documentary value 
in its representation of the folkways of the Bushmen. As Lor writes: 
 
[The Gods’s] main virtues are its striking widescreen visuals of unusual locations, and the sheer 
educational value of its narration concerning the Bushmen and their folkways. In fact, the opening 
reel set deep in the Kalahari often resembles a low-budget, annotated version of “The Dawn of 
Man” opening segment of Stanley Kubrick’s “2001: A Space Odyssey,” but with the attractive 
Botswana people playing themselves rather than having men in ape suits enacting the roles of 
primitives encountering new technology (here the Coke bottle). (Lor 18) 
 
10 I transpose Laura Mulvey’s analysis of the male gaze in classical Hollywood cinema to ethnographic 
film. See Mulvey 19-20. 
 
11 I follow the lead set by Courtney in her analysis of The Birth of a Nation,  67-75.  
 
12  A strikingly similar voiceover accompanies shots of the Bushmen in Beautiful People.  
 
13 See Bordwell 19. 
 
14 In The Cruise (1998), Tim Levitch soliloquizes; “If architecture is the history of all phallic emotion, the 
Empire State Building is utter catharsis.” 
 
15 See Lacan 3-9. 
 
16 For an analysis of Christ as male archetype, see Dyer chapters 1 and 5.  
 
17 For an analysis of Christ and the Virgin Mary as archtypes for the lighting of the white face, see Dyer 
chapters 2 and 3. 
 
18  One should note the similarity between shots of the Bushman homeland in The Gods with 
representations of the Bushmen in the apartheid propaganda film Remnants of the Stone Age People. An 
excerpt from the voiceover narration which accompanies this propaganda is illustrative of temporal elitism, 
the ideology of apartness, and the discourse of the vanishing primitive: 
In South Africa, this vast country with its many and complex problems, most of the interest is 
centered in the cities, where South Africans and visitors alike feel the pulse of this land throbbing 
at an ever increasing tempo. The hustle and bustle of the young virile cities occupy so much of our 
time, that we seldom have the leisure to pause and consider the things going on around us, but 
when we do have the time, what better place is there than one of our modern museums, where we 
can see and consider relics of a bygone and more leisurely age. Only three centuries ago these 
little Bushmen who today exist in the minds of most people only as museum pieces, roamed the 
vast interior of southern Africa[.] … The reason for their virtual disappearance probably lies with 
the fact that they shied away from, and refused to cooperate with, other people. … Where today 
are found the remnants of their once numerous clans, and where after a hazardous and difficult 
journey through miles and miles of untrodden and uninhabited velt, we made this photographic 
record of their unbelievably primitive lives.  
Like the voiceover narration in the opening sequence of The Gods, this lecture inscribes masculinity on the 
colonial watcher. Furthermore, it inscribes a reproductive masculinity on the city itself while associating 
that virility with modernity and a sense of time. The city is a place of virile, throbbing, heterosexual white 
modernity while the velt is the location of the incompatibly primitive and the slow. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRIMITIVISM AND THE WESTERN: GENRE WORK AND DANCES WITH 
WOLVES 
The Gods and Dances with Wolves: Settler Moves to Innocence 
The Gods Must Be Crazy and Dances with Wolves seem like films that interact 
with different contexts. Specifically, The Gods Must Be Crazy totally disavowed the 
existence of settler colonialism in South Africa. In contrast, Dances with Wolves is 
especially concerned with settler colonialism as a historical fact.  While the erasures of 
The Gods should be read in the context of apartheid oppression, Dances with Wolves 
seems not to have emerged alongside any similar context of violence in the United States. 
However, Dances with Wolves constructs this apparent political truth. According to its 
own terms, Dances with Wolves does not need to disavow the contemporary violence of 
settler colonialism because the film imagines this violence to have been conclusively 
waged in America’s colonial past. As a result of this construction, these films seem to do 
different work. The Gods justifies settler colonialism through its total disavowal. DWW is 
a ceremony of settler-indigenous reconciliation that distracts from the reparation of land 
and rights to indigenous people.1  
The juxtaposition of these two films stands to increase our understanding of 
Dances with Wolves because it will demonstrate that the film performs the same 
ideological work as The Gods: the disavowal of the enduring structure of settler 
colonialism. To establish the methodological framework with which I will illustrate this 
common work, the remainder of this chapter’s preamble will: 1) define settler 
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colonialism; 2) identify the tactics which legitimize settler colonialism; 3) describe how 
The Gods employs these tactics; and 4) describe how both films employ these tactics in 
similar ways.  
As Tuck and Yang write, settler colonialism is a form of colonization which 
combines exploitative (or external) with internal colonization. Exploitative colonization 
denotes the extraction of wealth for the enrichment of colonizers (Tuck and Yang 4). 
Internal colonization is the “biopolitical and geopolitical management of people, land, 
flora and fauna within the ‘domestic’ borders of the imperial nation [that] ensure[s] the 
ascendancy of the white elite” (Tuck and Yang 4-5).  Settler colonialism is a combination 
of these two modes: 
For example … many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their 
homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, 
signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding 
schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via mining on 
Indigenous lands in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in 
Alaska)… the horizons of the settler colonial nation state are total and require a 
mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than a selective 
expropriation of profit-producing fragments. (Tuck and Yang 5) 
In sum, settler colonialism is the establishment, by a non-indigenous population, 
of a permanent, sovereign homestead on the expropriated land of indigenous inhabitants 
(Tuck and Yang 5). The establishment of sovereignty is the difference between the settler 
and the immigrant: “Immigrants are beholden to the indigenous laws and epistemologies 
of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting indigenous laws and 
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epistemologies” (Tuck and Yang 6-7). Finally, because settler colonialism requires the 
permanent disenfranchisement of indigenous people, it requires that “Indigenous peoples 
… must be made into ghosts” (Tuck and Yang 6). This erasure is what Patrick Wolfe 
calls the logic of elimination: 
The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous 
people, though it includes that. In common with genocide as Raphael Lemkin 
characterized it, settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. 
Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a 
new colonial society on the expropriated land base—as I put it, settler colonizers 
come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event. In its positive aspect, 
elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-
off (and superseded) occurrence… Settler colonialism destroys to replace. (388 [I 
have elided a paragraph break])  
While colonial violence frequently converges with genocidal violence, Wolfe writes that 
genocide and colonialism are distinct. Because he conceives of colonialism as a structure 
and not an event, Wolfe writes that “a major difference between [colonial genocide] and 
the generality of non-colonial genocides is its sustained duration” (400). Wolfe’s most 
important point is this; “when invasion is recognized as a structure rather than an event, 
its history does not stop—or more to the point, become relatively trivial—when it moves 
on from the era of frontier genocide” (402). Recognizing settler colonialism as a structure 
rather than an event will lead to a proper understanding that settler colonialism is a 
“structural genocide” (Wolfe 403). 
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 Primitivism has lent structural genocide its moral legitimacy. Emerging from 
Scottish Enlightenment thought at the end of the 18th century, primitivism regarded 
colonization as that fungible process by which savagery would be assimilated or 
destroyed.2 In more specific terms, primitivism has mitigated the guilt of European 
settlers over the dispossession and slaughter of native peoples. Because primitivism casts 
colonial violence as a vehicle of progress, primitivism casts colonial violence as 
ultimately benevolent.3 While primitivism is at play in The Gods Must Be Crazy and 
Dances with Wolves, both films also engage more specific tactics in support of settler 
colonialism. These tactics include reconciliation, metaphorical decolonization, settler 
moves to innocence, and the exclusivity of settler futurity.   
Tuck and Yang argue that the appropriation of the language of decolonization has 
served academia as a settler move to innocence.4 They argue that the rhetoric of 
decolonization is incommensurate with true colonization, which can only mean the 
reparation of indigenous lands and sovereignty. As a settler move to innocence, symbolic 
decolonization “kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it 
resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future” (3). As 
Tuck and Yang argue, the ceremonial rhetoric of decolonization serves “to reconcile 
settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity” (3).  In her discussion of the 
global proliferation of truth and reconciliation movements, Gillian Whitlock posits a 
similar thesis: 
The material and lived experiences of First Nation and indigenous peoples in 
Canada and Australia continue to be shaped by extraordinarily high rates of 
poverty, death, unemployment, youth suicide, substance abuse and sexual abuse, 
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domestic violence and family breakdown…there remains much for which to 
apologize. [However,] it must be asked whether a preoccupation with apology and 
symbolic acts of reconciliation has diverted attention from the need to radically 
reform the conditions in indigenous and First nation’s communities and to address 
the situation of urban indigenous peoples. (25) 
Following these scholars, I say that The Gods and Dances with Wolves are 
cinematic counterparts to the truth and reconciliation commission or the academic 
ceremony of “decolonizing the mind.” In addition to the global tactic of primitivism, 
these films are ceremonies of settler-indigenous reconciliation which function as moves 
to innocence. The Gods is about the harmonious collaboration of a colonial agent with a 
primitive counterpart. This racial harmony disavows the exploitative labor relations of 
South African apartheid. Furthermore, the film is a settler move to innocence which 
functions through the recentering of white suffering. Finally, primitivism and the 
reproductive logic of classical Hollywood are an ideology and an aesthetic which express 
the endurance of white supremacy in the colonial space, what Tuck and Yang call settler 
futurity. In sum, The Gods imagines time and reproduction in such a way as to reassure 
its audience of the viability of settler futurity.  
Working for the same ends, Dances with Wolves employs the settler-indigenous 
adoption narrative to manufacture settler innocence. Discussing DWW as a prime 
example of the Euro-American adoption fantasy, Tuck and Yang write that “these 
fantasies …refer to those narratives … in which the Native (understanding that he is 
becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the 
settler for safe keeping. This is a fantasy that is invested in settler futurity and dependent 
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on the foreclosure of an Indigenous futurity” (14).5 In a way which echoes the closing 
sequence of The Gods, DWW dramatizes futurity as the privilege of the white settler. 
While the Lakota almost literally disappear, John Dunbar and a presumably pregnant 
Stands With a Fist (Kevin Costner and Mary McDonnell) ride like Joseph and Mary into 
a white, reproductive future. Superimposed on this image of settler futurity, an intertitle 
posits the vanishing Indian as a historical fact of the late-19th century. The film reserves 
futurity for its white characters, denies futurity to indigenous people, and constructs 
colonial violence as a historical event. Like The Gods, DWW paradoxically insists on 
both the reproduction of white settlers while disavowing the ongoing violence which this 
reproduction entails.  
As an aesthetic analysis, this chapter will demonstrate how DWW performs its 
settler move to innocence. In short, DWW works as a settler move to innocence through 
its particular interaction with its genre. Specifically, the film’s adoption fantasy re-
enchants the classical western film and its epic hero.  
Primitivism, Identity Appropriation, and Genre in Dances with Wolves 
 Like The Gods Must Be Crazy, Dances with Wolves was a great financial and 
popular success. The film swept the Academy Awards in 1990, wining Best Picture, Best 
Director, Best Adapted Screenplay, Best Cinematography, Best Sound, Best Film 
Editing, and Best Original Score. Given this success, it is noteworthy that scholars and 
critics consider DWW to have been a revival of the western.6 Films in the genre are 
typically apprehended by their geography, their iconography, and there placement in 
history. The timeframe of the classical Western is that period after the American Civil 
War and before the end of the 19th century. The space of the Western is that great tract of 
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land west of the Mississippi River, east of the Rocky Mountains, and north of the Rio 
Grande. The iconography is that of horse and rider, the rifle, the six-shooter, and of 
course, the Indian. While it satisfies the geographical, historical, and iconographic 
parameters which audiences identify as “western,” Dances with Wolves is a revisionist 
western because its protagonist questions the legitimacy of manifest destiny. Of course, 
the film’s adoption narrative immediately compromises this revisionism because it 
figures John J. Dunbar as a nostalgic revival of the classical western hero. As he adopts 
an indigenous identity, the film encourages the spectator’s sincere identification with a 
white male and the erasure of his complicity in colonial violence. As such, DWW is a 
revival of the classical western, a genre whose protagonist was a heroic personification of 
manifest destiny.  
The earliest films to represent Native Americans mimic 19th-century anthropology 
in their constructions of anachronism (Griffiths 122). The denial of coevalness is more or 
less explicitly retained in westerns through the 1920s.7 By the time of the resurgence of 
the “A” western with Stagecoach (1939), the temporal structure of the primitive : modern 
binary had become implicit. While John Ford would structure his westerns according to 
the clash between civilization and savagery, a review of the scholarly literature of the 
classical western shows little in the way of the explicit denial of coevalness.8  Union 
Pacific (1939) and Stagecoach (1939) are two examples of this trend. While these films 
posit the nuclear family as a bastion of civilization beleaguered by savage Indians, the 
films do not necessarily present this assault in a way which characterizes the Indian as 
anachronistic. Rather, Indians in these films are one of the many obstacles of the frontier 
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which must be swept away or contained before civilization can activate its progressive 
machinery (Slotkin 267).9  
The primitivism of Dances with Wolves interacts with the history of the western 
in a few important ways. First, the film’s fantasy of an anachronistic Native American is 
a revisionist rejection of the Indian qua obstacle. Second, the film is a revival of the 
explicit temporal continuum of American moving pictures which preceded the classical 
western. The film reiterates the tropes of 19th-century anthropology in such a way as to 
justify or elide colonial violence. White guilt over manifest destiny and the redemption of 
this guilt through the appropriation of an anachronistic identity combine in such a way as 
to bifurcate the film’s form: Dances with Wolves is aesthetically and thematically 
nostalgic in its celebration of a white hero, but it is historically and politically revisionist 
in its guilt over manifest destiny. Most importantly, the un-ironic self-actualization of a 
white male hero is distinctly out of step with the revisionist western. This recuperation of 
the revisionist western’s fallen hero is the tactic of DWW’s settler move to innocence. 
The adoption narrative, in turn, is the method of this recuperation: “this narrative spins a 
fantasy than an individual settler can become innocent, indeed heroic and indigenized” 
(Tuck and Yang 14).  In his appropriation of an anachronistic racial identity, Dunbar 
dramatizes the film’s own generic regression from the anti-hero of the revisionist western 
to the epic hero of the genre’s classical period.10 While Dunbar’s regression to a previous 
state allows the film to redeem the fallen angel of manifest destiny, it also functions as a 
metaphor for the process by which the film would return to the state of the classical 
western before the deconstruction of frontier mythology.11 As Shari Huhndorf observes in 
Going Native, Dunbar plays Indian as a settler move to innocence: 
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Dances with Wolves, the movie industry claimed with pride, was an original, 
Hollywood’s first successful attempt to render justice to these Indians through 
Costner’s sympathetic telling of their proud history. This claim attests to one of 
the primary impulses behind going native: European Americans’ desire to 
distance themselves from the conquest of native America. (3)  
 Dances with Wolves uses primitivism to revive the myth that settler colonists may 
achieve greatness through struggles and suffering in the wilderness. This myth has a three 
part structure, involving separation from civilization, regression to a primitive state, and 
regeneration through violence (Slotkin 11-12). DWW harmonizes this myth with a trope 
of the classical western in which the suffering of white people is a function of their 
struggle to realize manifest destiny or achieve self-actualization in a harsh frontier 
(Simmon 118; Bandy and Soehr 1-4).12 The agony of the white male body in Dances with 
Wolves is a revival of the melodramatic morality of the classic western. This morality 
figured the virtuously suffering white settler as a martyr for civilizational progress. 
Because the revisionist western problematized the idealization of righteous violence 
while simultaneously demythologizing the western hero, violence in the western can only 
be truly regenerative if the genre is deployed in its classical mode.13 Dunbar’s 
appropriation of indigenous suffering is a settler move to innocence because it allows the 
film to function as a classical western. As Tuck and Yang write on the appropriation of 
indigenous suffering; “The settler’s personal suffering feeds his fantasy of mutuality… 
Because pain is the token for oppression, claims to pain then equate to claims of being an 
innocent non-oppressor” (16). 
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Dances with Wolves employs the western in its non-ironic mode through its 
primitivist plot. Specifically, primitivism informs the film’s two narrative conceits. First, 
DWW superimposes the primitive : modern binary on a melodramatic axis of good and 
evil. In this constellation, the Lakota Indians represent a utopian culture vis-à-vis a 
reprobate modernity. Overlaid on this seemingly revisionist binary is the film’s second 
conceit, the process by which a white protagonist is able to traverse the racial and 
temporal continuum of the colonial imaginary. By appropriating an indigenous identity, 
Dunbar claims the moral authority conferred on this identity by the film’s melodrama. 
Ironically, Dunbar’s traversal of the racial continuum undoes the film’s revisionist work 
because it allows the un-ironic redeployment of a trope from the western’s classical 
period: the suffering white hero-settler and his regeneration through righteous violence.  
 As the racial nostalgia of its protagonist is a dramatization of its own generic 
nostalgia, Dances with Wolves exhibits a compound nostalgia. To satisfy this nostalgia, 
the film deploys a network of narrative, aesthetic, and generic devices. Melodrama, if 
sincerely employed and received, is an essentially redemptive aesthetic mode based on 
nostalgia for moral clarity. Primitivism, by its very nature, involves nostalgia for a 
previous state and the promise of redemption that this state holds for the colonizer’s gaze. 
In Dances with Wolves, these two modes work in tandem to redeem the classical western, 
a genre which was originally concerned with the redemption of the protagonist by means 
of his virtuous, melodramatic, civilizational struggle. In the wake of the revisionist 
western and its attack on white masculinity, Dances with Wolves sends the white male 
back to the frontier for a new scenario of regenerative violence. However, the redemption 
of this scenario is profoundly ironic because any sincere account of regenerative violence 
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is necessarily problematized by revisionist accounts of manifest destiny. The only way 
Dances with Wolves can elude its own irony is by the means of its two primary narrative 
conceits: the superimposition of primitivism with melodrama, and the protagonist’s 
traversal of the spatial, racial, moral, and temporal axes of the colonial imaginary.   
The first section of this chapter will situate DWW more specifically with regard to 
the classical and revisionist Western. The second section will address how DWW engaged 
with its cultural context: the New Age and Mythopoetic Men’s movement of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Then, I will review the literature on the tradition of literary and 
cinematic melodrama and melodrama’s relationship to contemporary primitivism. 
Considering these social and aesthetic contexts, I will analyze Dances with Wolves’s 
specific scenario of regenerative frontier violence, the captivity narrative. I will conclude 
the chapter with an analysis of the film’s use of cinematography, mise-en-scène, and non-
diegetic music, and explore how these elements of the film create meaning through their 
interaction with the western, the melodramatic and primitivist modes, and the crisis of 
white masculinity.  
The Classical Western, the Revisionist Western, and DWW 
An understanding of DWW’s handling of American history, the white hero, and 
manifest destiny is only possible in light of the evolution of the western genre. Let us 
assume that changes in the genre over the last hundred years have been homologous with 
changing attitudes toward manifest destiny, and that throughout its history, the western 
has been a reflection on American history (Bandy and Stoehr 5). As Janet Walker argues 
in her introduction to Westerns: Films Through History, westerns are utterances in a 
discourse. Just like history textbooks, westerns are always interpretive interventions in a 
discourse which constructs history (Walker 1-22).  
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As attitudes toward manifest destiny have transformed, the western has 
represented Euro-American colonialism in different ways. In the interim between the 
Spanish-American War and World War I, the western emerged as ideological support for 
American imperialism (Berg 213; Bandry and Stoehr 15-20).14 Particularly after western 
film production moved from the forests of the east coast to the deserts and vistas of the 
American West, the emptiness of the landscape in western films played into myths of 
civilizational progress: “The newer Westerns emphasized battles between cowboys and 
‘Injuns’ and, within white society, between heroes and villains. Such battles were 
typically waged over unclaimed land that was waiting to be conquered and controlled and 
cultivated” (Bandy and Stoehr 17).15  
 In these films, development and manifest destiny were closely linked to the 
portrayal of violence as melodramatic, virtuous, and chivalric. Specifically, the revenge 
plot of the classical western descends from codes of European chivalric honor.16 In the 
classical western, there is no question as to the vengeance quest’s moral clarity. As 
William Indick writes; “The theme of chivalric vengeance became the central theme, in 
one way or another, in almost every Western. … The hero’s vengeance is always 
honorable. … The hero’s justice is an honorable act, a just one, and not only fulfills the 
hero’s personal need for ‘satisfaction’ but also performs a task of social value” (24-28). 
The task of social value in the classical western was that task which furthered manifest 
destiny.17   
Manifest destiny and chivalric violence would be problematized by the revisionist 
westerns of the 1960s. In these films, the moral ambiguity of violence dramatizes the 
disintegration of faith in the chivalric code. Arguing that this trend has its roots in the 
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‘psychological’ western of the 1950s, Indick writes that, “the hero and the villain appear 
to suffer from the same conflicts. The hero, no longer a pure white knight is also 
afflicted, in varying degrees, by the killing sickness” (28). This moral reconsideration of 
the western hero was part of a larger trend in which a new generation of directors began 
to favor “more realistic, less myth-governed movies. Suddenly audiences as well as film 
critics became interested in ‘ordinary’ characters with everyday problems and flawed 
lives” (Bandy and Stoehr 227).  
Whereas the classical western celebrated manifest destiny through its association 
with an idealized hero, the revisionist western abandoned myths of the heroic white male 
(Berg 213; Bandy and Stoehr 234). This unsettling of the white male hero was 
concomitant with the post-modern assault on narratives of manifest destiny (Berg 224). 
As Aleiss writes; “by the late 1960s, Indian activism combined with Vietnam War 
protests and racial uprisings set the stage for Hollywood’s ‘anti-Western’ and their 
vicious attacks against frontier white aggression” (120). In Butch Cassidy and the 
Sundance Kid (1969), Easy Rider (1969), and Midnight Cowboy (1969), the classic 
western’s “macho, upright lawmen of Stagecoach and Union Pacific had crumbled into 
society’s doomed outcasts” (Aleiss 121-122).18 With the release of Little Big Man (1970), 
Arthur Penn was determined to set the record straight regarding American genocide; “He 
believed that Hollywood’s Indian images were based upon a ‘pure, naked racism’ and 
that Custer was really a ‘pompous, self-aggrandizing man’”(Aleiss 124). In Soldier Blue 
(1970), director and World War II veteran Ralph Nelson was explicit in his anti-war 
sentiment, drawing parallels between the massacre of Native Americans and the 
American military misadventure in Vietnam:  
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News photos of scarred and mutilated Vietnamese victims infuriated Nelson, so 
he channeled his anger into Soldier Blue’s bloody scenes. ‘It was about war – all 
war,’ he explained. ‘It is war which is obscene.’ Although Nelson denied that My 
Lai influenced Soldier Blue, he admitted that in the movie’s massacre of Indian 
women and children, ‘history was repeating itself.’ (Aleiss 127)   
Following Little Big Man and Soldier Blue, Apocalypse Now (1979) is a Vietnam-
era anti-western that may serve as an instructive precursor to Dances with Wolves. 
Apocalypse Now was part of a cycle of films, including The Deer Hunter (1978), Platoon 
(1986), and Full Metal Jacket (1987) which, through their critical portrayals of the 
American military in Vietnam, challenged the cinematic glorification of armed struggle 
that had characterized American cinema after World War II (Rasmussen and Downey 
176-177). This martial revisionism is in harmony with western revisionism of the same 
period, particularly considering the critical manner in which revisionist westerns 
responded to the Vietnam War.19 While John Hellmann argues that Apocalypse Now is 
structured more along the lines of the hardboiled detective novel than the western, the 
film’s construction of colonial time and its postmodern parody of the American cavalry 
officer warrant a reading of the film as a revisionist western that prefigures Dances with 
Wolves.20   
Apocalypse Now delivers a stinging critique of American colonial violence, the 
cowboy, frontier mythology, and the American military effort in Vietnam. The location 
of this critique is the parodic, postmodern figure of Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore 
(Robert Duvall), the leader of the film’s mechanized cavalry. In the highly ironic, film-
noir voiceover which introduces Kilgore and his troops, Captain Willard (Martin Sheen) 
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establishes both a historical continuity, and a structural homology, between the American 
cavalry’s role in classical manifest destiny and the contemporary violence of Vietnam; 
“First of the 9th was an old cavalry division and had cashed in its horses for choppers and 
gone tear-assing around ‘nam looking for the shit.”  
The verbal establishment of this structural homology serves as a critique of 
manifest destiny because Colonel Kilgore and his men pursue meaningless, wanton 
violence. Moreover, this representation of senseless destruction is made reflexive or self-
referential by the appearance of a journalist and camera crew. The journalist shouts 
directly at Willard: “Don’t look at the camera! Just go by like you’re fighting… It’s for 
television!” This self-reflexive historical awareness prepares the cinematic spectator for 
her first glimpse of Colonel Kilgore. His costume is an amalgam of historically 
appropriate, Vietnam-era military fatigues combined with the anachronistic flourishes of 
a yellow neckerchief and an Old West cavalryman’s hat. While Colonel Kilgore’s 
narrative purpose is to escort Captain Willard and his men up-river, deeper into the heart 
of darkness, his more impressive and memorable function is to serve as an ironic 
deconstruction of cowboy violence. When he learns that a member of Willard’s crew is a 
famous surfer, Kilgore destroys a Viet Cong village and massacres its inhabitants so that 
the his men may secure a desirable point break (Figure 16). Kilgore’s monstrosity is 
beyond review when he delivers his pithy, absurd rationale for the beachhead’s violent 




 In its likening of this Vietnam-era helicopter commander to the cavalryman of 
the Old West, the film refuses either to retroactively endorse classical manifest destiny 
through a celebration of a modern-day cowboy, or to allow the celebration of the 
historical cowboy to justify America’s more recent colonial violence. However, this 
revisionist sentiment is undermined by the film’s construction of colonial time and space. 
Like Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Apocalypse Now figures movement up river as a 
journey back in time and a descent into madness.21 In both Apocalypse Now and the 
novella of its source material, the colonial encounter is structured by a temporal 
continuum whose primitive pole festers with the threat of savage contagion. 
Dances with Wolves reiterates this colonial construction of time and space by 
allowing its protagonist to travel back in time through his journey into the wilderness.22 
However, the reiteration of this structure may not be immediately apparent because 
Figure 16. Charlie Don’t Surf. 
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Dances with Wolves replaces the contagion of the savage primitive with the therapeutic 
primitive of the New Age. Shari Huhndorf writes: 
New Agers claim that colonized peoples, including Natives, are in many respects 
fundamentally superior to their Western counterparts. Compelled by the 
conviction that modern Western societies confront terrible crises (including 
environmental destruction, spiritual bankruptcy, and rampant health problems), 
the movement goes native in its quest for solutions. (162)  
While New Ageism seems to have replaced the image of the savage with a more 
politically correct Indian, the primitive qua therapy we see in Dances with Wolves has 
simply repackaged the contagion of Heart of Darkness as a therapeutic commodity. Lisa 
Aldred writes: 
In the so-called postmodern culture of late consumer capitalism, a significant 
number of white affluent suburban and urban middle-aged baby-boomers 
complain of feeling uprooted from cultural traditions, community belonging, and 
spiritual meaning. The New Age movement is one such response to these feelings. 
New Agers romanticize an "authentic" and "traditional" Native American culture 
whose spirituality can save them from their own sense of malaise. However, as 
products of the very consumer culture they seek to escape, these New Agers 
pursue spiritual meaning and cultural identification through acts of purchase. 
(328-329) 
In Dances with Wolves, Keven Costner takes the consumption of indigeneity to its logical 
conclusion. For him, as for the New Agers he represents, this consumption becomes a 
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therapeutic lifestyle. As a result, the film transforms the Native American into a leisure 
identity that malaise-stricken whites are free to consume.23  
The consumption of Native American identity by New Agers is a settler move to 
innocence. As Shari Huhndorf writes, white Americans have consumed Indian identity in 
the pursuit of self-discovery and self-healing (163). In going native, Dunbar pursues this 
self-actualization through a recuperation of indigenous suffering. Through his 
appropriation of Native identity, the white male assumes the innocence of victimhood. 
Huhndorf writes: 
New Agers’ desire to go native reproduces, even as it extends, the history of 
colonization, shown in this case by the compulsion to own Native cultures and 
even Native identities. Moreover, this latest phase of colonization attempts to 
ensure that Native America no longer offers a fundamental critique of Western 
values and practices. (163) 
In terms most relevant to the disavowal of ongoing settler-colonial relations and the 
redemption of the classical westerner, Huhndorf observes that “individual self-
transformation rather than political action … provides the New Age’s primary 
preoccupation” (165). 
Mythopoetic Men and the Appropriation of Suffering  
 The mythopoetic men’s movement of the 1980s and 1990s was a New Age 
subculture whose colonial imaginary demonstrates a striking affinity with Dances with 
Wolves. The men’s movement was a loose confederation of emotionally dissatisfied 
males who came together seeking emotional and spiritual fulfillment. The movement was 
a reaction to the ascendency of feminism and the critique of white patriarchy in the wake 
of the civil rights movement. The movement was comprised mostly of white, middle- and 
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upper-class males between the ages of 35 and 60 (Schwalbe 19). The dissatisfaction and 
anomie addressed by the men’s movement found their source in the same cultural trends 
that had unsettled the classical westerner of American cinema: instead of uncritically 
endorsing the hegemony of white male patriarchy, popular opinion had come to question 
the basic moral integrity of the white male. This cultural pressure drove men to the 
mythopoetic movement for its validation of the male character (Schwalbe 23). While 
actual participation in the movement’s ceremonies and retreats was limited to around 
100,000 men, the anxieties which had fostered the mythopoetic movement were active 
across American culture in the late-20th century (Schwalbe 4-5). In sum, men turned to 
the mythopoetic movement to rebuild their sense of masculine self-worth.24   
DWW dramatizes the mythopoetic movement: the film would validate the white 
male character in an era when white patriarchy was under attack. Like DWW, participants 
of the men’s movement worked to redeem their masculinity through the appropriation of 
Native American identity. In its own terms, the men’s movement addressed a simple, 
overarching apprehension: that its members were suffering (Barton 3-4). In their adoption 
of the victim narratives of the civil rights movement, the mythopoetic men 
misappropriated the racial identity of one of America’s most disenfranchised groups, 
Native Americans. 
 In sum, the mythopoetic men pursued the redemption of male virtue through the 
performance of indigeneity. Referred to as ‘neo-primitivism’ within the movement, these 
practices include drum circles, chanting, sweat lodges and guided visualizations (Barton 
4).  Like the white male protagonist of Dances with Wolves, and like the New Age 
movement more broadly, these men consumed Native American identity in an attempt to 
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bolster a masculinity which had been discredited by the post-colonial and feminist 
critiques of the 1960s.   
 Even more striking than the structural similarities between DWW and the 
mythopoetic movement are the affinities in diction between the men’s Jungian therapy 
and the archetypal criticism of DWW. In its own terms, mythopoetic therapy sought to 
bring men into communion with unconscious masculine archetypes. By activating these 
archetypes, mythopoetic therapy was meant to encourage elevated consciousness and a 
revaluation of masculinity (Schwalbe 35-52). In her Jungian analysis, Amanda Smith 
identifies these same operations in DWW. She proposes that Dunbar’s “mythical descent” 
into the archetypal unconscious was the heart of the film’s popular appeal. Almost 
directly mirroring the language of Schwalbe, Smith writes; “A good deal of the power of 
Dances with Wolves lies not in its glorification of a specific culture … but in its ability to 
dramatize that culture in a manner so that it becomes the medium for freeing its 
protagonist from a vision that is too limited or circumscribed and awakening deeper 
sensibilities” (199).  
Schwalbe describes the benefits of mythopoetic work in similar terms: the goal of 
the therapy was to “awaken in men the human sensibilities that had been dulled by … an 
exploitive economy … ” (242). The technique of this awakening is a practitioner’s 
inhabitation of the “Wildman” archetype: “To the mythopoetic men, the Wildman was 
not a rampaging rogue male, but an image of the unfettered, zestful, robust animal-like 
spirit found in everyone. This was the spirit … that the men saw as having been quashed 
by bureaucracy and industrialism” (Schwalbe 224).What Smith and Schwalbe both fail to 
criticize, however, is that the primitive masculine archetype on which this therapy relies 
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reduces the American Indian to the status of a therapeutic commodity. This is Indian qua 
lifestyle, as a spiritual resource for a journeying white male. In many ways, it is Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness all over again, but with the New Age twist that the savagery of the 
mythic descent has been replaced by the redemption of an authentic masculinity. As such, 
the mythopoetic men’s movement reduced indigeneity to the Primitive Other qua fetish 
object and therapeutic technique.  
Traversing the Axis: White Male Agony to Transcendental Mobility 
As a dramatization of the crisis of 
white masculinity, the opening sequence of 
Dances with Wolves insists on the 
preeminence of white male agony. In this 
sequence, Kevin Costner lies supine on a 
battlefield operating table as two surgeons 
prepare to amputate his right leg. This scene 
reinforces its amputation narrative with a 
series of claustrophobic images, a series of 
close-ups which allow only fractured images 
of Costner’s body (Figure 17). This aesthetic 
visually mimics the amputation threatened in 
the narrative. As such, the sequence is 
typical of the fragmentation of the male body 
in action movies of the late-20th century, a 
trend that Mark Gallagher attributes to the 
Figure 17. Castration in DWW. 
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crisis of masculinity in contemporary capitalism: “a social and economic structure that 
severely limits and codifies the bourgeois male’s ability to establish his identity through 
physical activity…” (199).25 As the film’s primal scene, this castration sequence serves as 
a thematic and aesthetic counterpoint to the film’s later images, in which Costner will 
demonstrate his mastery of mobility in wide-angle shots on the open prairie. These later 
scenes serve one of the cultural functions of the action film in late-20th-century America, 
to “provide fantasies of heroic omnipotence and of escape from, and transcendence of, 
cultural pressures” (Gallagher 199). The film’s opening sequence is so thematically 
significant because it serves as an unquestionable foregrounding of white male suffering 
while keying that suffering to a threat to white male mobility: Dunbar is threatened with 
the loss of his leg, another victim of gangrene on the slaughter fields of the Civil War. 
This foregrounding of suffering as a function of mobility is significant because if Dunbar 
is to successfully appropriate a Native American identity, he must literally and 
figuratively traverse the temporal axis of the colonial imaginary.   
Thinking in terms of mobility, the Native American of DWW is the object of a 
colonizer’s gaze much after the fashion in which Laura Mulvey describes the female 
object of male desire in Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema; “In contrast to woman as 
icon, the active male figure demands a three dimensional space[.] … He is a figure in the 
landscape[.] … The male protagonist is free to command the stage, a stage of spatial 
illusion in which he articulates the look and creates the action” (21).  The privilege of 
movement through space and time is central to Dunbar’s journey from emasculation to 
mastery. As the signifier of spiritual essence, the figure of the Native American, like 
woman as icon, is a stationary object set in a mythical western past, an object toward 
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which the White protagonist moves on a journey of personal redemption. The primitive 
never moves, never acts, never gains our identification. Much like The Gods Must Be 
Crazy, Dances with Wolves constructs the primitive other as essentially fixed, and I 
employ this term for its broad semantic field. As such, the primitive is an anachronistic 
object fixed in the western past, a fetish object which fixes white male castration, a 
domesticated other which can no longer threaten the white male, and a feminized object 
toward which the white male plots his journey through space and time in an effort to lay 
claim to the identity which will redeem his virtue. 
 However, this journey may only commence after Dunbar resolves his crisis of 
mobility. In the film’s opening sequence, the equestrian jackboot figures prominently to 
dramatize this crisis, functioning as a signifier of the white male castration complex while 
keying castration to an anxiety of motor incompetence. The film’s first shot is the 
removal of the boot from Dunbar’s bloody leg. Shot from Dunbar’s point of view, the 
boot is removed, dropped onto the surgeon’s floor, kicked aside. When Dunbar’s boot 
joins a pile of bloody boots in the periphery of the surgeon’s quarters, it asks to be taken 
as a signifier of a larger trend of emasculation. Removed from Dunbar’s injured 
extremity, his boot assumes a state of detumescence. It languishes as a flaccid signifier of 
castration. Here, the boot functions as a classic fetish object, a phallic surrogate which 
signals the impotence of the protagonist while displacing the castration it signals. 
The image of the boot is so significant because the disavowal of castration in 
DWW relies on the reiteration of a classical trope of European colonialism, the notion that 
movement away from civilization is analogous to movement back in time (Fabian 8-12). 
DWW is a late- 20th-century reiteration of this intellectual tradition, and achieves the 
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disavowal of racial difference through the activation of this mythology. As so much of 
DWW relies on Dunbar’s journey into the frontier, the boot becomes a significant symbol 
of masculine, colonial travel. Dismembered and flaccid, the boot cannot be a vehicle for 
westward expansion, temporal travel, or the traversal of the moral axis of the film’s 
primitivist melodrama. The removal of the boot signals emasculation. Without it, Dunbar 
would be unable to perform the journey of transformation which disavows the historical 
guilt and social anxiety of late-20th-century, white, American masculinity. When 
integrated and erect, the boot becomes a tool and symbol of Dunbar’s journey into the 
frontier and also the means by which the film’s moral and temporal axes are traversed.  
Dances with Wolves dramatizes the Eurocentric mythology of time-space in its 
cinematography, in the aesthetic juxtaposition of claustrophobic fragmentation with 
wide-angle shots of transcendental beauty. Dunbar’s motion into the heart of the 
American frontier is showcased by a cinematography which forms an aesthetic and 
emotional counterpoint to the film’s castration scene. This formalistic dyad reinforces the 
moral certainty and ethical utopianism of the film’s melodrama, but it also underscores 
Dunbar’s journey out of the fragmented space of Western culture and into the integrated 
space of the mythical West. Whereas the first scene encourages pathos and identification 
through extreme close-ups, quick editing, and tense music, inverse formal elements 
collude in the film’s travel sequences to evoke a return to transcendental innocence.  
In the series of shots in which Dunbar traverses the prairie, the film’s motif of the 
Costner close-up works in tandem with several extreme long shots. These long shots 
work in concert with the film’s award-winning score and slow-paced editing to produce a 
sense of calm, transcendence, and totality in contradistinction to the film’s opening 
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sequence.  This sequence observes a 180 degree logic which suggests a cartographical 
perspective of space and time. The cartographical perspective echoes a trope of 19th-
century American art in which the left side of the frame represents the west and the 
primeval past.26 The 180 degree logic, the extreme long shots, and the movement of 
Dunbar from right to left across the motion picture frame, suggest that the axis of action 
in these scenes achieves a longitudinal, epochal, and spiritual significance. The cinematic 
spectator is free to deduce that the camera takes a position from the south while 
observing the movement of the protagonist from east to west, evoking the movement of 
Euro-American settlers across North America in the 19th century. 
Dunbar masterfully rides through space, back to the past, and into the frontier, 
achieving a level of spatial, locomotive mastery in firm juxtaposition to his impotence in 
the film’s opening sequence. In one particularly long shot, Dunbar rides at full gallop 
from a hilltop at screen right across an extended stretch of South Dakota prairie (Figure 
18). While Dunbar rides from the extreme right of the frame to a position in the center of 
the screen, the camera tracks left to emphasize and elongate Dunbar’s movement through 
time and space. At the same time, the tracking camera moves the cinematic spectator 
from east to west due to the identification of the spectator’s gaze with the gaze of the 
camera.27 This tracking shot keeps Dunbar and his horse at center frame for several 
seconds. This shot emphasizes westward travel as a reconstitution of Costner’s gestalt 
while harmonizing Dunbar’s movement with the movement of the spectator and the 
landscape. This harmony is essential because it insists on the uncritical reception of 
Dunbar as the classical western hero. Rather than being in ironic tension with an anti-
hero, the viewing position so constructed is one of intimacy and sincere identification. 
  
107 
Finally, the integration of the classic westerner into the landscape does more than redeem 
whiteness. It serves to redeem the myth of manifest destiny because the landscape of 
these shots is profoundly empty. According to DWW, this landscape is a nearly limitless 
space of natural and spiritual resources for the white men who traverse it. This is a 
cinematic rendering of late-20th century American attitudes, in which the frontier 
“continues to represent notions of conquest, progress, and individual achievement” 
(Carmichael 3).  
Melodrama, Primitivism, and the Captivity Narrative 
This transcendental ride establishes the narrative which will preoccupy much of 
the remainder of the film, in which Costner journeys deeper into the redemptive bosom of 
the American frontier. For the most part, this process is dramatized by his love of, and 
integration into, the tribal culture of the film’s Lakota Indians. As such, Costner’s 
therapeutic appropriation of Native American identity, what is essentially an extended 
therapy session at Spa Lakota, is set in stark juxtaposition to the violence, emptiness, and 
castration of western modernity. The establishment of this melodramatic opposition 
Figure 18. Transcendental Wilderness Experience. 
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between good and evil, the primitive and the modern, serves as an ideological screen for 
the film’s promotion of Native Americans as a therapeutic commodity for white settler-
consumers.  
  Melodrama emerged at the turn of the 19th century as an aesthetic response to the 
disintegration of the unassailable truths of Christianity and its sacred narratives. 
Melodrama served to restore a measure of moral and ontological certainty to a world 
bereft of its sacred narratives through the proposition of an absolute and clearly legible 
moral universe. As Peter Brooks writes; “The melodramatists refuse to allow that the 
world has been completely drained of transcendence[.] … they locate that transcendence 
in the struggle of the children of light with the children of darkness, in the play of ethical 
mind” (22). Following Peter Brooks, Linda Williams argues that melodrama is the 
dominant mode of the classical Hollywood film (42-62). The melodramatic mode as it 
applies to the classical Hollywood film is key to understanding the primitivism and genre 
work of Dances with Wolves. 
 First, I would like to draw a structural and aesthetic parallel between the collapse 
of sacred narratives after the Enlightenment with the collapse of frontier mythology. If 
melodrama was an aesthetic response to the evacuation of sacred narrative, we might 
view the temporal, civilizational melodrama of manifest destiny as a particularly 
American aesthetic form which functioned as a replacement for a sacred Christian 
narrative. In this particularly American scenario, a millennial Christian narrative of 
salvation is replaced by a geographical and civilizational destiny of national 
exceptionalism. However, the postcolonial revision of this civilizational myth, the loss of 
faith in the classical western’s melodramatic violence, is a replaying of the fall from 
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ontological certainty of the sacred Christian narrative which precipitated melodrama in 
the early-19th century.  
In its employment of the melodramatic mode, Dances with Wolves works to 
redeem the western much in the way that Peter Brooks argues 19th-century melodrama to 
have redeemed the western psyche in a post-sacred age. Dances with Wolves works in 
this fashion because it is structured according to the following terms of American 
cinematic melodrama. First, Dances with Wolves, like American melodrama, is 
preoccupied with nostalgia for a lost innocence (Williams 65). Second, this mode focuses 
on “victim-heroes and the recognition of their virtue” (Williams 66). Lastly, “melodrama 
presents characters that embody primary psychic roles organized in Manichaean conflicts 
of good and evil” (Williams 77). In considering these characteristics of American 
cinematic melodrama, we may say that the makers of contemporary American 
primitivism are the pre-eminent melodramatists of the present era: they refuse to allow 
for a world drained of its transcendental splendor. More specifically, it is the interplay of 
nostalgia, the victim-hero, and the Manichaean conflict of good and evil which so 
completely harmonizes the melodramatic mode with the temporal axis of the colonial 
imaginary. In DWW, the primitive is coterminous with the transcendentally good, 
especially in the sense that it serves the primary psychic role of righteous victimhood, 
while Western civilization and manifest destiny are coterminous with an unambiguous 
evil which would victimize its other. The overlaying of melodrama’s moral structure on 
the primitive : modern binary is particularly complex, for the temporal axis of 
primitivism does not simply oppose darkness with light; rather, it opposes the spiritual 
and ontological void of modernity with the spiritual and ontological self-evidence of an 
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anachronistic victim. Just as melodrama would have reenchanted the post-sacred Europe 
of the early-19th century, so too does primitivism serve as a tool for reenchantment in 
contemporary American melodrama. What is so interesting about contemporary 
American primitivism is that it presents a melodramatic moral binary which is meant to 
both dramatize and remediate the disenchantment of modernity. In other words, the 
primitive : modern moral binary of DWW dramatizes the spiritual emptiness of modernity 
which precipitated the melodramatic mode in the early 19th century.28  
The western is a natural field of play for the superimposition of the primitivist 
with the melodramatic mode, as the genre has always been structured according to a 
developmental binary of wilderness and civilization (Neal 135). In classical westerns, this 
binary takes a melodramatic moral orientation, pitting the righteousness and suffering of 
pioneers or the white nuclear family against the hardships presented by bandits, bad guys, 
Indians, or the environment. In its generic nostalgia, Dances with Wolves revives the 
melodramatic figure of the virtuously suffering victim while inverting the classical 
western’s racial morality. As a revisionist western which condemns manifest destiny, 
victimhood is the purview of the American Indian.  As a melodrama, this victimhood 
serves to emphasize the utopian virtue of a culture under threat of extinction from the 
encroachment of Western civilization. However, because Dunbar is able to traverse the 
temporal axis of the colonial imaginary and appropriate an indigenous identity, he is able 
to recuperate the moral position of the classical westerner through his claims to righteous 
suffering.  
The structural and spiritual parallels between early 19th-century melodrama and 
the melodrama of American primitivism at the turn of the 21st century are important 
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because of the nature of contemporary primitivism’s ideological work. Whereas 
melodrama in its classical period would have reenchanted the world with its moral 
legibility, the work of contemporary American primitivism is to reenchant the classical 
westerner with the spiritual and moral integrity of the noble primitive. This spiritual and 
moral integrity are made possible by the moral clarity of the melodramatic colonial 
encounter. Because this process is superimposed on the fetish object of the temporal axis 
of the colonial imaginary, melodramatic primitivism disavows the castration of the 
classical westerner characteristic of the revisionist western. In DWW, this disavowal is 
achieved through the process by which Dunbar appropriates the suffering and victimhood 
of Native Americans, the process by which he disavows racial difference.  
The process by which Dunbar appropriates Native American victimhood is most 
perfectly played out in the film’s scenario of regenerative violence: the captivity of 
Dunbar by the American military. As the climax of the film’s action, this captivity 
sequence is significant because of its emotional and narrative dominance over the film’s 
other captivity narrative, the rather more classical abduction of a young Stands With a 
Fist by the psychopathically savage Pawnee.29 Through its repression of the classical 
captivity narrative in an emotionally-removed flashback, and through the foregrounding 
of Dunbar’s own captivity at the hands of American soldiers, Dances with Wolves allows 
its male protagonist to assume the position of a tragically suffering victim while 
displacing the suffering of a female character. Furthermore, because Kevin Costner is 
taken prisoner in the racial drag of Dances With Wolves, he misappropriates the 
victimization of Native Americans for white masculinity.  
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While this is the broad emotional strategy of the film’s melodrama, the specific 
tactics of this sequence revolve around the emotional dynamics of violence. Specifically, 
the most salient and memorable aspect of Dunbar’s captivity experience is the graphic, 
passionate violence visited on the white male body (Figure 19).  As the film’s most 
intense, intimate, and graphic portrayal of violence, this sequence is typical of a broader 
pattern in the film’s portrayal of white male suffering: white men kill each other, white 
men kill themselves, and white men are savaged by, well, savages (Figure 20).30 Except 
for one sequence in which Indian deaths result from inter-tribal warfare, very little 
violence is visited on the Indian body, and almost none of it is at the hands of whites. 
This is, perhaps, the film’s most troubling erasure, the process by which it allows the 
white male body a monopoly on physical agony. This recentering of white male suffering 
encourages historical amnesia as to the true victims of the violence of manifest destiny: 
American Indians.  
Figure 19. Channeling Andrew Steyn’s Stain. 
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This is the heart of the film’s 
ideological work. In its crucifixion of John 
Dunbar for the sins of manifest destiny, 
DWW appropriates the victimization of the 
American Indian for the redemption of the 
white male while deemphasizing past and 
ongoing colonial aggression against 
indigenous peoples. In terms of the film’s 
genericity, we should recognize that this 
emphasis on white suffering is a redemption 
and reiteration of classical frontier mythology and the classical western film. As Richard 
Slotkin writes, the redemption of the American character in frontier mythology has 
everything to do with a separation from civilization, a regression to a primitive state, and 
a scenario of regenerative violence. In the early stages of Euro-American colonial 
mythmaking, the particular scenario of regenerative violence was the captivity narrative. 
In the earliest forms of this narrative, the Christian purity of a white settler would be 
threatened by the savagery of their primitive captors: “by resisting the physical threats 
and spiritual temptations of the Indians, the captive vindicates both her own moral 
character and the power of the values she symbolizes” (Slotkin 15). In Dances with 
Wolves, Dunbar’s moral resolve is so great that he chooses to endure the most brutal 
treatment rather than betray his adopted culture. Rather than aid the American military in 
their persecution of the Lakota, Dances With Wolves defies his captors while staunchly 
Figure 20. White Male Agony. 
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professing his new worldview. He speaks in Lakota: “I am Dances With Wolves. I have 
nothing to say to you. You are not worth talking to.” 
In the scenes which follow, the degeneracy of his former colleagues is 
melodramatically emphasized. Having already killed Dunbar’s horse, the soldiers wipe 
their asses with his journal and shoot his pet wolf. Having done this work to establish 
Dunbar’s captors as unambiguously contemptuous, the film fulfills the second aspect of 
the classical American captivity narrative, the regenerative violence of the rescue. In this 
scene, several members the Lakota tribe liberate Dunbar from the clutches of his foul 
captors. To a very great extent, the violence of this sequence is not the morally 
ambiguous violence of the revisionist western (featured, for instance, in The Wild 
Bunch).31 On the contrary, it is the morally necessary violence of the classical western. 
This violence draws up the contrast between good and evil while demonstrating the 
power and mastery of Indians as benevolent victims.  
In other terms, the violence of this sequence is a revival of the chivalric violence 
of the classical western, in which the hero’s vengeance provides for the satisfaction of his 
honor and the performance of a task of social value. We may take the film’s social task to 
be a historically and generically revisionist one: the film is an apology for the racist 
stereotypes endemic to Hollywood’s Indian and an apology for the violence of manifest 
destiny (Newman 21; Matthews 42; Vera and Gordon 141). The film is a public ritual 
meant to exorcise white guilt over colonial genocide. It is in this sense that the film is a 
therapeutic commodification of Native Americans. This commodification works in 
harmony with the violence visited on the white body. While the violence visited on 
Dunbar’s body is his crucifixion, the scapegoating of white America’s sins on the site of 
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Christ’s body, this recentering of the suffering white male recenters and recuperates this 
figure as the mythical hero of the American frontier (Figure 21). 
Music, Redemption, and Generic Nostalgia 
 In the scenes of Dunbar’s physical and spiritual reconstitution on the prairie, the 
film’s non-diegetic soundtrack delivers a triumphant, easily discernable melody. This 
melody emphasizes the grandiosity of the landscape and construes Dunbar’s movement 
as a journey into a transcendental utopia. The non-diegetic music in this sequence is the 
first of several leitmotifs which literally underscore the narrative of masculine 
regeneration. This music is expressionistic, melodramatic, and Romantic.  
It is expressionistic in the sense that it externalizes the protagonist’s psychological 
and spiritual state. Furthermore, this music narrates Dunbar’s psychological experience as 
a function of his integration into a utopian mise-en-scene. John Barry, the composer of 
the film’s score, has said that his music was meant to express a transcendental experience 
of nature; “the music is the language of the spirit of the animals. … I like to score the 
inner feelings of a character – get into their shoes in an imaginative way and take the 
Figure 21. Cowboy Christ or White Masculinity in the Colonies. 
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audience there and enlighten them in a poetic rather than a realistic way” (Quoted in 
Matteo LI 15).  Remarking that the score was meant to supplement narrative and mise-
en- scène, Barry said in an interview that “[the protagonist] was a noble, simple and 
dedicated man who had a kind of purity in everything he did. … Because the look of the 
picture involved such a feeling of space, we envisioned a score that would be large and 
romantic. It uses a nice-size orchestra and a choir of 12 contraltos” (Quoted in Holden 
C20).  
While the non-diegetic music of DWW is expressionistic, it is also melodramatic 
in a compound sense. First, DWW is literally melodramatic: it is a drama with melody 
after the fashion of the Wagnerian leitmotif. The narrative of redemption on the open 
prairie motivates a memorable and triumphant melody set in a bright and uncompromised 
major key. Second, the leitmotif of this sequence is melodramatic because it establishes 
the wilderness as the mise-en-scène of utopia. Music codes the spectator’s understanding 
of place by drawing the mise-en-scène into the logic of the film’s Manichean binary. In 
the keying of a transcendental musical theme to its melodramatic moral structure, DWW 
achieves aesthetic and thematic harmony.  
Expressionism and melodrama are both aesthetic modes motivated by the anxiety 
of modernity, but they work in different ways. Whereas expressionism would foreground 
the anxiety of the protagonist, projecting his internal drama onto the mise-en-scène, 
melodrama would disavow modernity though the establishment of a moral utopia.32 
DWW blends these modes when it uses non-diegetic music as a non-naturalistic 
expression of modernity’s emotional crisis. In deciding whether the music of DWW 
works expressionistically or melodramatically, we should consider that the non-diegetic 
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music of popular narrative cinema is not broadly apprehended as non-naturalistic. This is 
true even though it is the most obviously non-naturalistic part of the moveigoing 
experience. There are no leitmotifs in our waking life (Gorbman, Music Criticism 72-
76).33 Whereas non-diegetic music is classical cinema’s most overt moment of narration, 
it is nonetheless not experienced as a narrative intrusion (Gorbman, Unheard 3). Quite 
the contrary: through the subordination of non-diegetic music to plots motivated by 
character, and through non-diegetic music’s commitment to the narration of these plots, 
non-diegetic music becomes as transparent as the editing of classical Hollywood style. 
Film music is generally regarded as inaudible and invisible (Bordwell, Thompson, and 
Straiger 33-35; Gorbman, Unheard 73-79; Flinn 36-37; Brown 1).34  
This transparency is crucial for DWW’s redemption of the classical western and 
its hero. Within the aesthetic mode of primitivist melodrama, the modern protagonist and 
his universe are redeemed by the harmonization of the protagonist’s soul with the soul of 
his world. Because the film’s travel sequence is about the transcendental integration of 
protagonist and landscape, it follows that music in this sequence would be an expression 
of both the protagonist’s soul and the soul of the world. While non-diegetic music may 
not be naturalistic, it is nostalgically supernatural. In DWW, non-diegetic music is 
transparent and unheard because it is metaphysically indistinguishable from the mise-en-
scène and Dunbar’s soul. By extension, the transparency of the film’s music is an 
indicator that the film would disavow its narrative address to the viewer. If this is the 
case, then it is also the case that the film would disavow its status as a western. This is 
crucial for the film’s generic nostalgia because the revisionist western depends on the 
ironic deflation of the classical western protagonist.  
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Indeed, DWW must establish a viewer who is willing to traverse a temporal axis 
of her own: the temporal axis of the evolution of the western film. This requires that the 
cinematic spectator disavow the existence of the revisionist western because the 
revisionist western problematizes the moral clarity of white suffering on the frontier. In 
the age of the revisionist western, the violence of the white man is an ambiguous 
signifier. It is the management of the ambiguous signifier that is the function of film 
music: “[music] functions to lull the spectator into being an untroublesome (less critical, 
less wary) viewing subject” (Gorbman, Unheard 58).   Gorbman writes more 
expansively: 
Music serves to ward off the displeasure of uncertain signification. … It interprets 
the image, pinpoints and channels the “correct” meaning of the narrative events 
depicted. It supplies information to complement the potentially ambiguous 
diegetic images and sounds. It cues the viewer to narrational positions. … It 
creates on one hand an ironic distance between viewer and characters, and, on the 
other, complicity with the film’s narrative voice. (Gorbman 58)35 
Music in DWW is formally nostalgic. Specifically, music in DWW works within 
the context of the revisionist western to disavow the fallen angel of manifest destiny. In 
an age of eclectic irony, in which the classical western and its revisionist counterpart are 
simultaneously available in the postmodern media array, the nostalgic formalism of 
DWW is an attempt to elude the irony precipitated by this field of contradictory texts. As 
Jim Collins writes, DWW is an example of what he has called “The New Sincerity”:  
[Films in this mode fantasize] the move back in time away from the corrupt 
sophistication of media culture toward a lost authenticity defined simultaneously 
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as a yet-to-be-contaminated folk culture of elemental purity, and as a site of 
successful narcissistic projection, the hero’s magic mirror … in which an 
originary genre text takes on a quasi-sacred function as a guarantee of 
authenticity. (259) 
In Collins’s analysis, the authenticity of the film’s Lakota Indians serves as a metaphor 
for the film’s aesthetic goal: the denial of intertextuality and the ironic ambiguity of the 
revisionist western. This denial is essential because the intertextuality of the revisionist 
western must preclude the un-ironic appreciation of the white male’s wilderness 
experience. Intertextuality demands the ironic skepticism of the cinematic spectator.  
 It is in the context of Collins’s essay that we should consider DWW’s non-diegetic 
music. Specifically, we should recognize John Barry’s lush, Romantic soundtrack as part 
of the revival of saturation scoring and the Wagnerian leitmotif. After the rise of the jazz 
score in the 1950s and the pop-music score of the 60s, the Romantic soundtrack was 
revived by John Williams in Jaws (1975), Star Wars (1977), and The Raiders of the Lost 
Ark (1981) (Cooke 463; Kalinak 184-202). Williams’s music “not only imbued the films 
with a spirit of heroism in the face of threatened evil … they also tended towards the old 
manner of saturation scoring, a trend often noticeable in genres that require a high degree 
of suspension of disbelief” (Cooke 462). DWW shares an affinity with Star Wars in the 
sense that its music is a reinforcement of the film’s moral melodrama. In the ironic 
context of the revisionist western, the establishment of the westerner as unequivocally 
heroic requires a great suspension of disbelief. In DWW, this suspension is accomplished 
by the saturation of the film’s diegetic world with an unambiguously heroic score.  
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 Finally, while the film’s music is part of the revival of the Wagnerian score, it is 
important to note that the Romantic soundtrack of the classical studio period was always 
already a nostalgic rendering of musical forms from the late-19th century (Cooke 79; 
Flinn 20). Classical Hollywood cinema was interested in Wagnerian Romanticism 
because of this music’s utopian disposition. In brief, this music pursued grandiosity, 
totality, and universality in reaction to 18th-century classicism’s “emphasis on structure 
and rationality” (Flinn 24). The utopian inclination of Romanticism was already a 
distinctly nostalgic mode in the 19th-century. It was a utopian rejection of the urban and 
the rational, the industrial revolution and the Enlightenment (Ferber 15, 99). The 
Romantic notion of the sublime entails the harmonization of a modern individual with the 
grandiosity of the primitive, natural world (Flinn 25; Ferber 99-101).  
It is fitting that DWW reinforces a Romantic narrative with a neo-Wagnerian 
score. In doing so, the film achieves a compound nostalgia: the nostalgia for moral 
clarity, the nostalgia for the mythic westerner, the nostalgia for a pre-industrial Eden. 
Moreover, the complex nostalgia of its soundtrack reinforces the film’s narrative: 
Dunbar’s journey back in time is itself reliant on the nostalgia inherent in the colonial 
axis of the temporal imaginary. Richard Wagner may as well have been lauding DWW 
when he wrote that “it is the expression of an honorable wish to reach back from an 
unlovely present to the past, and therefrom to reconstruct lost beauty” (Quoted in Flinn 
13).  In DWW, Dunbar seeks to traverse a Romantic axis. This axis perceives the 
alienation of the urban present in contradistinction to the plenitude of a rural past. Dunbar 
is the film’s attempt to redeem the postmodern westerner with the figure of the Romantic 
genius, a figure doubled in the off-screen celebrity of Kevin Costner, who was celebrated, 
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Romantically, as an artistic genius.36 The classical westerner is a natural avatar for the 
revival of this Romantic figure, as the westerner, like the artist after Romanticism, is 
perceived as that individual who seeks self-actualization in his sojourn away from the 
urban present.37  
 In the film’s final sequence, when Costner and the Lakota Indians bid their 
emotional farewells, Dances with Wolves delivers its Romantic, melodramatic score for 
the final time. In this scene, the film’s non-diegetic score reinforces the film’s most 
troubling construction. As Kicking Bird and company wistfully gaze after the absconding 
white couple, Wind In His Hair hails Costner from a nearby canyon wall. In a rather 
unfortunate turn, the film insists on bestializing Wind In His Hair, echoing this shot with 
a similar shot of howling wolf (Figure 22). 38  
From his melodramatic perch, Wind In His Hair passionately shouts; “Dances 
With Wolves, I am Wind In His Hair. Do you see that I am your friend? Can you see that 
you will always be my friend?”  In its management of this scene’s narrative connotations, 
and in its efforts to placate political concern over the trope of the vanishing Indian, the 
film’s score makes a final, Wagnerian argument: that this is a beautiful if melancholy 
vision of a fading dream, of a utopia that was and can never be again. As the white couple 
flees, the nostalgia effect of the film’s soundtrack is verbally reinforced with the film’s 
Figure 22. Indian as Animal Spirit. 
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sole intertitle: “Thirteen years later, their homes destroyed, their buffalo gone, the last 
band of free Sioux submitted to white authority at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. The great 
horse culture of the plains was gone and the American frontier was soon to pass into 
history.” 
 In this final sequence, the film domesticates the primitive other as vanishing 
Indian. Indeed, the perfect past tense of the film’s closing intertitle constructs their 
disappearance as a forgone conclusion. In contrast to the vanishing primitive, Kevin 
Costner may return to the present as a self-actualized denizen of the late-20th century. 
Unlike the Native American, Costner and McDonnell are free escape, with the cinematic 
spectator, back to the future.39 Like The Gods Must Be Crazy, the final scene in Dances 
with Wolves is about the difference between white people and their primitive others: the 
core of this difference is the exclusive racial privilege that white people may claim on 
temporal travel. Just as in The Gods Must Be Crazy, the difference between moderns and 
primitives is the difference between mobility and fixity. It is this ideological constellation 
that motivates the film’s final narrative action. As Costner explains to Kicking Bird, the 
American military will pursue Costner as their sworn enemy. For the sake of the safety of 
the tribe, so his story goes, Costner must leave the Lakota, return to white civilization, 
and preach the gospel of inter-racial tolerance. While this seems philanthropic, this is a 
rationale which masks the domestication of the primitive. In Heart of Darkness and 
Apocalypse Now, contact with the savage primitive involves an irrevocable madness. In 
contrast, contact with the noble primitive in Dances with Wolves is as temporary for its 




The Western, The Epic, and Ceremonies of Settler Innocence 
In its disavowal of genre, DWW is an example of melodrama that we should 
properly refer to as epic. The film’s formal affinity with the classical epic allows the film 
to function as a ceremony of settler innocence. In the context of the revisionist western, 
the viewer of DWW would have been right to expect some version of Don Quixote rather 
than Achilles. However, audiences received Dunbar in chivalric terms; “Lt Dunbar is 
simple, honorable, and gallant, as befitting the classic Western hero” (Matthews 89). 
Whereas Don Quixote is an apt prototype for the revisionist westerner, functioning 
himself as a parodic comment on the mythical deflation of the medieval knight, Dunbar’s 
knighthood defies the irony of the revisionist westerner. Dunbar’s traversal of the 
temporal axis of the colonial imaginary allows him to inhabit the metaphysical space of 
Lukács’s integrated civilization, the dimension in which “the starry sky is the map of all 
possible paths – ages whose paths are illuminated by the light of the stars. … The world 
is wide and yet it is like a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential 
nature as the stars” (Lukács 29).  It is no coincidence that the publicity campaign for 
DWW eschewed the word “western” opting instead for “epic.”40 The sincerity of DWW is 
so formally nostalgic that we might rightfully call it an “epic” in the sense Lukács 
employs in The Theory of the Novel. It is as if Costner qua Quixote had reenchanted the 
frontier with the sheer force of his nostalgic delusion. It is as if Don Quixote’s readers 
gave themselves over to the beauty of our hero’s Romantic vision.  
From a postcolonial standpoint, this generic and metaphysical nostalgia is the 
film’s greatest danger. Even though I know I’m being manipulated, even though I know 
Dances with Wolves is melodramatic catharsis that validates white privilege, I find 
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myself weeping as Wind in His Hair howls his ecstatic farewell. 41 In Dances with 
Wolves, melodrama serves as a metaphysical court of law which allows the acquittal of 
the classic westerner:  this is what it means to cry in the film’s final scene.42 Just as the 
film’s soundtrack tames the recalcitrance of the troublesome viewer, the broader effect of 
the film’s melodrama is the displacement of critical thought with an emotional ceremony 
of settler innocence.43 After thirty years of revisionist westerns, Adam as westerner was 
wandering in exile. One would think, in light of contemporary understandings of manifest 
destiny, that this exile would be irrevocable. And yet, the passion of the white Christ in 
Dance with Wolves, especially as it is narrated by a supernatural score, endorses a 
quixotic delusion of melodramatic primitivism, winning uncritical sympathy for its errant 
knight.44  
Conclusion: Imperialist Nostalgia and Temporal Elitism 
 However, it is not primarily that the film’s generic nostalgia redeems American 
Adam for the historical sins of manifest destiny. On the contrary, the film’s generic 
nostalgia disavows the ongoing transgressions of settler-colonial relations. The film’s 
nostalgic, Romantic, and epic qualities are moves to settler innocence because they 
operate along a primitivist axis of time. In turn, this axis of time and its denial of 
coevalness perform the historical containment of colonial violence and the suffering of 
indigenous people. 
DWW disavows the ongoing transgressions of settler colonialism by means of 
imperialist nostalgia. Imperialist nostalgia is the colonizer’s yearning for the very forms 
of life which he or she has destroyed. As such, imperialist nostalgia is a settler move to 
innocence; “In any of its versions, imperialist nostalgia uses a pose of ‘innocent yearning’ 
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both to capture people’s imaginations and to conceal its complicity with often brutal 
domination” (Rosaldo 108). As Rosaldo writes more expansively: 
Imperial nostalgia occurs alongside a peculiar sense of mission, the white man’s 
burden, where civilized nations stand duty bound to uplift so-called savage ones. 
In this ideologically constructed world of ongoing progressive change, putatively 
static savage societies become a stable reference point for defining (the felicitous 
progress of) civilized identity. “We” valorize innovation and then yearn for more 
stable worlds, whether these reside in our own past, in other cultures, or in the 
conflation of the two. Such forms of longing thus appear closely related to secular 
notions of progress. When the so-called civilizing process destabilizes forms of 
life, the agents of change experience transformations of other cultures as if they 
were personal losses. (108) 
John Dunbar’s redemption depends on his assumption of an indigenous identity. 
This appropriation entails a traversal of colonial time. The melodramatic morality of the 
primitive : modern binary is structured according to imperialist nostalgia. Dunbar’s 
journey is therapeutic because the past is a location of moral and ontological purity.  
DWW’s iteration of imperialist nostalgia disavows the ongoing structure of settler 
colonialism through the local tactic of the adoption fantasy.  In DWW, this fantasy figures 
the vanishing Indian as the historical hardship of a white protagonist. First, this means 
that the very trauma of indigenous people is appropriated by a white male. Second, the 
appropriation of trauma replicates the appropriation of land while functioning as a 
symbolic reconciliation between settler and Native. This is particularly significant given 
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the emerging experience of colonial violence as trauma and the inability of national 
reconciliation ceremonies to address this trauma in a meaningful way.45  
In DWW, the appropriation of trauma via imperialist nostalgia is all the more 
effective as a settler move to innocence because of the historicity inherent in the very 
ideas of disappearance and loss. Dunbar experiences loss within the confines of a 
historical vignette. The moral purity of his loss is afforded by his appropriation of a 
utopian culture. Nostalgia over this vanishing culture disavows ongoing settler-colonial 
relations because it is a sadness over the foreclosure of indigenous futurity. Through the 
appropriation of a suffering which is anachronistic rather than contemporary, Kevin 
Costner displaces white guilt over the ongoing structure of settler-colonial violence with 
the performance of guilt over violence as a historical event. 
By this technique, DWW denies that colonial violence “is reasserted each day of 
the occupation” (Tuck and Yang 5). Imperialist nostalgia is so well suited for this denial 
because it is predicated on the impossibility of a relationship between contemporary 
settler/subjects and anachronistic indigenous/objects. Nostalgia for a lost object 
necessitates the absence of that object. The disappearance of an object precludes the 
abuse of that object. As it allows this move to settler innocence, imperialist nostalgia is a 
nefarious form of temporal elitism. In DWW, this temporal elitism works through the 
satisfaction of the settler desire that “indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made 
into ghosts” (Tuck and Yang 6). In its transubstantiation of Wind in his Hair from human 
to wolf, DWW presents the American Indian as a Holy Ghost who may make Adam 
whole. As a congregant at the altar of the American Spirit, Costner consumes the Native 
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body as the redeeming body of Christ. Tuck and Yang write; “the settler is natural, 
whereas the indigenous inhabitant [is] unnatural, even supernatural” (6).46 
Here, the primitive : modern binary is analogous to the sacred : temporal binary of 
western spirituality. This analogical structure condemns the primitive qua poltergeist. 
While the settler suffers and strives in the fallen world of the temporal dimension, the 
Indian is relegated to an ahistorical limbo. In Dances with Wolves, the settler may claim 
the Indian spirit as a (super)natural resource on the temporal (Great)plane(s). The Indian 





1 Here, and throughout this dissertation, my language and concepts are informed by Tuck and  Yang 1-40.  
 
2 For two very thoroughgoing analyses of the origins, precedents, and prevalence of this ideology, see 
Pearce 82-89, and Berkhofer  44-53.  
 
3 As Berkhofer reports, settler colonial attitudes toward America’s indigenous people were informed by 
progressive models of time known as “conjectural history.” These models explicitly privileged white 
society while endorsing settler-colonial violence: 
In conjectural or theoretical history, the ranking of societies that was part of the comparative 
method became a theory of progression. By analogy between the life cycle of a human being and 
the history of the species, philosophers in the eighteenth century, espescially in France and 
Scotland, produced a history of the sequence of stages of society that the race had passed through 
to reach the height of progress exemplified in Europe at the time. Just as the single person 
advanced from infancy through youth to reach adulthood, so all humankind had passed through 
savagery and barbarism before gaining civilization. (47) 
4 According to Tuck and Yang, settler moves to innocence are: 
those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or 
responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. 
In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so 
sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. (10)  
 
5 Tuck and Yang identify the origins of the adoption fantasy in the writings of James Fennimore Cooper: 
Across all five books, Cooper’s epic hero is Natty Bumpo, a white man ‘gone native’, at home in 
nature, praised for his wisdom and ways that are both Indian and white. In Last of the Mohicans, 
this hero becomes the adopted son of Chingachgook, fictional chief of the fictional tribe 
“Mohicans”, who renames Natty, Nathaniel Hawkeye – thus legitimating and completing his 
Indigeneity. At the same time, Chingachgook conveniently fades into extinction. In a critical 




adopted, indigenous white man, Hawkeye. When Uncas dies, the ramification is obvious: 
Hawkeye becomes without becoming the last of the Mohicans. You are now one of us you are not 
Native. “The pale-faces are masters of the earth, and the time of the red-men has not yet come 
again” (15) 
 
6 The genre experienced a decade of abeyance following the commercial and critical catastrophe of 
Heaven’s Gate (1980) (Russell 142). 
 
7 Referring to the explicitly Darwinian struggle of The Vanishing American (1925), Michael Riley writes; 
“in being cast as the last practitioners of a dying way of life the vanquished Indians are at best only the 
ghosts of the past” (62).   
 
8 See Nolley 73-90. 
 
9 Slotkin’s commentary on the Indian in Stagecoach is particularly brief, and mentions nothing of temporal 
elitism; “the Indians are a menacing abstraction for most of the film, and their final eruption into the frame 
is so predictable, so conventionally treated, and so visually stimulating that is seems as much a release of 
tension as the arrival of a crisis”  (306). Telotte writes that the American Indian in Union Pacific is more an 
incarnation of an obstructive chaos than he is an anachronistic, ethnographic specimen; “They are simply 
one of the more complex, curious, and dangerous obstacles standing in the way of what one character terms 
‘this mighty enterprise’ of national building” (148).   
 
10 In his nostalgia for the West, Costner may be unaware of the generic history with which his film 
interacts: 
Costner never distinguishes between different western cycles, and his nostalgic view seems to 
erase of elide the more pessimistic, revisionist sentiments (which critique the expansion of whites 
into “Indian territory”) as part of a “classic” western narrative, suggesting that Costner’s highly 
nostalgic conception of the Hollywood western differs radically from critical accounts. (Russell 
146) 
 
11 For other interpretations of the parallel between Dunbar’s racial journey and the film’s genericity, see 
Russell 142-158, and Collins 242-262. 
  
12 In The Invention of the Western Film, Scott Simmon cites this quote from The Big Trail (1930) as the 
central argument of the classical western: 
We can’t turn back. We’re blazing a trail that started in England! Not even the storms of the sea 
could turn back those first settlers. And they carried it on further. They blazed it on through the 
wilderness of Kentucky. Famine, hunger, not even massacres could stop them. And now we’ve 
picked up the trail again, and nothing can stop us. Not even the snows of winter, nor the peaks of 
the highest mountains. We’re building a nation! But we’ve got to suffer. No great trail was ever 
blazed without hardship. And you’ve got to fight. That’s life! And when you stop fighting, that’s 
death. (Quoted in Simmon 118)  
 
13 The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance is a key example of a film that problematized the mythology of 
western violence. The film is about the protagonist’s attempt to debunk the popular legend that his killing 
of the eponymous Liberty had been a melodramatically uncompromised victory of good over evil and the 
execution of chivalric violence. Instead, the film’s extended flashback is the protagonist’s confession that 
his violent engagement with Liberty actually represents the failure of his own moral resolve and his 
commitment to the ideals of law, order, and the democratic resolution of conflict. Moreover, the protagonist 
admits that it was not actually his bullet that killed Liberty Valance, but rather that of the protagonist’s 
friendly rival, played by John Wayne. 
 
14  Bandy and Stoehr write: 
The Vanishing American depicts injustices suffered by Indians at the hands of a sadistic 




the history of past injustices suffered by “weaker” races and peoples. But this prologue winds up 
espousing a principle of Darwinist determinism – and so “the weak” must accept that they will 
simply perish in the end, a principle that undercuts the otherwise sympathetic subject matter. (15-
16) 
 
15 Howard Hawks’s Red River (1948) is a fine example of developmental ideology. In an opening scene, 
John Wayne arrives triumphantly at a vast expanse of unused land and presides over this vacant earth with 
an imperial, developmental gaze. He declares that in ten years all of this “empty” land will be covered in 
“good beef.” 
 
16 In Stagecoach, John Wayne’s revenge plot is intertwined with civilizational and redemptive violence. 
Having broken out of jail to pursue his revenge against the men who killed his father and brother, Wayne’s 
character gains redemption in two scenarios of violence: the first is the successful defense of the film’s 
eponymous stagecoach from a band of faceless Indians, the second is his successful execution of the men 
responsible for his family’s murder. In a surprise ending which signifies Ringo’s redemption, the marshal 
responsible for Wayne’s return to prison sets Wayne loose in the wilderness with his love interest.    
 
17 In Cecil B. Demille’s The Plainsman (1936),  the protagonist’s imperative to tame the West (an 
imperative delivered by no less a man than Abraham Lincoln) is satisfied through the protagonist’s just 
revenge against savage Indians and the traders who sell those Indians Winchester rifles. In the killing of 
these villains, the protagonist wreaks his just revenge for the torture he endured at the hands of savages 
while simultaneously making the frontier safe for future generations of white settlers.  
  Similarly, in My Darling Clementine, the revenge quest is explicitly tied to social and 
civilizational progress. In an early scene in which Henry Fonda’s Wyatt Earp kneels over the grave of his 
slain brother, Earp vows to avenge his brother’s death and, in the process, secure the frontier for the safety 
of future generations of young men and women.  
  
18 As Bapis writes: 
Paul Newman’s pacifist Butch Cassidy did not know how to “shoot” a man, and Jon Voight could 
not figure out why potent markers – the buckskin jacket, cowboy boots, and a hat – did not draw 
New York City women to him like a magnet. Even Rooster Coogan had aged. He was “retired,” 
patch-eyed, and addicted to booze. The remaking of the American man by reinventing the Western 
persona drew the attention of millions but signaled the passing of the standard, “professional” 
hero. (162) 
 
19 The revisionist western and the revisionist war film conjoined in The Green Berets (1968), a commercial 
and critical flop starring an aging John Wayne. As Rasmussen and Downey write:  
Prior to Vietnam the film industry generally justified, explained, and even encouraged American 
war efforts. That response, which had seemed suitable to the two world wars and the political 
climate surrounding the Korean conflict, was inappropriate given the socio-political controversy 
surrounding Vietnam. For example, Bayles observes that John Wayne’s The Green Berets, “set in 
the confident days of 1963, fashioned in the style of 1949, nd lobbed like a grenade into 1968,” 
was panned by critics and mocked by servicemen because of the incongruity of its juxtaposition 
against contemporary reactions to the war. (176) 
 
20 See Hellman 418-439.  
 
21 For an analysis of the narratological similarities of Apocalypse Now to Heart of Darkness, see Cahir 181-
187. 
 
22 For an analysis of Dances with Wolves as an American Heart of Darkness, see Ostwalt 209-216. 
 





24  As Philip Deloria observes, playing Indian has a long history in the United States, going back most 
notably to the Boston Tea Party and taking significant incarnations in both  Indian-themed fraternal 
organizations of the mid-19th century and the explosion of “scouting” in the early 20th. With regard to the 
Boston Tea Party, Deloria writes that the Indian was taken as a symbol of unfettered liberty and 
independence from the Old World, and was perceived by settler colonists as that icon of what was uniquely 
American. Dismissing the claim that Indian costume was used to mask identity during the Boston Tea 
Party, Deloria writes that “the performance of Indian Americanness afforded a powerful foundation for 
subsequent pursuits of national identity” (7). This identity, in turn, is based on the two-fold nature of the 
noble savage stereotype. Because it signifies freedom and a natural, indigenous Americanness, the noble 
Indian was taken as a signifier of American exceptionalism. In contrast, the savage Indian allowed the 
construction of colonial America as a civilizing force (Deloria 1-9). Since the Boston Tea Party, Americans 
have continued to play Indian as a means of coping with contemporary circumstances, and Deloria locates 
the mythopoetic men’s movement within the tradition of white Americans playing Indian:  
In the antebellum United States, would-be national poets donned Indian garb and read lyrics to 
each other around midnight backwoods campfires. At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
thoroughly modern children of angst-ridden upper- and middle-class parents wore feathers and 
slept in tipis and wigwams at camps with multi-syllabic Indian names. Their equally nervous post-
World War II descendants made Indian dress and powwow-going into a hobby, with formal 
newsletters and regular monthly meetings. Over the past thirty years, the counterculture, the New 
Age, the men’s movement, and a host of other Indian performance options have given meaning to 
Americans lost in a (post)modern freefall. In each of these historical moments, Americans have 
returned to the Indian, reinterpreting the intuitive dilemmas surrounding Indianness to meet the 
circumstances of their times. (Deloria 7)  
Similar to Deloria, Huhndorf writes that anxieties about modernity have motivated white Americans to play 
Indian throughout the 20th century. However, the Indian as therapeutic alter-ego tends to have distinct 
ideological consequence for renderings of colonial conflict. As Huhndorf writes; “Ironically, even as they 
articulate anxieties about modernity, these representations and events also reaffirm the racialized, 
progressivist ethos of industrial capitalism” (14). Further, Huhndorf writes that white people’s indigenous 
masquerade “obscures the relations between the colonizers and the colonized … by inviting [settlers] to 
occupy Natives’ places and histories” (202).  
 
25 Gallagher writes; “fragmented shots of the hero’s body in action and multiple angle views of the same 
body signify the hero’s threatened or fractured masculinity”(208). 
 
26 Natali notes that DWW inherits this pictorial spatialization of time from a tradition in 19th century 
American; “In many paintings of the 19th century, where the point of view of the artist implicitly prescribes 
that of the spectator, the left or ‘west’ side of the canvas is frequently occupied by the primeaval forest, 
with a few Indians, symbols of primitive America’s past, its savagery and prehistory” (114).  
 
27 For an analysis of the spectator’s identification with the camera, see Metz 42-56. 
 
28 I am working in parallel to observations made by Philip Deloria in Playing Indian. He writes that the 
Native American became a symbol of authenticity and wholesomeness in the 20th century for a white 
America beleaguered by the shocks of industrial capitalism after the Civil War. In this era, Americans 
began to “question progress when they saw their fellow citizens defined as cogs in industrial machines 
rather than as independent yeomen” (99). As a response to this anxiety over modernity, white America 
played Indian throughout the 20th century in a search for authenticity and wholesomeness. As Deloria 
writes, the search for authenticity in a post-lapsarian modernity often takes Indianness as its object and 
other: 
The authentic, as numerous scholars have pointed out, is a culturally constructed category created 
in opposition to a perceived state of inauthenticity. The authentic serves as a way to image and 
idealize the real, the traditional, and the organic in opposition to the less satisfying qualities of 
everyday life. The ways people construct authenticity depend upon both the traumas that define 
the maligned inauthentic and upon the received heritage that has defined the authentic in the past. 




locate authenticity in the figure of an Other. This Other can be coded in terms of time (nostalgia or 
archaism), place (the small town), or culture (Indianness). The quest for such an authentic Other is 
a characteristically modern phenomenon, one that has often been played out in the contradictions 
surrounding America’s long and ambivalent engagement with Indianness. (101) 
 
29 Indeed, Stands With a Fist’s captivity narrative has been recognized by Gene McQuillan to have formal 
affinities with classical colonial settler narratives, while at the same time taking a modified form in such a 
way as to construct a good Indian / bad Indian dichotomy: 
[Stands With a Fist] gradually recalls a scene which could have been lifted directly from an 
eighteenth-century captivity narrative. On a sunny day, children are playing with chickens and 
puppies near a farm house, an outdoor table is set for a picnic, and the parents sit happily in the 
midst of this pastoral calm. The sudden arrival of several Indian warriors leads to a brief exchange 
of words. As the settlers turn to walk away, a warrior plants a tomahawk in the back of one of 
them, and a slaughter ensues. In the midst of all this confusion, a young girl named Christine 
(Stands With a Fist) is able to run away and hide. It is important to note that the marauding 
Indians are clearly identified as Pawnees, the “bad Indians” of this film. They do not discover 
Christine’s hiding place, and she is eventually found by the Sioux tribe…The presence of Stands 
With a Fist in the Sioux camp, rather than proving the tribe’s capacity for evil, suggests the tribe’s 
capacity for mercy. (McQuillan 77-78) 
 
30 In my reference to “savages” I must clarify that Dances with Wolves represents Native Americans as 
such. Specifically, the film’s Pawnee Indians are “savage” by the terms of the film’s internal logic. While a 
sympathetic rendering of the Lakota, Dances with Wolves is equally unsympathetic with its portrayal of the 
Pawnee. This representation in the film is a cinematic rendering of a similar representation in the novel of 
the film’s source material. Consider this particularly racist excerpt from Michael Blake’s novel Dances 
with Wolves: 
[The Pawnee] saw with unsophisticated but ruthlessly efficient eyes, eyes that, once fixed on an 
object, decided in a twinkling where (sic) it should live or die. And if it was determined that the 
object could cease to live, the Pawnee saw to its death with psychotic precision. When it came to 
dealing death, the Pawnee were automatic, and all of the Plains Indians feared them as they did no 
one else. (Quoted in Riding In 94)  
 
31 The opening and closing shootouts of The Wild Bunch are extended, repulsive, almost pornographic 
sequences of meaningless, amoral violence. Significantly, this violence is perpetrated, not by evildoers who 
will eventually meet their demise at the hands of some chivalric hero, but, on the contrary, by the band of 
men with whom we are meant to identify. These are the anti-heroes of the revisionist western and this is its 
morally ambiguous violence. 
 
32 For a discussion of expressionism as a function of modernity, the anxiety of the subject, and the 
externalization of repressed anxiety in the modern subject, see Hayward 172 -176, Beaver  92-94. 
 
33 Gorbman argues that Dances with Wolves perpetuates the classic splitting of the American Indian into the 
noble and savage components of the noble savage stereotype, and that this splitting is keyed to the film’s 
non-diegetic music. She writes; “John Barry’s score hails from the grand, lush, neo-romantic 1930’s 
tradition of Erich Korngold and Max Steiner, which continues into contemporary movies with John 
Williams… It is replete with beautiful themes that give narrative clarity and emotional force to the story.” 
(Drums 191).  
 
34 Before the use of non-diegetic music in King Kong, producers worried that audiences would demand to 
know the source of off-screen music (Brown 62-63). Brown writes; “King Kong greatly helped the original, 
classical film score become what it was and what it largely remains today: an integral component of a given 
motion picture’s overall profile that is so expected in people’s minds that nonuse often becomes 
noteworthy” (62). 
 





36 Ferber writes; “No characteristic of Romanticism is more prominent than the prestige, even glory, which 
it confers on the poet. He acquires the stature of prophet, priest, and preacher, hero, law giver, and creator; 
he grows almost into a god” (32). 
 
37 Flinn writes; “it was during the romantic era that the artist was first perceived in opposition to society” 
(28).   
 
38 The absconding white couple in Dances with Wolves not only echoes the racial, divergent montage of 
The Gods Must Be Crazy, it replicates the miscegenation anxiety of the classical, colonial captivity 
narrative. Gene McQuillan writes; “like Natty Bumpo, the children of Dances with Wolves and Stands 
With a Fist would be able to claim that they are ‘without a cross,’ that they have ‘the full blood of whites’” 
(80-81).   
 
39 Back to the Future Part III (1990), like its predecessor Back to the Future (1985), literally dramatizes 
white access to the temporal continuum. In a much more literal way than Dances with Wolves, Back to the 
Future III dramatizes the ability of white people to both visit, and escape, the Old West. 
 
40 Greg Evans writes; “wary of having ‘Wolves’ perceived as a Hollywood Western, Orion will begin its 
marketing campaign by targeting an upscale and decidedly adult audience. Per the studio exec, ‘Wolves’ is 
being positioned as a serious ‘epic,’ with a docu-like depiction of Native American life” (97). 
 
41 I paraphrase Teju Cole, who writes via twitter; “The White Savior Industrial Complex is not about  
justice. It is about having a big emotional experience that validates privilege” 8 March 2012, Tweet. 
 
42  This metaphysical, melodramatic, and cinematic court of law exists in parallel to literal, legal courts 
which have routinely and uniformly sanctioned and justified settler colonial appropriation of indigenous 
land and sovereignty. As Mark Rifkin writes in Manifesting America, a juridical tradition in the United 
States dating to the ante-bellum period relies on the notion of legal acquiescence to justify a doctrine of the 
impossibility of reparation. Rifkin writes that, because the imperial legal establishment of settler America 
has discursively manufactured the consent of indigenous peoples, this perceived consent makes reparation 
“impossible.” More broadly, Rifkin writes that this is the tactic by which the United States discursively 
transformed foreign land into domestic space. He writes:  
The imperial structure of U.S. jurisdiction prior to the Civil War … inheres to this double 
movement [of consent and impossibility]: recoding land formerly beyond the purview of U.S. 
governance as intimately embedded in national space; and producing subjectivities for 
involuntarily interiorized peoples that are designed to testify to their non-coerced acceptance of 
their place in national life. (6) 
 
43 Linda Williams writes; “Audiences of melodrama are positioned like juries of common law trials. Guilt 
or innocence is determined by orchestrated recognitions of truth that are inextricably tied to how audiences, 
who are essentially juries of peers, feel toward the accused” (81).  
 
44  With the release of James Cameron’s Avatar (2009) came a resurgence in academic and popular interest 
with the “white savior film” and apprehensions of the white messiah complex in popular American culture 
as a function of globalization and international development.  
Hernan Vera and Andrew Gordon write that these films feature the white protagonist as “the great 
white leader who saves blacks from slavery or oppression, rescues people of color from poverty and 
disease, or leads Indians into battle for their dignity and survival” (33). Following Vera and Gordon, 
Matthew Hughley writes that this genre has been motivated by the crisis of whiteness in the late-20th 
century. During a time of widespread assault on narratives of white supremacy, and during a time in which 
the white middle class has perceived threats to its economic and social status as a new norm, the narratives 
of mainstream media have compensated for white anxiety with representations of triumphant white 
redeemers. The ideological work of this genre has been to repair damaged myths of white normalcy and 




A basic formulation of the white savior complex holds that the disenfranchisement, 
underdevelopment, or backwardness of non-white people necessitates the benevolent intervention of the 
white First World in the affairs of the non-white Third, and as such, the white savior film is a revival of the 
colonial attitude of manifest destiny (Hughley 9). However, the white savior complex in not simply playing 
out on the silver screen. Katherine M. Bell argues that the on-screen white heroes who battle against dark 
and ominous forces often take real-world counterparts in celebrity philanthropists. These people are 
“constructed as redeemer[s] of distant Others. …This philanthropic role mingles with a celebrity’s on-stage 
personas to create the White Saviour, a powerful brand of contemporary cultural authority” (Bell 1).  
Considering that DWW, The Last Samurai, and Avatar are three salient iterations of the white 
savior film, and considering the near universal apprehension that Avatar was in many ways a remake of 
DWW, it stands to reason that the global popularity and commercial success of Avatar warrants a rereading 
of DWW. Avatar’s popularity and ubiquity demonstrate that the white savior film, especially in its 
expression within contemporary primitivism, is a still-emerging mode of popular American cinema. By 
reading DWW in the context of this still developing mode, we can better understand its ideological work. 
For instance, while Avatar’s white male is the literal savior of his adopted tribe, defending the natives from 
the dystopian forces of an environmentally exploitative, neo-colonial military industrial complex, in DWW, 
the disappearance and defeat of the Lakota Indians and the closing of the American Frontier is always 
already presented as a foregone conclusion. As such, these two films, while holding so much in common, 
exhibit two very different mythologies of the white male savior. In Avatar, the white protagonist is a very 
literal on-screen image of the liberal white savior, dashing in to save a Third World primitive which cannot 
be expected to save itself from the onslaught of a colonial force. In DWW, the eco-Peace Corps-tourist-
philanthropist simply abandons the Indians to their inevitable demise. The film’s emphasis on the passion 
of the white male body and its explicit invocation of the crucifixion suggest that DWW activates the passion 
of a white Christ. It does so in a way which caters to white guilt over the genocide of manifest destiny.  
Thus, as Hughley argues, the film redeems whiteness in an age when white privilege is under 
attack. While the Indian is left to vanish into the American past, Christ is left to redeem the white celebrity 
philanthropist. Indeed, Bell observes that this outcome is a structural norm of the genre; “As publicity 
generated by famous people highlights the dire social and political inequalities of our time, celebrity 
philanthropy … generates a cultural authority that recenters whiteness, and in turn burnishes the celebrity 
brand” (Bell 2). Just as privileged volunteers in far-flung, poverty stricken locales are often criticized for 
their pursuit of emotional catharsis and personal development under the guise of altruism, a review of the 
trade press in the months following DWW’s release leaves little question that anyone was better served by 
the film than Keven Costner, who won several Academy Awards, earned millions of dollars, cemented his 
reputation as motion picture royalty, and burnished his reputation as a defender of the disenfranchised 
(Newman 21; Matthews 42; Salisbury 35).  
 
45 Dion Million writes in Therapeutic Nations; “indigenous people in the late-20th and 21st century came to 
understand the systematic, ongoing colonial violence which they endure as a trauma” (7). In her analysis of 
the inadequacies of symbolic acts of national “healing,” Millon writes: 
Human rights as a field of struggle … poses an international arena wherein Indigenous peoples 
have consistently engaged … in moral affective contestation with the nation-states whose 
“sovereignty” they challenge. This is an engagement that requires successful affective argument 
given the turn to the moral ethos of trauma. Canada looked to this field of human rights law in the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where it asks for a reconciliation 
between a victim and a perpetrator in the same moment that any actual political power for 
Canadian Indigenous peoples is continuously deferred to a future self-healing from capitalism’s 
present and ongoing violence. (12) 
Finally, Million is clear that these acts of national reconciliation as therapy have not been effective in 
addressing the ongoing violence of settler-colonial relations; “the reconciliation that indigenes are called on 
to trust as acts of justice do not actually stop the removal of Indigenous women, or stop the social welfare 
interventions and criminalization that are endemic to Indigenous peoples and nations” (23). 
 
46 In The Transit of Empire, Jodi Byrd identifies a similar construction of the Indian in critical theory. She 
writes; “American Indians and other indigenous peoples have often been evoked in [critical theory] as past 




national progress who haunt the United States on the cusp of empire and are destined to disappear with the 





 THE VANISHING INDIAN AND THE LAST SAMURAI: IMPERIALIST 
NOSTALGIA AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
Like Dances with Wolves, The Last Samurai (2003) would redeem the myth of 
manifest destiny and its classical hero.1 In both films, a white man abandons the project 
of manifest destiny and finds redemption in an anachronistic culture. By featuring 
morally exceptional protagonists, these films are ceremonies of racial reconciliation and 
setter moves to innocence.2 While Chapter III explored the redemption of the western as 
a settler move to innocence, this chapter argues that imperialist nostalgia in The Last 
Samurai was a response to anxieties precipitated by The War on Terror. Specifically, the 
bad Oriental of The War on Terror threatens the settler colonist’s exclusive claim to 
futurity because “the terrorist” is constructed as both medieval and techno-sophisticated. 
As a response to this anxiety, the good Oriental of The Last Samurai reaffirms the 
inevitable triumph of the colonial project and the temporal exceptionalism of the settler 
colonist because he is constructed as the vanishing Indian.  
This thesis synthesizes two intellectual frameworks: Renato Rosaldo’s imperialist 
nostalgia, and Jodi Byrd’s observation that the reproduction of Indianness manufactures 
the imperative of empire. As we saw in Dances with Wolves, imperialist nostalgia is the 
longing of the colonist for the primordial state of the very culture which she has 
destroyed. This nostalgia masks the colonist’s complicity in colonial violence (Rosaldo 
108). The Last Samurai activates imperialist nostalgia, vis-à-vis The War on Terror, 
through the reproduction of Indianness in the Orient. As Jodi Byrd writes, the 
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reproduction of Indianness in Asia and the Middle East serves an imperative to Anglo-
American mastery because this reproduction activates the logic of manifest destiny (xx).3 
Both The Last Samurai and The War on Terror project Indianness into The Orient. While 
The War on Terror constructed the techno-sophisticated terrorist as a terrifying Indian 
savage, The Last Samurai activates the therapy of imperialist nostalgia in the figure of a 
good Indian who is unambiguously anachronistic and inevitably vanishing. In its 
activation of the logic of manifest destiny and the trope of the vanishing Indian, The Last 
Samurai is a therapeutic response to The War on Terror.  
 In my analysis of the samurai and “the terrorist” as complimentary signifiers in 
the discourse of contemporary primitivism, I adapt Philip Deloria’s observation that the 
noble savage is routinely split into its constituent parts. Deloria writes that the noble 
primitive and the savage primitive appear in settler-colonial discourse to critique 
modernity and justify the colonial mission, respectively (4). The noble samurai of The 
Last Samurai take savage counterparts in two locations, in the character of Minister 
Omura (Masato Harada) and the intertextual figure of “the terrorist” in The War on 
Terror.  
Because the vanishing Indian and its frontier mythology structure representations 
of masculinity in both The Last Samurai and The War on Terror, nostalgic mourning in 
the former reinforces an ideology of racial vanishing in the latter. I argue that the 
vanishing Indian in The Last Samurai is a therapeutic reproduction of Indianness which 
responds to anxiety over the reproduction of the bad Indian in the Middle East. Therefore, 
the imperialist nostalgia of The Last Samurai is an indicator of imperialist contempt for 
the bad Oriental. 
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The War on Terror constructs “the terrorist” as a techno-sophisticated savage.  
Like Minister Omura of TLS, “the terrorist” is an object of imperialist contempt because 
of his difference from the object of imperialist nostalgia. The samurai satisfy imperialist 
nostalgia because they are temporally contained. In contrast, Omura and “the terrorist” 
activate imperial contempt as others that refuse the denial of coevalness. Like the Indian 
of Dances with Wolves, the samurai encourage the fantasy that colonial violence was a 
discrete campaign waged against an inevitably vanishing other. 9/11 problematized this 
fantasy with an Indian who threatened the denial of coevalness. 
 The first half of this chapter will establish the reproduction of Indianness in The 
Last Samurai and The War on Terror. The Last Samurai explicitly constructs the samurai 
as Indians. Moreover, the film construes Japan as a place for Nathan Algren to play out a 
metaphysical mulligan in his treatment of indigenous people. Similarly, The War on 
Terror figures the terrorist as a contemporary Indian on a new frontier. After establishing 
the presence of the vanishing Indian in these two texts, the first half of this chapter 
concludes with an analysis of this Indian’s therapeutic effect on the film’s white 
protagonist. The second half of this chapter explains the bifurcation of Japanese 
masculinity as an analogue for “the terrorist” in The War on Terror. I argue that the 
Katsumoto : Omura dyad is a melodramatic rendering of imperialist nostalgia for the 
wholly anachronistic other. I read this therapeutic nostalgia as a response to constructions 
of “the terrorist” in scholarly and popular texts.  
Melodrama and the Vanishing Primitive in American Foreign Policy 
Nathen Algren is hired to exterminate the samurai even though they are 
constructed as vanishing primitives. As such, sadness over their inevitable disappearance 
masks the colonizer’s complicity in the destruction of their culture.4 While admitting to 
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the presence of colonial violence, the samurai disappear as a function of modernization, 
or more generally, the progressive march of Eurocentric time. Within this ideology of 
time, Algren works as a salvage ethnographer for the cinematic spectator. He observes, 
records, and recounts the customs of a vanishing people through a series of voice-over 
journal entries. This combination of vanishing Indian and salvage ethnographer 
encourages the cinematic spectator to “turn a blind eye to how [indigenous cultures] were 
able to resist and survive European encroachment and dispossession … ” (Rony 91). 
Indeed, the logic of the film’s melodrama demands the absolute apocalypse of an 
anachronistic people. This melodramatic extinction is essential to the film’s imperialist 
nostalgia, for extinction satisfies settler yearning for the denial of coevalness. As a 
melodrama of the vanishing Indian, the film is an example of that revisionist western in 
which “Indians are still cast as … the antithesis of modern civilization; and their cultures 
are still represented as doomed to extinction by the inexorable advance of a modernity 
which Indians could never have achieved by their own efforts and to which they were 
incapable of adjusting” (Slotkin 631-632).   
The melodramatic conflict of the primitive with the modern has always been at 
play in the foreign policy of the United States. Just as melodrama is the preeminent mode 
of U.S. popular cinema, so too has melodrama been crucial to constructions of the 
country’s foreign wars. Moreover, the melodrama of war in the United States has been 
nearly synonymous with primitivism. As Susan Brewer writes in Why America Fights, 
“the official narratives have presented conflict as a mighty clash between civilization and 
barbarism in the Philippines and World War I, democracy and dictatorship in World War 
II, freedom and communism in Korea and Vietnam, and, most recently, civilization and 
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terrorism in Iraq” (4). The Bush administration’s casting of post-9/11 conflict as a battle 
between modern democracy and medieval darkness was only the latest iteration of a well-
established understanding of U.S. military power (Ivie 55-65). Considering the affinity 
between cinematic melodrama and the melodramatic rendering of the United States’ 
foreign wars, I propose that post-9/11 conflict became mediatized as a classic American 
war film and a typical American melodrama: The War on Terror. 
In my discussion of The War on Terror, I do not analyze U.S.-led military 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I do not analyze terrorism, terrorists, Muslims, Islam, 
or “The Muslim World.”  Rather, I discuss these terms as signifiers which circulate as a 
discursive field. “The War on Terror” is a rhetorical device which frames a vast array of 
visual and verbal signifiers. Representations of Muslims, terrorism, and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq form a collection of images, signifiers, and utterances which are 
framed, as an aggregate, within a discursive field constructed as “The War on Terror.” In 
a cinematic analysis of this rhetorical framing, I want to consider “The War on Terror” as 
a screen artifact, as a series of motion pictures, or as a film. “The War on Terror” frames 
the signifiers of post-9/11 discourse as the title of a film. I write under the assumed 
metaphor “terrorism is a motion picture.” As such, I refer to The War on Terror in italics 
throughout this chapter.  
The War on Terror is a vast, fractured, repetitive fiction which mediates the 
spectator’s interaction with the post-9/11 world. In this understanding of The War on 
Terror, I follow Edward Said’s work in Orientalism. The War on Terror is a localized 
discourse which functions as a subset of orientalism: purveyors of The War on Terror 
construct terrorism and terrorists. I follow Said’s argument that the Orient was produced 
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by European academic discourse. As Alexander Spencer writes; “A discourse-centered 
terrorism studies has emerged. Here terrorism is not understood as a physical fact, but as 
a social construction … terrorism is constituted through discourse” (394). 
 My primary intervention in this reading of the construction of terrorism is to 
observe that the logic of temporal elitism manages orientalism in The War on Terror. 
Similarly, I say that the orientalist construction of the Japanese in The Last Samurai is 
primarily managed by the denial of coevalness. More specifically, the civilizational 
melodramas of both The War on Terror and The Last Samurai are managed by the 
temporal logic of manifest destiny, the vanishing Indian, and American frontier 
mythology. In very explicit terms, The War on Terror and The Last Samurai map the 
ideology and temporality of manifest destiny onto the Middle East and Japan, 
respectively. In sum, classical American myths of time and the other have been 
superimposed on orientalism in the post-9/11 era.  
 Also in the interest of methodological precision, I want to note that the production 
of Muslims, Islam, and terrorism is a contested discourse. Within this discourse, 
progressive utterances certainly work against negative stereotypes of Muslims and Islam. 
However, my analysis assumes that The War on Terror has been dominated by orientalist 
paradigms. These paradigms construct an adversarial binary between “Western 
Civilization” and “the Muslim World” while positioning Arabs, Islam, and terrorism as 
interchangeable co-signifiers. Describing misperceptions of Arabs, Muslims, and 
terrorism in post-9/11 discourse, Olivier Roy and Antoine Sfeir write:  
It was supposed that all Arabs are Muslims, forgetting that there are some fifteen 
million who are not. Again it was presumed that all Muslims are Islamists, though 
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Islamists are only a minority of the Muslim world. Finally, all Islamists were 
taken to be terrorists, although terrorism has been practiced only by a handful of 
individuals dreaming of Islamic conquest. (vii) 
As Morey and Yaqin have it, post-9/11 discourse routinely presents The Muslim Other 
qua problem: 
Whether the controversy is over veiling, cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine, or protests about the 
knighthood given to Salmon Rushdie, Muslims appear always as a problematic 
presence, troubling those values of individualism and freedom said to define 
Western nations. (1) 
On 14 September, 2001, Thomas Friedman engaged in a paradigmatic example of 
temporal, civilizational discourse. He argued that 9/11 was a result of a rift in the Muslim 
world between the “modernists and the medievalists” (Freidman). In Neomedievalism, 
Neoconservatism, and the War on Terror, Bruce Holsinger observes that Friedman’s 
temporal chasm became a dominant paradigm in the rhetoric of the popular press and the 
White House. As Holsinger writes, this paradigm is dictated by the imperative of 
temporal elitism; “Imagining the September 11 attacks as acts of ‘medievalism’ divides 
the world along an axis simultaneously of history and geography, placing the West on the 
side of modernity and Islamism on the side of the primitive, the archaic, the premodern” 
(Holsinger 7). As such, The War on Terror is the cultural context through which we 
should understand the colonial imaginary of The Last Samurai. In both films, historical 
and geographical axes are infused with an ideologically motivated melodrama of time.  
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The Last Samurai  (2003) debuted within a discourse of temporal elitism. The 
film is preoccupied with the juxtaposition of the traditional with the modern. Even more 
resonant with The War on Terror, the film foregrounds Japan’s internal historical 
struggle. In an early scene, the British translator Mr. Graham informs Nathan Algren that 
the emperor [of Japan] is mad for all things western, and the samurai believe it’s 
changing to fast. In fact, the ancient and the modern are at war for the soul of 
Japan. So your new employer Mr. Omura is bringing in every western expert he 
can get his hands on: lawyers from France, engineers from Germany, architects 
from Holland and now of course, warriors from America. 
Repeating Friedman’s construction, this dialogue also establishes modernity as the 
privilege of the European colonist. TLS superimposes this verbal construction on a series 
of eye-line matches which ally the gaze of the cinematic spectator with the gaze of the 
Anglo-American protagonist while visualizing the rift between the modern and the 
ancient (Figure 23). The camera having followed Algren from San Francisco to Japan, 
the colonizer’s gaze manages the juxtaposition of steamship with rickshaw, Victorian 
clothing with traditional Japanese.5 Working in tandem, this scene’s dialogue, 
cinematography, and props construct the denial of coevalness and the temporal axis of the 
colonial imaginary. 
This denial of coevalness in The Last Samurai runs parallel to the denial of 
coevalness in American foreign policy. President Truman instigated the modern version 
of this discourse in his opposition of the “first world” to the “third” along a 





coevalness; “To mark poverty as underdevelopment was intended to categorize the poor 
as anomalies of the present” (Tripathy and Mohapatra 109). 
President Kennedy, for his part, explicitly mapped the American West onto this 
developmental model. He figured the “undeveloped” world as a new American frontier 
while proposing that this new frontier, like the Old West, could serve as a space for the 
self-actualization of the American spirit (Cobbs Hoffman 17-21; Slotkin 3, 493). The War 
on Terror is an amalgam of many discourses, taking elements from frontier mythology, 
Cold War melodrama, and developmental temporal elitism. In The War on Terror, the 
Figure 23. Shot-Reverse-Shot and the Colonizer’s Gaze. 
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“developing world” and the Middle East have been mapped as a contemporary frontier 
and populated by an anachronistic savage, the combatants of radical Islam. 
 In his essay “The ‘Old West’ in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors in Real 
and Imagined Indian Country,” Stephen W. Silliman reports that members at all levels of 
the U.S. military have used the term “Indian country” to refer to “hostile, unpacified 
territories in active war zones” (237). This metaphor has been ubiquitous in U.S. military 
discourse from Vietnam through the occupation of Iraq in 2003 (Silliman 237-240). 
Silliman argues that frontier mythology and manifest destiny have been “discursively and 
practically recapitulated in the Middle East” (237).  For members of the U.S. military 
establishment, this recapitulation figures military operations as the march of civilization 
over savage peoples (Silliman 237-241).  
Most significantly for my analysis of The Last Samurai, Silliman writes that the 
recapitulation of manifest destiny has endowed contemporary military efforts with a 
sense of inevitable victory. Because the United States’ military considers itself to be 
facing an inevitably vanishing Indian in the Middle East, the current conflict is perceived 
as just and legitimate. The conflict is justified because its victory is a forgone conclusion 
(Silliman 241-242). While the metaphor of “Indian country” has shaped attitudes towards 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to note that the metaphor also works 
retroactively: it reinforces triumphalist interpretations of manifest destiny as a means of 
understanding the 19th-century because it construes Native Americans as barbaric 
terrorists and enemies of the United States (Silliman 243). Because The Last Samurai 
features the vanishing samurai qua American Indian, it runs the great risk of picking up 
the connotations of “Indian country” as used by the United States’ military. 
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The Vanishing Indian in The Last Samurai 
The vanishing Indian in The Last Samurai is a forgone conclusion. As an 
American film featuring a white protagonist which was produced in the 21st century, TLS 
is a Romantic fantasy of a culture that disappeared more than a century ago. Furthermore, 
Tom Cruise is almost impossible to imagine as a 19th-century cavalryman. If we assume 
that Cruise is playing himself, a 21st-century movie star, and that the cinematic spectator 
identifies with Cruise’s subject position, it becomes clear that TLS functions as an 
ethnographic time machine.6 For both its protagonist and cinematic spectator, the film 
offers a glimpse back in time at a people of long ago and far away; “As Johannes Fabian 
has pointed out, the specificity of anthropology is that the subjects of its inquiry are 
represented as existing in an earlier age” (Rony 103).  In TLS this is triply so. First, the 
samurai represent an earlier age of Japanese culture and an impediment to modernization 
for their others within the diegesis. Second, in his journey across the Pacific Ocean and 
his integration into traditional Japanese society, Algren moves through time as he moves 
through space. Compounded on this temporal travel is the extra-diegetic pastness of the 
samurai, the simple fact that a viewer of TLS presumes to observe a reconstruction of the 
late-19th century from the position of the 21st.   
Taking this ethnographic structure of time, the film insists on the historical 
similarity of the samurai with the American Indian. It is bothersome that this similarity is 
a device by which Algren may cope with his colonial guilt. As he soliloquizes on his 
journey across the Pacific Ocean; “I have been hired to help suppress the rebellion of yet 
another tribal leader. Apparently this is the only job for which I am suited. I am beset by 
the ironies of my life.” Algren’s confrontation with the samurai is his opportunity to 
rewrite his own personal history, a chance to revisit the history of colonial genocide in 
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North America. The film emphasizes this historical return by pairing his soliloquy with 
flashbacks to his experience on the killing fields of the old frontier. Ironically, Algren’s 
fame as an “Indian killer” leads to his employment in a structurally homologous colonial 
massacre. As the disenchanted henchman of modernity, Algren is a fine example of the 
revisionist westerner. His admiration for the samurai and his colonial guilt motivate a 
rejection of modernization in Japan. Algren is a none-too-subtle personification of white 
guilt over settler-colonial genocide in the Americas. Like the protagonist of Dances with 
Wolves, he is the projection of turn-of-the-20th-century guilt into a late-19th-century 
character. As such, The Last Samurai attempts to exorcise America’s national trauma in 
an Oriental frontier. The technique of this therapy is imperialist nostalgia for the 
disappearing samurai. 
TLS allows the fallen westerner back into the frontier to pursue a regenerative 
wilderness experience. This regenerative wilderness experience is achieved in the facile 
equation of samurai with American Indians. The film is about the return of the colonist to 
the scene of his moral failure.7 By replicating the old frontier in the Far East, the film 
allows white masculinity a historical and metaphysical mulligan. This mulligan takes 
shape in a ceremony of racial reconciliation.  
 While I see this ceremony as a move to settler innocence and as a primitivist 
endorsement of The War on Terror, many popular critics argued that the film was a 
romantic and inaccurate rendering of an aristocratic, feudal culture. In an expression of 
the primitivist animus which characterized The War on Terror, Bob Mondello worried 
that the film presented “a noble tribal culture being crushed rather than a brutal 
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reactionary one being placed under the rule of law” (Quoted in Ravina 85). Tim Appelo 
saw the sympathetic portrayal of the film’s samurai as an endorsement of radical Islam: 
Let’s see: samurai were fundamentalist zealots furious about American military 
hegemony and their country’s modernizers, so they hid out in remote hill country, 
trained a terrorist army, and glorified suicidal war against their ruler and his 
Yankee infidel allies, all in order to uphold their allegedly ancient holy traditions. 
Gee, who does that sound like nowadays? (Quoted in Ravina 89).  
Observations of structural similarities between the film’s samurai and stereotypes of the 
radical jihadi are not without merit. It is easy to imagine the Japan of the film as a 
distorted mirror image of the United States’ military misadventure after 9/11. In The Last 
Samurai and The War on Terror, American forces traveled to the Orient and armed 
Orientals in the hopes of defeating a medieval enemy.  
 While these similarities are salient, the means by which the samurai vanish have 
more to do with the inevitability of progress than the celebration of anachronism as an 
ideal. One critic writes; “With its romantic view of samurai traditions, and its equating of 
the suffering of Native Americans and endangered Japanese warriors, The Last Samurai 
may be open to charges of a certain anti-Western bias” (Lally).8 On the contrary, similar 
constructions of radical Islam, the samurai, and the American Indian endorse a colonial 
bias in every case. All of these signifiers are managed by the trope of the vanishing 
Indian and the denial of coevalness. 
In the film’s final battle sequence, the samurai execute a melodramatic suicide 
attack. In its foregrounding of the machine gun as the terminus of this attack, the film is 
clear about the superiority of colonial military technology. The slaughter of the samurai 
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by the Gatling gun is foreshadowed in the film’s first scene. As a salesman of Winchester 
rifles, Algren exclaims, “this is the gun that’s winning the West!” The sequence 
introduces Algren’s alcoholic disenchantment with manifest destiny; however, Tom 
Cruise intones in his darkest mode, “you could kill yourself six braves without ever 
having to reload.” Thus, the film reproduces the assumption that indigenous peoples are 
doomed to fall in the face of colonial military technology.  
 Like Braveheart (1996), Gladiator (2000), The Patriot (2000), Glory (1989), and 
other historical, martial epics of the turn of the 21st century, the last battle sequence of 
The Last Samurai is both deeply melodramatic and concerned with the redemption of its 
white male protagonist. Like Braveheart and Glory (another Edward Zwick feature), the 
film’s climactic battle sequence pits the forces of good against the forces of evil. These 
three films frame this Manichean confrontation within a narrative arc of virtuous, 
melodramatic defeat. Finally, Braveheart and Glory explicitly invest the virtuous 
suffering of the white male with the passion of the Christ (Braveheart is particularly 
messianic), and we may understand Glory in particular as a white savior film which 
prefigures The Last Samurai. 
 While all of these films are historical, The Last Samurai is particularly concerned 
with the passage of history and epochal shift. As such, the film structures its 
melodramatic battle and this battle’s virtuous suffering according to the primitive : 
modern binary. Therefore, a Christ-like defeat is an ultimately forgone conclusion for the 
film’s anachronistic samurai. The disappearance of the primitive is managed by the 
juxtaposition of feudal with industrial warfare. The ideological work of this juxtaposition 
plays out in the disparate experiences of Algren and his companions. Whereas the 
  
149 
samurai perish at the fire of the machine gun, this battle is an arena of redemption for the 
film’s white hero.  
 In the face of industrial weaponry, the samurai vanish. Their disappearance is a 
function of their interaction with the new. Having been ridiculed as hopelessly outmoded, 
the samurai are methodically cut down by a machine. As it is the difference between the 
musket and Gatling gun that is the difference between life and death, it is the mechanical 
rationalization of work which is such a threat to these anachronistic warriors. The 
difference between armor and machine guns is a local instance of the difference between 
the artisanal and the mass-produced: the artisanal is doomed to give way before the 
overwhelming efficiency of its modern rival. Medievalism and its artisanal modes of 
production are obsolete.  
At its most figural, we may take the machine gun’s rationalization of work as a 
metaphor for historical and technological progress. The victory of the machine gun over 
the sword is a metaphor for the hegemony and dominance of a new model of time, what 
Bliss Cua Lim has called modern time consciousness. Modern time consciousness is that 
linear, mechanical, scientific time which was born in the wake of geological and 
evolutionary thinking in the mid-19th century. As an industrial time consciousness which 
would achieve global dominance by the turn of the 20th century, it is also the time 
consciousness of colonialism. Modern time consciousness is so politically powerful 
because of its assumed universality. In short, modern time consciousness has subsumed 
and devoured local, indigenous, non-industrial ways of experiencing time (Lim 69-88).  
 Considering the release of King Kong in 2005, the machine gun in The Last 
Samurai suggests the samurai as a substitution for radical Islam. In her analysis of King 
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Kong (1933), Rony writes that Kong’s death on the Empire State Building is an allegory 
for the inevitable victory of modernity over the primitive; “this was the necessary 
conclusion to King Kong … the native must be crucified, murdered, or at least captured 
and made a wax figure[.] ... For, above all, in order for the myth of modernity to be 
maintained, order must reign again, and everything must return to its place” (Rony 186-
187). As a primordial force, Kong is conquered by the same technology as the samurai. In 
Peter Jackson’s 2005 remake, Kong was once again a savage force who threatened the 
tallest building in New York. As such, Kong is structurally homologous with radical 
Islam as it was constructed in The War on Terror, as an entity having recently destroyed 
the World Trade Center as a function of its antagonism to modernity. In Tracking Kong, 
Cynthia Erb writes that Jackson’s remake is very much infused with post-9/11 
melancholy over the loss of the Twin Towers. As Erb observes, Kong gazes wistfully 
over a lower Manhattan distinctly bereft of the World Trade Center (240-248). Taken as a 
set, the samurai, King Kong, and radical Islam all function as terms opposed to modernity 
and its signifiers.   
While the confrontation of the samurai with the machine gun is a striking tableau 
of the vanishing Indian, dialogue between Cruise and Watenabe invests this scene with a 
narrative of European superiority. Here, Algren regales Katsumoto with the Spartan 
defeat at Thermopylae. In doing so, Algren would lend their battle plan some of the 
honor that western history has conferred on the ancient Greeks. However, Algren’s pep 
talk only reveals the logic of the film’s colonial paternalism. To wit, the reiteration of this 
myth superimposes the prototypical victory of Europe over the Orient on a more recent 
one. The battle at Thermopylae is a story of the superiority of European ingenuity over a 
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vastly superior force of Asian others. The rehearsal of this story is unwittingly 
appropriate given the film’s repetition of a Euro-American victory over an Oriental other. 
The Last Samurai simply trades in the Hot Gates for the Gatling gun. Algren’s invocation 
of the Greeks and Katsumoto’s eagerness to replicate their death is the construction of a 
paternalistic condescension. In this constellation, to die with honor against an 
overwhelming force is to echo a celebrated accomplishment of European culture against 
its classical rival. While the samurai may win a melodramatic moral victory, any 
lamentation over their suffering only serves as a distraction from the practical material 
victory of modernity. The best the samurai can hope for, by this scene’s logic, is to face 
their extinction with a melodramatic bravado. Whereas by film’s end the samurai are 
wiped out of existence, Tom Cruise stands, ever stalwart, as the samurai’s last, greatest 
interpreter, archivist, and activist. In the film’s final bit of dialogue, when the painfully 
effete emperor of Japan asks Cruise to explain how Katsumoto died, Cruise responds 
with a pedantic retort as the all-knowing salvage ethnographer, “I will tell you how he 
lived.”  
While the machine gun serves as the particular scenario of the vanishing Indian, 
Algren’s use of a samurai sword is the technique of his regeneration. To this effect, The 
Last Samurai  reproduces late-19th and early-20th century attitudes toward the machine 
gun as a tool of colonial violence. First, there is no doubt that the machine gun is a 
particularly American invention of the 19th century. As John Ellis explains, the machine 
gun emerged in the United States at this time because the U.S. lacked an established class 
of artisans and a stockpile of small arms, features which characterized firearms and their 
production in Europe in the same period (Ellis 22-23). In its embodiment of the industrial 
  
152 
mode of production, the machine gun was marketed as an icon of human progress. In the 
words of Richard Gatling: 
it occurred to me that if I could invent a machine – a gun – that would by its 
rapidity of fire enable one man to do as much battle duty as a hundred, that it 
would to a great extent, supersede the necessity of large armies, and consequently 
exposure to battle and disease would be greatly diminished. (Quoted in Ellis 27) 
Like the sewing machine, the gun increased the productivity of the worker:  
The gun can be discharged at the rate of two hundred shots per minute, and it 
bears the same relation to other firearms that the McCormack’s Reaper does to the 
sickle, or the sewing machine to the common needle. It will no doubt be the 
means of producing a great revolution in the art of warfare from the fact that a 
few men with it can perform the work of a regiment. (Quoted in Ellis 29) 
As an icon of modernity, it is no surprise that the machine gun was used and 
conceived as a weapon of colonial violence. However, this use relegated the machine gun 
to a peripheral status among the aristocratic officer class of the European military 
establishment. While this establishment acknowledged the weapon’s effectiveness in the 
colonies, colonial mythology maintained that European domination was a result of racial 
rather than technological superiority. Compounded on this colonial mythology was a 
centuries-old ethos that valorized the courage and élan of the individual soldier, the 
chivalric nobility of the bayonet push, and the glory of the cavalry charge. The machine 
gun was a profound threat to the values of this military ethos (Ellis 117-142).  
In Japan of the Tokugawa period (the mid-1600s to the 1870s), the aristocratic 
military establishment resisted firearms for very similar reasons. Before the Battle of 
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Nagashino in 1575, feudal warfare in Japan consisted of highly ritualized encounters 
between individuals. As Noel Perrin writes in Giving Up The Gun: Japan’s Reversion to 
the Sword, 1543-1879; “Such a battle could produce almost as many heroic stories as 
there were participants. It even had a kind of morality, since each man’s fate depended 
principally on his own ability and state of training” (24).9 The Battle of Nagashino 
prefigures the final battle of the Satsuma rebellion on which The Last Samurai is based. 
In a confrontation which would revolutionize Japanese attitudes toward the musket, 
10,000 of Lord Oka’s matchlockmen decisively rebuffed a great cavalry charge; “It all 
worked out brilliantly. Takeda’s samurai did charge, and they were mowed down. In fact, 
the plan was so successful that a Japanese lieutenant general writing in 1913 could say 
that in his opinion very little improvement in infantry tactics has been made since” 
(Perrin 19). By the Battle of Komaki in 1584, the musket had become such a norm in 
Japanese warfare that the confrontation ended in an impasse. Neither general allowed 
their cavalry to charge the opposing side; “instead, both armies dug trenches, settled in, 
and waited. In some ways it was like a scene from WWI, three and a half centuries ahead 
of schedule” (Perrin 26). However, by the mid-1600s, Japan witnessed an almost total 
retreat from the use of firearms. Like late 19th- and early-20th-century Europeans, the 
Japanese warrior class feared that the gun would undermine the dash and skill of the men 
who used them.10 
In its juxtaposition of an artisanal with an industrial mode of warfare, The Last 
Samurai engages in a melodrama that depends on a temporal axis. Edward Zwick has 
said that the agenda of The Last Samurai is “to talk about what is lost in principle and 
personal values in the name of progress and technological revolution” (Quoted in Lally). 
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The melodramatic portrayal of artisanal combat suggests what is lost: the redemption of 
chivalric combat. Through his appropriation of an indigenous identity, Algren may 
practice this redemptive violence. Indeed, Algren redeems his crimes of the American 
frontier by fighting alongside the Indians of the East. 
When Katsumoto falls to the machine gun, Algren helps him end his life (Figure 
24).  With seppuku, Algren engages in a redeeming act of anachronistic violence. In a 
therapeutic reworking of Algren’s personal colonial past, he redeems the honor of his 
primitive other: he saves Katsumoto’s soul. This is the replaying of a scene in which 
protestant colonists sought to save the souls of Native Americans from eternal damnation. 
Figure 24. The Samurai Vanish. 
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These early settlers “taught subsequent generations of Americans to feel a pleasing 
melancholy at the sight of Indian death … [derived from] a belief in the Christian 
paradox of eternal life through death” (Stevens 19). With this ritual suicide, Algren 
simply revises the particulars of the white savior in the colonial wilderness. Instead of 
saving Katsumoto’s soul in a Christian sense, Algren saves Katsumoto from a 
dishonorable death. As we can tell by Algren’s facial expression, Katsumoto’s death 
fosters a pleasing melancholy. More importantly, Katsumoto’s death is the moment of his 
beatific transcendence. Having said that a lifetime spent in search of the perfect blossom 
would not have been a wasted life, Katsumoto’s final earthly vision is a cherry tree in full 
bloom. In a state of transcendental epiphany, Katsumoto gasps: “they are all perfect.” 
The Good Indian: Resolving Anxiety over Temporal Exceptionalism  
In his righteous death at the hands of the sinister Omura, Katsumoto fulfills a 
settler-colonial fantasy of the good Indian. His quality is a function of his death. As a 
dead Indian and static object, Katsumoto is knowable, fixed, and stable. He is the good 
Indian who remains fixed in the past. In contrast, Omura is an unstable signifier. A 
Japanese man who has adopted western clothing, manners, and weapons, Omura survives 
the film’s narrative and threatens the denial of coevalness.  
  When Mr. Graham states that “the ancient and the modern are at war for the soul 
of Japan,” he reiterates a colonial stereotype prevalent since the 16th century, that Japan is 
a place of temporal paradox and internal contradiction, that it is an essentially duplicitous 
place. As Ian Littlewood writes in The Idea of Japan, European observers have been 
troubled by Japan because they perceive it as a foreign culture with a disturbing level of 
sophistication. In the case of Japan, “the usual European distinction between savage 
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natives and civilized westerners [is] difficult to apply” (Littlewood 1).  Whereas 
Europeans have derived feelings of superiority from their sense that the colonial other 
was too different or uncivilized to adopt their technologies and cultural forms, Japan 
proved a notable exception to this rule; “[As such, Japan] seemed to be claiming a 
kinship with Europe which put at risk the sacred boundaries between east and west” 
(Littlewood 6).  
Tacitly following the thinking of Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger or Julia 
Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, Littlewood writes that Japan’s perceived liminality has 
always been a threat to European observers: 
[Japanese paradox] is not something we suffer gladly. Whatever challenges the 
categories by which we understand the world is likely to make us 
uncomfortable[.] … Among the most fearful aliens are those that come in the 
form of some intermediate state – blobs, growths, slime[.] … Boundaries are a 
source of security; we need them in order to define the world. They are literally 
what the business of definition is about. Without east there is not west, without 
natives there are no sahibs, without ‘them’ there is no ‘us’. To define what we are 
we depend on what is alien. To call Japan a paradox is really to say that it 
threatens the existing boundaries and therefore our definition of ourselves. It is for 
this reason that the language of paradox has always been counterbalanced by a 
language that reaffirms these boundaries as emphatically as possible. (8 [I have 
elided paragraph breaks]) 
With the Katsumoto : Omura binary, The Last Samurai  is a melodramatic 
management of Japanese threats to temporal boundaries. Whereas the sinister Omura 
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represents the Japanese capacity for Euro-American attitudes, business practices, and 
modes of warfare, the noble Katsumoto remains loyal to ancient ways and Japanese 
customs. The manner in which The Last Samurai performs its ideological work is the 
process by which Omura and Katsumoto take up positions in a melodramatic binary. 
Katsumoto is virtuous and honorable for being anachronistic, while Omura is dastardly 
and sinister for his inhabitation of modernity’s cultural forms. Taken together, Omura and 
Katsumoto represent signifiers in a fetishistic, colonial discourse. The Last Samurai 
asserts the threat of Japanese hybridity while simultaneously disavowing Japanese 
modernity. Whereas Omura is an Oriental monster who blurs the boundaries between the 
east and the west, Katsumoto is a signifier in a vocabulary of primitivism that reaffirms 
temporal boundaries as clearly as possible. In doing so, the good Indian qua dead Indian 
preserves the denial of coevalness and the settler colonist’s temporal exceptionalism. 
 The ideological work of the Omura : Katsumoto binary has operations beyond 
the poles of its temporal vector. This axis is energized by another paradoxical trope: the 
Orient as aesthetic wonder and the Orient as utterly inscrutable. As the sumptuous 
production quality of The Last Samurai attests, the colonizer’s gaze has regarded Japan as 
an “aesthetic wonderland, a place to be viewed” (Littlewood 61). In his discussion of 
contemporary promotional images for the Japanese tourism industry, Littlewood defines 
this specular regime in terms of time: 
[Promotional images of Japan] present us with a timeless world of rock gardens, 
mountain peaks and tranquil lakes. A spray of bamboo stands in front of the 
mountains, a lone rock with a single pine breaks the surface of the lake. This is 
the way it has always been. When people appear, they are part of the same eternal 
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picture[.] … this is a Japan refined to its mythical elements, purged of modern 
Japanese and of all the other unwelcome realities of the present day – modern 
buildings, modern clothes, modern cars, modern technology. (62) 
The Arcadian representation and consumption of Japan is a function of primitivism. The 
Orient as an aesthetic wonder is a mode of viewing which manages Katsumoto and his 
placement in a sumptuous mise-en-scène. As Littlewood’s analysis makes clear, the 
good, peaceful, spectacular Japan is that Japan temporarily purged of its modernity: it is a 
vision of Japan whose temporal duality is momentarily disavowed.    
In contrast to this utopian, primitivist, scopic regime runs another, antithetical 
discourse of the Far East. This discourse presents the Orient as profoundly unknowable 
and inscrutable, as a spectacular mélange of ambiguous signifiers which threaten visual 
mastery. Whereas the utter visibility of the East has a pleasurable effect in the utopian 
mode described above, the inscrutability of the Orient is a profound threat. In her book 
Lost in Translation: Orientalism, Cinema, and the Enigmatic Signifier, Homay King 
draws on Laplanche’s theory of the enigmatic signifier to further a postcolonial analysis 
of the inscrutable oriental. For Laplanche, the enigmatic signifier is the primal, traumatic 
kernel which defines much of an individual’s life. In this model, the infant subject is 
assailed by the address of adult others because he cannot decode the stream of signifiers 
with which he is addressed. While the infant knows that she is the object of direct 
address, she is powerless to decode a speaker’s meaning or intentions. As such, these 
speakers will always represent a potential threat. For Laplanche, the infant’s inability to 
decode these signifiers is a primal trauma which is reproduced throughout the subject’s 
life whenever a signifier is not completely understood (King 1-23).   
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In her application of Laplanche’s theory to cinematic constructions of the Far 
East, King writes that Hollywood habitually produces “East Asia as the site of an 
enigmatic decipherability. The Orient appears as a labyrinthine world teeming with 
inscrutable objects, concealing secrets that are irretrievably lost in translation” (2). In 
other words: 
The originary scenario of the enigmatic signifier is retriggered throughout the 
subject’s life whenever he or she is sent a mixed message, hailed by ambiguous 
address, or confronted with a scenario that seems to invite and yet resist decoding. 
The entrenched dichotomy between East and West, often assumed to be 
monolithic and completely diametrically opposed, provides fertile ground for 
these paranoid sorts of encounters and thus a uniquely rich terrain for their 
analysis. (King 4) 
 Katsumoto’s uncompromised anachronism is essential to his place in the film’s 
melodrama. Specifically, Nathan Algren’s imperialist nostalgia requires a vanishing 
Indian who is perfectly anachronistic. This rendering of Katsumoto is the film’s most 
obvious effort.  For the total satisfaction of imperialist nostalgia, Katsumoto’s 
anachronism is keyed to ontological certainty and the pleasure of ethnotopia.    
 In the scene of Algren and Katsumoto’s first formal meeting, Algren discovers 
Katsumoto chanting an untranslated and presumably ancient prayer in a picturesque 
temple. The clarity and emptiness of the mise-en-scène suggest that Katsumoto is a 
character of ontological legibility and clear boundaries. His gestalt is easily discerned as a 
function of the beauty and simplicity of his setting. This physical clarity works in concert 
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with the architecture and Katsumoto’s prayer to construct an uncompromised 
anachronicity.  
From his well-defined perch within this picturesque mise-en-scène, Katsumoto 
reinforces his signification of the antediluvian; “My family built this temple a thousand 
years ago.” These words immediately co-signify the anachronistic with the beautiful. 
That which is clearly ancient is that which is available within the visual regime of 
ethnotopia. If Japan is a land of visual delights, part of this visual pleasure is the 
consumption of that which is clearly different (Figure 25).  
 The succeeding dialogue neurotically insists on the clarity of the boundaries by 
intellectually mimicking the visual definition of Katsumoto against the mise-en-scène. In 
his accented yet perfectly inflected English, Katsumoto engages Algren in a discourse of 
the self and other; “My name is Katsumoto. What is your name?” When Algren remains 
silent, Katsumoto worries that he might have presented as the inscrutable Oriental. 
Walking from the shadows and into the light, Katsumoto asks in a tender and inquisitive 
tone, “are my words not correct?”  Katsumoto’s passage from the darkness to the light, in 
conjunction with the clarity and tender honesty of his speech, establish Katsumoto as a 
scrutable Oriental concerned with the boundaries of self and other. Moreover, Katsumoto 
Figure 25. Ancient Place, Ancient Prayer. 
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is concerned with establishing the code by which his signifiers may be deciphered. In his 
concern over proper speech and decipherability, Katsumoto acts the part of the good 
Oriental (Figure 26).  
 When Nathan neglects to introduce himself, choosing instead to lambaste 
Katsumoto for beheading the general under which Nathan served, Katsumoto establishes 
the theme of Nathan’s adoption narrative. Katsumoto shifts from the discourse of self-
other ontology to the register of pedagogy; “General Hasagawa asked me to end his life. 
A samurai cannot stand the shame of 
defeat. I was honored to cut off his head.” 
He continues in the pedagogical mode 
while emphasizing cultural difference; 
“Many of our customs seem strange to 
you, and the same is true of yours. For 
example, not to introduce yourself is considered extremely rude, even among enemies.” 
After Nathan introduces himself, Katsumoto formally bows, and says, quite earnestly, 
that he is honored. When Nathan insists that he has questions regarding the terms of his 
captivity, Katsumoto responds with a neurotic retort; “I have introduced myself, you have 
introduced yourself. This is a very good conversation.” This scene is symptomatic of 
colonial anxieties regarding confrontations with an Oriental other. It is not Katsumoto 
who is trapped in a cycle of pathological repetition; rather, he is himself a fetish object in 
a neurotic constellation of good and bad Orientals. When Katsumoto explains to Nathan 
that his lack of introduction is incredibly rude, the scene establishes their dynamic as both 
Figure 26. The Legible Oriental. 
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pedagogical and ontological. It is pedagogical in the sense that Katsumoto teaches Algren 
to be Japanese. It is ontological in the sense that Katsumoto serves as a scrutable other.  
 In the ethnotopic montage which builds on these themes, The Last Samurai 
constructs Nathan as the Anglo-American consumer of an Oriental paradise. Within this 
ethnotopia, the anachronistic Japanese and the knowledge they possess are available for 
the scrutiny and consumption of a modern observer. Algren’s ability to learn about the 
samurai, and their status as a profoundly knowable object, are a great comfort. Algren 
relates in voiceover; “it is here that I have known my first untroubled sleep in many 
years.” As a key moment in the film’s adoption narrative, this scene functions as a settler 
move to innocence after the fashion observed by Tuck and Yang in The Last of the 
Mohicans. Whereas the Indians pass into oblivion, they live long enough for the settler 
colonist to benevolently inherit their traditions and their lands (Tuck and Yang 14-15). In 
The Last Samurai, ethnotopia works in harmony with the adoption narrative to facilitate 
the utopian appropriation of indigenous lands and culture. 
The scene of Algren and Omura’s first meeting is the antithesis of Algren’s 
meeting with Katsumoto. Whereas Katsumoto dresses in robes and prays in his ancestral 
temple, Omura dresses in Victorian clothes and haunts the back rooms of an opulent San 
Francisco restaurant. As such, Omura represents Japan and the Japanese as historically 
liminal. Indeed, this threat is reinforced when Algren’s commanding officer, Colonel 
Bagley (Tony Goldwyn), introduces Omura by way of exposition; “Japan’s got it in mind 
to become a civilized country, and Mr. Omura here is willing to spend what it takes to 
send white experts to train their army.”  Bagley’s exposition introduces the theme of 
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Japan’s historical motion while allowing Omura to remain silent: an unctuous, ambiguous 
presence (Figure 27).  
The dialogue in this scene frames Omura as a duplicitous, inscrutable Oriental. 
After Algren drunkenly demands $500 a month for his services, Omura’s unnamed 
companion whispers to Omura in subtitled Japanese; “He’s rude.” Omura responds; 
“That’s how it is here. A land of cheap traders.”  Spoken in a foreign and diegetically 
indecipherable whisper, this comment eludes the scrutiny of the table’s Anglophone 
interlocutors while simultaneously alerting the cinematic spectator to Omura’s duplicity. 
Of course, it is not merely that Omura insults his racial others with a signifier that they 
are helpless to discern, but that he actively masks his intentions with an obsequious grin 
(Figure 28). 
Figure 28. The Duplicitous Oriental. 
Figure 27. The Inscrutible Oriental. 
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  Omura’s threatening inscrutability takes further expression in his cluttered mise-
en-scène. First, Omura’s haunting of an overstuffed restaurant signifies his freedom of 
movement in the modern world. The overabundant paraphernalia of this restaurant is an 
expressionistic reminder that Omura is an ontological threat. Whereas Katsumoto is 
clearly anachronistic, and as his ontological status is expressed in the clarity of his gestalt 
against an uncluttered mise-en-scène, Omura’s ontological threat takes visual expression 
through his gestalt’s immersion in a field of cluttered, modern signifiers.11   
 The Last Samurai constructs the difference between urban and pastoral space in 
ways which proliferate the Katsumoto : Omura binary. When Algren disembarks from 
Omura’s steamship, he is welcomed to Japan by Mr. Graham. In an expositional rickshaw 
ride, Graham addresses historical change while imploring the activation of the colonial 
gaze; “twenty years ago this was a sleepy little town: Now look at it!”  Though he 
compels his Anglo-American visitor to look, the cluttered mise-en-scène and quick 
editing of this sequence distinctly frustrate pleasurable gazing. This is in stark contrast to 
the leisurely viewing that Algren enjoys during his time with Katsumoto in the paradise 
of the Japanese pastoral. As such, the uncompromised anachronism of village life is 
constructed as a non-threatening other to the transitional culture of the Japanese 
metropolis. As opposed to the clear gestalts and revealed bodies that Algren enjoys 
throughout his conversion narrative, his observation of urban space is haunted by a 
faceless, elusive, and aimlessly milling Oriental horde. In this sequence, Japanese 
women, in particular, flit and dart in ways which allow only enigmatic, fleeting, and 
unsatisfying glimpses. As if to remove all doubt as to the scene’s thematic implications, 
Mr. Graham engages in a reverie of classical orientalism; “I came over with a British 
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trade mission, oh, years ago. I had a rather unfortunate tendency to tell the truth in a 
country where no one ever says what they mean. So now, I very accurately translate other 
people’s lies.” Thus, The Last Samurai insists on the stereotype of the duplicitous, 
threatening Oriental in its superimposition of orientalist dialogue on a visual sequence 
which frustrates the colonizer’s gaze (Figure 29). 
Oriental Masculinity in The War on Terror 
The War on Terror presents a dualistic construction of Muslim identity which 
mimics the bifurcation of Japanese masculinity in The Last Samurai.  In The War on 
Terror, the good Muslim is that Muslim who has so fully integrated into modernity and 
democracy as to no longer pose a threat. Like Katsumoto, this other is temporally 
unambiguous. In contrast, the terrorist is constructed as a medieval barbarian and 
temporal hybrid.12  
 In an academic journal article which positions itself as an exposé of terrorism and 
social media, Marie Wright expresses horror at the thought of the techno-sophisticated 
terrorist.13 Writing that “jihadists have used the Internet to broadcast their atrocities and 
thereby promote an image of power,” Wright declares that the video showing the 
beheading of Nicholas Berg by Abu Musab Zarqawi in 2004, “underscored the horrific 
partnership that had evolved between technology and terrorism” (Wright 4). To construct 
Figure 29. The Enigmatic Signifier. 
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this “partnership” as a “horror,” Wright must assume that technology and terrorism are 
essentially incompatible. She must assume that the terrorist and the internet are 
essentially alien to one another and belong to opposing shores of an unbridgeable gulf. It 
is clear that a Darwinian worldview underwrites her horror when she claims that this 
unholy partnership has “evolved.” 
 For Wright, only modern democracy is entitled to “technology,” a term which 
here denotes the digital camera and digital information technology. The horror Wright 
expresses is the horror that the colonial other may challenge the ethnotopia of the 
colonizer’s gaze.  For Wright, the primitive appropriation of visual technology is a threat 
to the denial of coevalness. The partnership between technology and terrorism is 
“horrific” because it indicates that the primitive other has slipped into the flow of 
evolutionary time. Of course, it makes sense that the terrorist appropriation of digital 
media would be so disturbing to the colonizer’s gaze. As Morey and Yaqin write in 
Framing Muslims; “In dealing with the Muslim “Other,” Western nations have employed 
a complex and precise set of surveillance systems designed to profile, track, and when 
necessary exclude the problematic Muslim subject” (6).  In other words, the West has 
established “cutting edge technologies and information networks … wherein Muslims 
can at a moment’s notice be erected as objects of supervision and discipline” (Morey and 
Yaqin 6). In sum, the appropriation of the camera and the internet by the Muslim Other is 
a direct threat to the colonizer’s scopic regime. 
Moreover, the surveillance and production of Muslim otherness is tied to the 
process by which The War on Terror produces the fiction of the “unified nation and the 
sealed-off civilization” (Morey and Yaqin 5-6). As Morey and Yaqin argue, the reality of 
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the Muslim diaspora exposes these constructions for the fictions that they are. The ‘West’ 
and ‘The Muslim World’ are a “political strategist’s daydream [in which] Muslims are 
positioned as an irretrievably Other presence” (5-6). The appropriation of media 
technology by the Muslim Other is an on-screen analogy for the blurring of boundaries 
threatened by the Muslim diaspora. The Muslim Other’s appropriation of media 
technology is a challenge to the ethnotopia of the colonizer’s gaze, and the production of 
a hybrid figure that threatens the boundaries between “then” and “now,” “them” and 
“us.” There is perhaps no better icon for the condensation of these threats than the images 
of Jihadi John with his victims in the moving images distributed by the so-called Islamic 
State since the summer of 2014.  
In an image I include here from The War on Terror, “Jihadi John” appears with 
the aid worker Allen Henning, a British citizen abducted in the northeastern part of Syria 
in the winter of 2013-2014 (Figure 30) (Taher). The group known as ISIS disseminated 
the video of his execution on YouTube on Friday, October 3rd, 2014.14 As an image 
produced by the so-called Islamic State and consumed by audiences in Great Britain and 
the United States, we may take this image as a condensation of colonial anxieties about 
the Muslim other, his appropriation of 
media technology, and his inscrutability. In 
a diegetic sense, this image represents white 
male impotence vis-à-vis a powerful 
Muslim other, and this impotence is a 
function of the inversion of the ethnotopic 
Figure 30. Jihadi John. 
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viewing relationship which we may observe in The Last Samurai. In an extra-diegetic 
sense, the videos themselves are a threat to the exclusive mastery of media technologies 
which the United States and Great Britain would mobilize for the surveillance and 
production of terrorism as a civilizational other.15  
To translate the viewing relationship of The Last Samurai into the geo-political 
terms of The War on Terror, Algren’s ethnotopia is a nostalgic rendering of the real-
world process by which the United States surveils its Muslim other. Like the image of 
Jihadi John in The War on Terror, TLS figures Omura as a gazing, malevolent agent. In 
the scene of Katsumoto and Algren’s arrival in the Japanese metropolis, Omura looks on 
from above, obscured and screened from view by a matrix of black wires (Figure 31). 
The image of Jihadi John and his captives is the replication of the threat to white 
surveillance in The Last Samurai. Jihadi John is inscrutable and threatening, but he is also 
a liminal figure who threatens the boundaries between the West and the East. Nicknamed 
“Jihadi John” due to his English accent, the man thought to be Mohammed Emwazi is a 
threat because he is a British citizen who has joined the forces of radical Islam. His 
hybridity triggers the colonizer’s anxiety about the temporal movement of the Oriental.  
In his description of ISIS’s beheading videos, David Carr writes; “what they made 
are modern media artifacts being used to medieval ends. The videos serve as both 
Figure 31. Inverting the Colonizer’s Gaze. 
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propaganda and time machine, attempting to wipe away centuries of civilization and 
suggest that the dreamed-of caliphate flourishes…” (ISIS Sends Medieval Message by 
Modern Method). Part of the problem, as Carr and others have it, is that these 
anachronistic barbarians have gained a great measure of success as a function of their 
techno-sophistication. However, it is not the simple acquisition of technology which is so 
threatening, but the fact that techno-sophistication is construed to represent the evolution 
of the Muslim other. In his description of changes in jihadist media practices, Carr 
betrays both the Darwinian paradigm which structures his colonial thinking, and the 
anxiety that the primitive other may have joined the stream of evolutionary time: 
In the evolution of modern jihadist propaganda, Bin Laden, addressing a single 
static camera with long-winded rhetoric in highly formal Arabic, represented the 
first generation[.] … The most prominent figure of the second generation was the 
YouTube star Anwar al-Awlaki … who … had a blog and a Facebook page. … 
ISIS is online Jihad 3.0. Dozens of Twitter accounts spread its message … Its 
videos borrow from Madison Avenue and Hollywood, from combat video games 
and cable television dramas, and its sensational dispatches are echoed and 
amplified on social media. (ISIS displaying Deft Command of Varied Media) 
As such, anxiety over the techno-sophistication of terrorism in the 21st century is 
inseparable from anxiety that the Muslim other has attained mobility along the 
evolutionary continuum of an exceptionalist colonial imaginary.  
The samurai qua vanished Indian is a reassuring balm when considered against 
the apprehension of radical Islam as a boundary-threatening contemporary. If we take 
Jihadi John as a substitution for Mr. Omura, we may observe that his transformation from 
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British citizen to inscrutable Oriental triggers colonial anxiety over the mobile, time-
travelling other. As The Last Samurai would have it, the good Oriental is he who stays 
fixed in the past, reveals himself to the colonizer’s gaze, and disavows temporal or 
technological hybridity. As a response to the Oriental as contemporary rival, The Last 
Samurai is an artifact of imperial nostalgia. This film is nostalgic for the Oriental as 
anachronistic victim. 
It is not surprising that The Last Samurai emerged after 9/11. The attack on the 
World Trade Center was the perfect stage for the construction of the Muslim other as a 
monstrous hybrid. In interpretations of this event, a discourse emerged in which an icon 
of modernity had been destroyed by an enemy constructed as barbarically anachronistic. 
This figure was loaded with colonial anxiety over duplicity and inscrutability. As Morey 
and Yaqin write, the stereotype of “the bearded Muslim fanatic” emerged alongside 
images of “the duplicitous terrorist who lives among ‘us’ the better to bring about our 
destruction” (2).16 The juxtaposition of King Kong with the airplane in his attack on the 
Empire State Building reinforces the boundary between the primitive and the modern. In 
contrast, constructions of 9/11 presented a scenario in which a primitive other challenged 
the denial of coevalness through the appropriation of American airplanes. Consider the 
civilizational paranoia in this excerpt from Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of 
Civilizations: “somewhere in the Middle East a half dozen young men could well be 
dressed in jeans, drinking coke, listening to rap and between their bows to Mecca, putting 
together a bomb to blow up an American airliner” (58). 
Huntington’s ultra-conservative vignette depends on the assumption that, while 
the material signifiers of consumer culture may have been imported by individuals in the 
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Middle East, Enlightenment values such as liberty, democracy, and peaceful human 
interaction are essentially beyond the capacity of the “Arab mind” (Sheehi 70). 
Furthermore, Huntington’s fable reinforces civilizational difference while simultaneously 
expressing anxiety over cultural hybridity and the danger of the duplicitous Oriental. The 
very function of Huntington’s “Arab mind” argument, and the primitivist discourse which 
circulates in The War on Terror, is the justification of war through the moral clarity 
afforded by melodramatic civilizational categories. What is so startling about 
Huntington’s vignette is its paradoxical capacity to function as a fetish object: it takes the 
sign of sameness in the other as evidence of difference. 
 In his analysis of metaphorical constructions of terrorism in a British tabloid, 
Alexander Spencer identifies the metaphor “Terrorism as Uncivilized Evil.” He writes 
that such metaphors have distinct political consequences: 
The ‘uncivilized’ predication constructs the terrorist as someone who cannot be 
logically reasoned with, and consequently there is no real point in talking to them. 
At the same time, ‘barbarians’ are brutal, violent and primitive … and therefore 
only understand violence as an answer. So the predication of terrorism as 
‘barbaric’ makes the use of violent counter-measures seem appropriate. (406-407) 
Spencer notes that constructions of terrorism as “primitive” and “barbaric” are 
coterminous with terrorism as “evil.”17 The melodramatic effect of this co-termination is 
the justification of war through the dehumanization of the other: 
The predication of terrorism as ‘evil’ and ‘barbarian’ marginalizes the grievances 
and political goals of these groups and the reasons for the violence are avoided as 
‘evil,’ ‘barbarian’ terrorists kill for the sake of killing rather than for some 
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concrete motive. Evilness becomes the ultimate justification for their act and at 
the same time provides a justification for extreme counter measures. (Spencer 
406)  
In sum, this discourse constructs a melodramatic axis in which a righteous modernity 
confronts a villainous primitive. Such constructions have had disastrous consequences for 
U.S. foreign and domestic policy regarding the treatment of Muslims. As Stephen Sheehi 
observes; “Torture, … racial profiling, kidnapping, … extrajudicial assassinations, 
freezing habeas corpus, and total war against and occupation of sovereign countries are 
the effects of the deployment of Islamophobic foils, stereotypes, paradigms and analyses” 
(33). 
 The 9/11 attacks and the techno-sophistication of radical Islam haunt the discrete 
boundaries of civilizational conflict. As such, the construal of the terrorist as an 
anachronistic other is a project of neurotic disavowal and fetishistic repetition. The Last 
Samurai is a text of imperialist nostalgia. As such, it is as a cipher for the melodramatic 
work of primitivism in The War on Terror. As Renalto Rosaldo writes, imperialist 
nostalgia is the process by which colonizers “often display nostalgia for the colonized 
culture as it was ‘traditionally’ (that is, when they first encountered it). The peculiarity, of 
course, is that agents of colonialism long for the very forms of life they intentionally 
altered or destroyed” (107-108).  In terms which are immediately applicable to both The 
Last Samurai and the discourse of “The War on Terror,” Rosaldo writes: 
Imperialist nostalgia occurs alongside a peculiar sense of mission, the white 
man’s burden, where civilized nations stand duty-bound to uplift so-called savage 
ones. In this ideologically constructed world of ongoing progressive change, 
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putatively static savage societies become a stable reference point for defining (the 
felicitous progress of) civilized identity. “We” valorize innovation and then yearn 
for more stable worlds, whether these reside in our own past, in other cultures, or 
in the conflation of the two. Such forms of longing thus appear closely related to 
secular notions of progress. When the so-called civilizing process destabilizes 
forms of life, the agents of change experience transformations of other cultures as 
if they were personal losses. (108) 
When we consider The Last Samurai vis-à-vis the construction of terrorism in The War 
on Terror, imperialist nostalgia is at work in two complimentary ways. First, The Last 
Samurai expresses nostalgia for the good Indian, and defines goodness in terms of 
ontological clarity and pure anachronism. The Last Samurai represents nostalgia for 
scrutable, anachronistic, techno-phobic others. It premiered in a moment when the United 
States found itself engaged with a temporally ambiguous enemy. In The War on Terror, 
primitivism functions as a “stable reference point” for defining America’s 
melodramatically righteous violence. Paradoxically, the primitivism of The War on 
Terror insists on the anachronism of an enemy who is both techno-sophisticated and 
barbaric. Here, primitivism is a colonial fetish which disavows and constructs the 
monstrosity of a liminal other. As Morey and Yaqin put it in Framing Muslims: 
It is as if the attempt to solder together a watertight worldview based on 
supposedly civilizational difference – whether carried out by those hostile to 
Islam or those feeling the need to aggressively propagate it—can never really be 
successful; the vessel in which cultural purists set sail is always, in the end, a 
leaky one that requires constant bailing. (20) 
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  “The Muslim World” is a strategic fiction which erases the many nations, creeds, 
sects, politics, and identities of the Muslim diaspora. The imperialist nostalgia of The 
Last Samurai and The War on Terror advances one of two strategies for justifying 
colonial aggression and neutralizing the threat of a boundary-defying other. In short, 
because the imperative to empire demands the temporal exceptionalism of the colonist, 
colonial mythology demands either the total assimilation of Islam into the folds of 
modernity, or insists on the absolute alterity of the Muslim other. This is a psychic 
defense for a colonial subject position because it unproblematically construes the other as 
an object of the white man’s burden, as an anachronistic, inevitably vanishing Oriental. 
Moreover, it establishes the West as “inviolable because it is ineradicably different and 
superior in every way to the menacing irrationality projected onto the wild-eyed Muslim” 
(Morey and Yaqin 25). In either case, the liminal, hybrid, or ambiguous figure is 
forbidden, disavowed, and demonized. If we map The War on Terror onto The Last 
Samurai, we can see that imperialist nostalgia for the good Oriental is a nostalgic mask 
for imperial contempt for the bad Oriental. These signifiers collaborate in The Last 
Samurai to reflect and galvanize the melodrama of The War on Terror. Imperialist 
nostalgia motivates a fear and contempt for its opposite. This synergy exposes the 
colonial project of The Last Samurai: the celebration of a colonial other who affirms the 




1 Mina Shin argues that The Last Samurai is a western in samurai guise: 
the Wild West backdrop is replaced with a Japanese prairie, and the Native Americans are merely 
replaced by the Japanese. Nostalgia for the doomed samurai is, in fact, nostalgia for the Wild West 




Westerns, The Last Samurai symbolically rehabilitates the American shameful past (sic) of the 
Indian genocide as inevitable and honorable historical progress toward modern America (1069).  
 
 
2 For an analysis of Dances with Woves as historical therapy for white audiences, see Golub 30. 
 
3 As Jodi Byrd writes:  
From the Pacific with the illegal overthrow of the kingdom of Hawai’i to the Caribbean with 
Guantanamo Bay as a torture center for “enemy combatants,” I argue throughout this book that 
U.S. cultural and political preoccupations with indigeneity and the reproduction of Indianness 
serve to facilitate, justify, and maintain Anglo-American hegemonic mastery over the signification 
of justice, democracy, law, and terror. Through nineteenth- and early twentieth-century logics of 
territorial rights and conquests that have now morphed into late twentieth- and early twenty-first 
century logics of civil rights and late capitalism, the United States has used executive, legislative, 
and juridical means to make “Indian” those peoples and nations who stand in the way of U.S. 
military and economic desires. (xx) 
4 As Laura M. Stevens has it, the vanishing Indian is both palpable evidence of manifest destiny and a 
nostalgic, moral absolution for the violence of colonial aggression. The dying Indian is a figure of sadness 
and sorrow in the American imaginary; “standing for conquest, images of dying Indians have helped to 
rationalize aggression, absolving responsibility through sad depictions of inevitable demise” (18). 
 
5 I follow Shohat and Stamm in Unthinking Eurocentrism. They argue that the camera, having travelled to 
North America with Columbus, encourages a cinematic identification with Columbus, his struggles, and his 
narratives. They argue that such identification makes the signifier “Columbus” synonymous with the 
signifier “History” (58-62). 
 
6 Mitchell writes;“Although at times Mr. Cruise comes off as too contemporary for the 19th century – at one 
point, he seems to be waiting for a cellphone call to confirm his terms for a cover of Details magazine – 
this displacement fits better when he becomes a prisoner” (E13).  
 
7  In a prefiguring of the redemptive return to the wilderness in The Last Samurai, the first Gulf War is an 
instructive study.  In this war, George H.W. Bush employed the rationale of the “savage war” to justify the 
large-scale use of the American military. Richard Slotkin argues that presidential rhetoric constructed 
Saddam Hussein as an evil dictator, a threat to American economic interests, and as a savage Indian;  
“Hussein himself was the perfect enemy for a modern Frontier-Myth scenario, combining the barbaric 
cruelty of a ‘Geronimo’ with the political power and ambition of a Hitler” (Slotkin 651). In concert with the 
presence of this anachronistic evil, President Bush asserted that “the violence of the Gulf War [had] 
regenerated the national spirit and moral character by expiating the defeat in Vietnam” (Slotkin 651). Here 
we see the collusion of many forces and ideologies: neo-liberal market capitalism and its global ambition, 
the inevitability of war with an essentially incompatible other, and the regeneration of the American 
character through the violence of a savage war. In essence, the first Iraq war combines and resuscitates two 
aspects of the New Frontier mythology. First, it establishes the undeveloped world as an arena for the 
redemption or restoration of the American spirit. The process of this redemption involves the invocation of 
frontier mythology’s other trope, the barbarous, anachronistic enemy. Most troubling, “the president 
authorize[d] the shedding of blood … to erase the discomforting memory of our historical experience of 
error and defeat, and to substitute in its place the lie of ‘symbolic victory’” (Slotkin 652). 
 
8 In response to these charges of anti-Western bias, Edward Zwick is explicit in his primitivist nostalgia 
qua white guilt: 
The movie acknowledged certainly that there was an American imperial impulse, that our 
relationship with Japan did not begin in 1941, and I think that’s important as historical redress. 
But I don’t think its agenda is political in that explicit regard. The agenda is to talk about what is 
lost in principles and personal values in the name of progress and technological revolution. 





9 Noel Perrin engages in his own share of nostalgic primitivism. Perrin concludes his book, written in 1979, 
by casting the long rhetorical shadow of nuclear holocaust. In a bit of romantic primitivism, he argues that 
the Japanese abandonment of the gun from 1600-1870 resulted in a period of peace and prosperity that has 
since been ruined by the industrial revolution in Japan. He argues that this period of retrogression, or 
primitivism, should shine as an example for westerners, that we might adopt a similar primitivism vis-à-vis 
the menace the nuclear bomb. Perrin replicates the very primitivism of late-19th century westerners in 
Japan. In 1858 the U.S. Consul General Townsend Harris observed; “the people all appeared clean, well 
fed … well clad and happy looking. It is more like the golden age of simplicity and honesty than I have 
ever seen in any country” ( Quoted in Perrin 90). Tom Cruise’s voice-over narration replicates this 
primitivist Arcadianism in The Last Samurai: 
Spring, 1877. This marks the longest I've stayed in one place since I left the farm at 17. There is so 
much here I will never understand. I've never been a church-going man, and what I've seen on the 
field of battle has led me to question God's purpose. But there is indeed something spiritual in this 
place. And though it may forever be obscure to me, I cannot but be aware of its power. I do know 
that it is here that I've known my first untroubled sleep in many years. … They are an intriguing 
people. From the moment they wake they devote themselves to the perfection of whatever they 
pursue. I have never seen such discipline. I am surprised to learn that the word “samurai” means 
“to serve”, and that Katsumoto believes his rebellion to be in the service of the Emperor. 
 
10 Noel Perrin writes: 
[individual heroism] occurred very rarely in mass battles with matchlocks. A well-aimed volley of 
a thousand shots killed flurried soldiers and cool-headed ones without discrimination – and at a 
distance too far for conversation. Bravery was actually a disadvantage if you were charging 
against guns, while if you changed sides and became a matchlockman yourself, there was still not 
much chance for individual distinction. You were now simply one of the thousand men in your 
rank, waiting behind your breastworks to mow down the charging enemy. It didn’t even take much 
skill to do this. Skill had been moved back from the soldier to the manufacturer of his weapon, and 
up from the solder to his commander. (Perrin 25) 
 
11  Here, I follow the analysis of mise-en-scène by Homay King 1-19.  
 
12   To quote Howard Dean, a prominent member of the Democratic leadership and a frontrunner for the 
Democratic Party’s nomination for president in the 2004 primary:  
I think it is great to have Mosques in American cities; there is a growing number of American 
Muslims. I think most of those Muslims are moderate. I hope they will have an influence on Islam 
throughout the world because Islam is really back in the 12th century in some of these countries 
like Iran and Afghanistan where they’re stoning people to death and that can be fixed and the way 
it is fixed is not by pushing Muslims away, it is by embracing them and have them become just 
like every other American, American’s who happen to be Muslims. (Quoted in Sheehi 30) 
Sheehi writes; “Dean’s vision involves properly co-opting and assimilating Muslims into American culture 
whereby they not only do not pose a threat to US hegemony and white supremacist culture but, in fact, 
work within Muslim communities globally to bring them into the American fold” (30). 
 
13 Wright’s horror is typical. Shane and Hubbard write in The New York Times; “[ISIS’s] bigotry and 
beheadings seem to come from a distant century, [but] its use of media is up the present moment” 
(Displaying Deft Command of Varied Media). 
 
14 See also Rukmini  and Freytas-Tamura.  
 
15 For a concrete example of paranoia over “the terrorist’s” appropriation of media technology, one need 
only refer to the United States’ reaction to Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts of Osama Bin Laden after 9/11. After 
the broadcast, Condaleeza Rice denounced Al-Jazeera.  Moreover, the United States bombed Al-Jazeera’s 




correspondents for the BBC as “clearly a direct strike on the Al-Jazeera office” (Terrorism: Essential 
Primary Sources 435). 
 
16  Morey and Yaqin note two trends in Muslim stereotyping. In the first, Muslims are represented as 
outsiders. The second is the Muslim as cultural hybrid: 
However, in recent years Muslim characters who pose a threat to the ethnonormalized community 
of the nation are more likely to be depicted as “Westernized” in outward appearance. As such, 
they are difficult to identify, thereby constituting an even more menacing “enemy within.” They 
may be outwardly respectable, look something like “us,” and hold down professions such as 
medicine or teaching. We would describe this particular mutation of the Muslim stereotype as a 
“post-Huntington stereotype,” taking our cue from a passage in The Clash of Civilizations in 
which Huntington attempts to describe ostensibly culturally hybrid subjects who may nonetheless 
be drawn to terrorism: “somewhere in the Middle East a half dozen young men could well be 
dressed in jeans, drinking coke, listening to rap and between their bows to Mecca, putting together 
a bomb  to blow up an American airliner” (115-116). 
 
17 According to Spencer, an understanding of the metaphorical, discursive construction of terrorism is 
important because, while the discourse and metaphors of terrorism do not cause policy, “metaphors are … 
likely to influence policy indirectly though their impact on a decision maker’s general approach to an issue; 






 TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE SUPER-DIEGETIC: 
 3D EXHIBITION AND AVATAR 
 Like The Last Samurai, Avatar (2009) explicitly constructs the difference 
between an aggressive, technologically advanced, colonial force and its virtuous, 
primitive other. But while The Last Samurai is an oblique cipher for the construction of 
the Muslim other in The War on Terror, Avatar directly engages with post-9/11 conflict. 
With throwaway references to “shock and awe,” a military commander who insists that 
“[he] will fight terror with terror,” and the sci-fi displacement of Middle-Eastern oil with 
the fictional mineral “unobtainium,” Avatar positions itself as both a pro-Indian revenge 
fantasy and a criticism of American imperialism. Because the film hangs its revenge 
fantasy and its anti-imperialist critique on a techno-phobic melodrama, it is tempting to 
read the film as a rejection of temporal elitism.  
However, to understand Avatar’s engagement with temporal elitism, we must 
recognize that the film spawned two parallel discourses. The first of these discourses is 
ambiguous and contested. It questions whether Avatar is a neo-colonial fantasy of white 
male omnipotence or an allegory of eco-heroism and indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Participants in this discourse evaluate the film’s representation of technology and the 
colonial encounter. Many criticize the portrayal of a technology with which a white male 
appropriates an indigenous identity. Others read the film as technophobic and anti-
imperialist, citing the film’s heroic rendering of an indigenous triumph. As a contested 
field of interpretations, this discourse reflects Avatar’s own ambiguous narrative. Thomas 
  
179 
Elsaesser writes that this contest over meaning is a result of the film’s own calculated 
ambiguity: 
The ideological message of [Avatar] seems to have been precisely calibrated, for 
instance, regarding … the degree of anti-Americanism, the manner in which 
ecological motifs are touched upon, and how – within the mythological matrix of 
“the White Messiah” that [David] Brooks calls “politically offensive” and 
[Slavoj] Žižek calls “brutally racist” – there is enough room for these indigenous 
peoples to claim or reclaim through the film their “rights.” … Cameron … was 
well aware of the United States’ deeply controversial role in the world, in the 
midst of two wars of aggression. … Avatar’s anti-Americanism is thus just 
explicit enough to flatter Hollywood’s vast international market, while not too 
offensive for Americans of the relevant demographic to feel repelled or insulted 
by it. (294)  
Elsaesser argues that the film’s narrative ambiguity is part of the postmodern marketing 
strategy of “multiple access points.” Avatar was intended to flatter a global market that 
would account for 70% of its total revenue. It is fitting that the film’s anti-American 
melodrama should so fully harmonize with a fantasy of white male dominance in a 
colonial utopia. This combination of narratives is a diegetic avatar for the film’s own 
global market strategy; “Anti-Americanism is an instrument in Hollywood’s arsenal for 
maintaining its dominance in a world market” (Elsaesser 294).1  
While the interpretation of Avatar’s plot is a contested field of meaning, popular 
and academic critics have unambiguously reiterated a colonial temporality in their 
reception of Avatar’s 3D exhibition technology. This discourse constructs Avatar as an 
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unqualified advance in cinematic technology. Whether critics deride the film’s visual 
sophistication as a distraction from narrative nuance, or celebrate the film’s technological 
achievement as a new mode of cinematic storytelling, the critics have unanimously 
regarded the film as a step forward in 3D exhibition.2 It is damning that this 
developmental model is so prominent in a film about the primitive : modern binary. 
Indeed, critics have noted the irony with which a technophobic melodrama of indigenous 
liberation assumed the form of a digitally-rendered 3D spectacle.3 
I argue that Avatar is not as polysemous as Thomas Elsaesser suggests because 
popular and critical discourse unambiguously constructed the film as a technological 
advance. The futurity of Avatar’s cinematic technology manages the film’s indigenous 
people with a super-diegetic binary. This super-diegetic binary recuperates the ambiguity 
of the film’s narrative because it throws the film’s indigenous people into horizontal and 
vertical relationships with futurity. The film’s diegetic binary is reinforced by an extra-
diegetic one. This extra-diegetic binary is decidedly uncontested.  The relationship 
between the Na’vi and Avatar’s own cinematic technology constructs the primitive as an 
anachronistic entity vis-à-vis a contemporary viewing position. The futurity of Avatar’s 
cinematic technology entails the denial of coevalness and temporal elitism.  
3D Technology and Avatar: An Uncontested Model of Progressive Time  
Poplar and scholarly reception constructed the 3D exhibition of Avatar as a highly 
evolved, sophisticated, and celebrated technology. As one scholar writes; “Cameron’s 
Avatar achieved record-breaking box-office figures and gained widespread critical 
acclaim for bringing the 3-D format to aesthetic maturity” (Ross 382). Expressing the 
popular perspective, Adam Cohen of the New York Times writes that 3D cinematography 
was the “real star” of Avatar. Cohen uses spatial and temporal metaphors of progress; 
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“Three-D technology has come a long way from the old days of the Three Stooges’ pie-
throwing antics. Mr. Cameron created a single camera that can shoot live-action 
stereoscope 3-D, to take the technology to a new level, and it is an undeniable crowd 
pleaser (sic)” (22).  In an article otherwise devoted to a celebration of Avatar’s anti-
colonial message, it is curious that Cohen’s rhetoric deploys the ideology of 
technological progress. In Cohen’s diction, travel through space “[having come] a long 
way,” is a spatial metaphor for temporal travel from “the old days.” That this movement 
through time and space should be interpreted as progressive is reinforced with the 
unambiguous vertical metaphor of the “new level.”4 
 To understand Avatar’s interaction with this context, I propose that we understand 
the film’s primitive : modern binary according to two diagrams of my own design. In its 
diegesis, Avatar melodramatically constructs a primitive : modern binary. This is 
represented by the horizontal axis of the triangle in Figure 32.  
Figure 32. Avatar’s Super-Diegetic Constellation. 
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However, Avatar’s own futurity installs the film’s indigenous people in a 
triangular constellation of difference. Within this constellation, the Na’vi are opposed to 
both diegetic and extra-diegetic icons of modernity. This becomes what I will call a 
super-diegetic constellation. In opposition to the Na’vi, the film’s diegetic technologies 
enjoy a vertical harmony with the film’s own extra-diegetic futurity. Throughout this 
chapter, I will use the language of “horizontal” and “vertical” relationships in reference to 
these diagrams. When I say that the film’s “horizontal” diegetic relationship is managed 
by or subordinate to the film’s “vertical” extra-diegetic relationship, I indicate the 
recuperation of the film’s contested meaning by the unambiguous celebration of the 
film’s own futurity. The horizontal relationship of the Na’vi to the film’s diegetic 
technology is always subsumed by this vertical axis.     
 In the use of the terms “extra-diegetic” and “super-diegetic,” I denote the 
ontological difference between non-diegetic music and extra-diegetic 3D technology. In 
the practice of everyday moviegoing, it is the rare spectator who marvels at the 
production of non-diegetic sound. In contrast, Avatar’s exhibition technology garnered 
constant attention as a non-diegetic spectacle of technological progress. As such, I say it 
was extra-diegetic, rather than non-diegetic. When I say that the Na’vi are thrown into 
both a diegetic and an extra-diegetic relationship to futurity, I indicate that the film’s 3D 
exhibition technology draws attention to itself as a technique wholly independent from 
Avatar’s narrative world in a way that is impossible for the film’s soundtrack. When I 
refer to a relationship as “super-diegetic,” I indicate that one of the film’s narrative 
elements enters into a relationship with both diegetic and extra-diegetic elements. The 
Na’vi endure a super-diegetic relationship with technological progress because their 
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opposition to diegetic technology runs in parallel with their relationship to the film’s own 
exhibition technology. Finally, this triangular relationship is super-diegetic because the 
film’s diegetic technology and the film’s 3D exhibition technology share a structural 
affinity in their relationship to the Na’vi.  
 But it is not simply that Avatar positions the Na’vi against diegetic and extra-
diegetic futurity, and it is not simply that Avatar’s diegetic binary is structured according 
to an evolutionary model. Rather, these local constructions of time run in parallel to a 
progressive temporal vector which structures the evolutionary discourse of cinema more 
broadly (Figure 33). 
To understand Avatar’s temporal elitism, it will be useful to summarize the 
broader history of cinematic primitivism. First, film theory has been infused with the 
notion that cinema is evolving toward a destination. Second, film theory has often 
construed cinema as the final realization of human, artistic, and Enlightenment ideals. 
These two notions are distinct in the sense that the first is about the internal evolution of 
Figure 33. The Evolutionary Paradigm of Cinematic Technology. 
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cinema itself, about cinema’s own private destiny and self-actualization, while the second 
figures cinema and the photograph as the teloi of human and scientific desires. Two 
foundational documents in the history of film theory that address these themes are André  
Bazin’s “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema” and “The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image.”  
In “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,” Bazin argues that the transition 
from silent to sound cinema was the progressive actualization of cinema’s true nature. 
Specifically, synchronized sound was a crucial step in the actualization of film’s final 
destiny, its realist aesthetic. In the essay’s first line, Bazin writes that “by 1928 the silent 
film had reached its artistic peak” (43). He personifies “the silent film” as an explorer 
achieving dominance over the natural environment. Bazin links a vertical destiny to 
movement through time, as a telos which was achieved in 1928. As such, he harmonizes 
a colonial trope of man’s dominance over the natural environment with an appropriation 
of Darwinism reminiscent of 19th-century anthropology. Bazin erroneously lends 
evolution a progressive arrow. As if to confirm this implication, the first sentence of 
Bazin’s second paragraph unambiguously declares the teleology of cinema’s aesthetic 
destiny; “In point of fact, now that sound has given proof that it came not to destroy but 
to fulfill the Old Testament of the cinema, we may most properly ask if the technical 
revolution created by the soundtrack was in any sense an aesthetic revolution” (43).  
Indeed, his answer to this query is a resounding “no,” for Bazin considers the 
introduction of sound, particularly sound’s supplement to the realism of the long take and 
deep focus, to have resulted in the realization of cinema as a mature, classical form. 
Instead of defining the split in cinema as that between silent and sound film, Bazin makes 
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a distinction between those films dedicated to capturing the real, which he understands in 
terms of the unity of space and time achieved through the long take and deep focus, and 
those films dedicated to the image, or the plastic manipulation of the real through 
impressionistic effects or montage. Considering depth of field to be of a piece with 
synchronized sound in its ability to fulfill the Old Testament, to represent the real, Bazin 
writes that depth of field was “a capital gain in the field of direction—a dialectical step 
forward in the history of film language” (51).  Deep focus was the actualization of 
cinema’s destiny because cinema’s true nature is to reproduce the real. Deep focus 
“brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to that which he enjoys with 
reality” (54).  
In “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” Bazin writes that photography is 
the realization of a human ideal. In doing so, Bazin places an ancient Orient in a 
dialectical relationship to the modern West. He blesses the Western and the modern by 
figuring them at the end of time’s arrow. He does this by suggesting that the progressive 
history of the plastic arts, starting with the mummies of ancient Egypt and concluding 
with cinema, has been motivated by what he calls “the mummy complex.” The mummy 
complex is the neurotic impulse for “the preservation of life by the representation of life” 
(195). Bazin argues that this practice took its original form with the Egyptian pharos, who 
believed that the replication or preservation of the body after death would preserve life 
(195). 
Writing that renaissance perspective prompted an obsessive pursuit of realism, 
Bazin argues that photography and cinema satisfied this pursuit through the mechanical 
reproduction of the image. Photography is the final satisfaction of the mummy complex 
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because “we are forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, actually 
re-presented, set before us … in time and space” (198). Because photography satisfies the 
mummy complex, Bazin claims that “photography is clearly the most important event in 
the history of the plastic arts” (199).  
These two essays work as a foundation for the evolutionary discourse of cinema. 
“Ontology” figures photography and cinema as inventions of Western culture. This 
privileges the West as the location of global-historical destiny and the satisfaction of a 
primitive desire. “Evolution” describes changes in cinema technology and aesthetics in a 
way which reinscribes these developmental narratives while figuring Euro-American 
cinematic aesthetics as a privileged, classical norm. 
Bazin’s teleology has been an enduring presence in film theory. In The Classical 
Hollywood Style, Kristin Thompson presents a historical trajectory of cinema which 
echoes Bazin while prefiguring the discourse of Avatar. She writes that the documentary 
mode of the single-shot actuality was characterized by a lack of training or sophistication. 
According to Thompson, this was a mode of cinema having to do with, or produced by, 
primitive peoples and cultures. Finally, she writes that this mode of cinema evolved into 
the more sophisticated style of the “classical” Hollywood period (Oksiloff 19-20). 
Thompson assumes a destiny for cinema, the so called “classical” period, while explicitly 
juxtaposing this destiny with a “primitive” cinema of and about “primitive” people. 
While Thompson attempts to maintain a value free comparison between these two modes, 
Assenka Oksiloff argues that “it is difficult to overlook, in the linking of the primitive 
with ‘untrained individuals’ and ‘simplicity,’ Thompson’s reassertion of an evolutionary 
narrative borrowed from traditional anthropological discourses” (20). Oksiloff argues that 
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Kristin Thompson is only a late instance of a broader pattern in which film theorists have 
mapped the history of cinema with anthropology’s temporal elitism:  
Primitive cinema is not a product of recent historical criticism, but rather a myth 
that took shape almost simultaneously with the emergence of cinema. Similar in 
significant ways to the myth of the primitive ethnographic body, the myth of 
primitive cinema functioned as a point of origin and a basis for the self-identity of 
a new phenomenon in mass culture. It satisfied the desire to trace an evolution of 
the medium and to situate oneself upon a line of aesthetic and technological 
progression, simultaneously positing the primitive while distancing oneself from 
it. (Oksiloff 22)  
 While Oksiloff’s work points to the origins of the evolutionary discourse of 
cinema, her study of German ethnography from the turn of the 20th century identifies a 
historical precedent for Avatar’s super-diegetic management of the primitive : modern 
binary. In her analysis of ethnographic cinema, Oksiloff writes that the German 
intelligentsia celebrated the motion picture as the realization of an Enlightenment ideal, 
as that technology that would allow objective, scientific observation.5 It was in this 
context that Rudolf Pöch made Bushman Speaking into the Phonograph (1908). Oksiloff 
writes that the film’s narrative action is a metaphor for the off-screen interaction between 
the ethnographic object and the camera that records him (Figure 34):  
Pöch’s film stages a ‘first contact,’ … between ‘primitive man’ and ‘advanced’ 
technology … “Bushman Speaking into the Phonograph” is devoted exclusively 
to the event named in the title: an elderly subject, identified simply as Kubi, is 
shown speaking into the mouth of the phonograph in a static medium long shot. 
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… In addition to foregrounding the technological procedure of gathering data – 
recording Kubi’s gestures and words – the film contrasts the Bushman to the 
technology used in recording his tale. This film depicts a dramatic encounter 
between the two ends of the evolutionary line: the most primitive and the most 
advanced specimens of culture. (Oskiloff 46) 
 The classical example of this primitivist tableau is a scene in Robert Flaherty’s 
Nanook of the North (1922) in which Nanook interacts with a gramophone (Figure 35). In 
this scene, Nanook appears delighted with the gramophone and its production of sound. 
Apparently dumfounded as to the device’s operations, Nanook examines the device with 
a series of exploratory bites. In reality, Allakariallak (the film’s star) was well acquainted 
with media technology and worked closely with Flaherty to choreograph the film’s 
scenes and evaluate the film’s rushes.6 A subsequent scene intercuts shots of barking 
dogs with Nanook and his family eating raw seal. An intertitle having asserted that the 
human characters share a “blood lust” with the wolf who is their “forebear,” this scene 
“visually [associates] Nanook and his family more closely with dogs than to the trader 
Figure 34. Bushman Speaking into a Phonograph. 
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and his Western technology…” (Rony 114-115). Taken together, these scenes emphasize 
Nanook’s primitive, oral corporeality.7 If we take the gramophone as a surrogate for 
cinematic technology, Nanook and Bushman Speaking serve as twin prototypes for the 
super-diegetic management of the primitive : modern binary. 
There is no doubt that Nanook is an important example of early ethnographic film.  
However, because King Kong (1933) explicitly portrays a diegetic relationship between 
cinematic technology and King Kong as an object of the colonizer’s gaze, King Kong is 
the more complex example of super-diegetic primitivism. Especially considering Peter 
Jackson’s remake of King Kong in 2005, the structural similarities between both of these 
films with early ethnographic cinema, and the structural similarities of these films to 
Avatar’s super-diegetic primitivism, an analysis of King Kong will demonstrate how 
Avatar has inherited the legacy of early ethnographic film and how late-19th and early-
20th century ideologies persist into the present moment.8  
 Cooper and Shoedsack’s King Kong (1933) is a transition from non-fictional 
ethnography to fictional ethnographic film. King Kong dramatizes the ability of white 
filmmakers to penetrate colonial space and capture the primitive other. King Kong 
transports the tropes, ideologies, and temporal elitism of visual anthropology into the 
Figure 35. Nanook and the Phonograph. 
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arena of popular film.9 As such, King Kong is a semi-autobiographical account of Cooper 
and Shoedsack’s own work as the makers of early ethnographic films such as Grass: A 
Nations Battle for Life (1925) and Chang: A Drama of the Wilderness (1927).10  
 Like the films of Pöch and Flaherty, Cooper and Shoedsack’s King Kong features 
the juxtaposition of a primitive other with modern technology. Because it features a film 
crew, their equipment, and the quest of this crew to capture Kong’s image, King Kong 
explicitly manages its representation of the primitive within a super-diegetic 
constellation. Kong is juxtaposed with the technology of the diegetic motion picture 
camera, but he is also juxtaposed with the technological prowess of King Kong the 
motion picture. Just as Kong is diegetically managed by steel chains, airplanes and 
machine guns, he is cinematically managed by the puppetry, stop-motion animation, and 
other visual wizardry required for the presentation of his body.   
 Indeed, King Kong (1933) was as much about its own technological achievement 
as it was about a narrative of colonial mastery. One review for The New York Times 
stated:  
Three months were spent investigating scientific records before a single scene 
was photographed on the RKO-radio sets where “King Kong” has been in the 
making since 1931. Geographical data concerning the vegetation, location and 
population of an imaginary island … were checked with experts and university 
research departments. Paleontologists were consulted by Willis O’Brien, whose 
job it was to animate the dinosauria … [The sound effects coordinator] went for 
suggestions to Dr. O.A. Paterson, curator of mammalian paleontology at the 
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Carnegie Museum, and Dr. J. W. Lytle, vertebrate paleontologist of the Los 
Angeles Museum. (A 50-Foot Ape X3) 
As this excerpt demonstrates, the popular discourse of King Kong explicitly linked 
scientific knowledge of the antediluvian to the technique and triumph of Kong’s 
production. Moreover, this discourse construed Kong as an icon of technical cinematic 
progress in a manner which prefigures similar evaluations of Avatar. In comparing the 
film to The Lost World (1925), one critic wrote: 
 [Kong] has the added advantage of sound, which ‘Lost World’ missed in 1925. It 
also has the additional technical knowledge and experienced gained by Willis 
O’Brien and other off-screen manipulators. O’Brien served as chief technician for 
both films. … So purely an exhibition of studio and camera technology—and it 
isn’t much more than that –‘Kong’ surpasses anything of its type which has gone 
before it in commercial film-making. (Bige 14)11 
 Of course, King Kong actively references its own technological progress in ways 
which may have encouraged this popular discourse. By listing “King Kong” among the 
film’s “players,” the film uses direct narrative address to establish Kong as an extra-
diegetic entity. By introducing Kong as the “8th Wonder of the World,” the film 
congratulates its own technical prowess (Figure 36).12 Thus, the film’s regard for its own 
technical achievement is structurally equivalent to the diegetic regard of the film’s 
modern characters for King Kong. Carl Denham’s triumphant exhibition of Kong for a 
modern audience in New York City is a diegetic dramatization of the film’s own 
spectacle. Indeed, in the shot-reverse-shot sequence in which Kong is displayed in his 
chains, the diegetic audience occupies the same space as the cinematic spectator, and the 
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film’s diegetic auditorium becomes an on-screen surrogate for the space of the extra-




Figure 36. King Kong as Extra-Diegetic Spectacle. 




This visual doubling is a metaphor for the double nature of the film’s ideological 
work. On the one hand, the film is a spectacle as a function of its technological 
innovation. As if to reinforce a sense of technological progress, the spectacle made 
possible by King Kong’s visual technology is the spectacle of the primitive other. As 
such, the relationship between filmic technology and the primitive other is as much a 
relationship of power and domination as the narrative played out on screen. Just as Kong 
is slain by the airplane and its machine gun, so too is Kong managed, dominated, and 
upstaged by the very technology that represents him. As such, both the diegetic audience 
and their extra-diegetic counterparts are encouraged to move into a relationship of 
temporal elitism with King Kong. As Bliss Cua Lim writes: 
Though Kong and those who worship him are co-present with the filmmakers, 
they are spatially and temporally distanced: Skull Island is a remote, uncharted 
island off the coast of Sumatra, a place where time has literally come to a 
temporally confused stop: the enormous primate, Kong, battles a dinosaur. Kong 
and the primitives who worship him are therefore anachronistic contemporaries of 
the diegetic filmmakers (and, implicitly, of the extradiegetic spectator). (90) 
Similar observations were part of the popular discourse at Kong’s release. As one 
reviewer had it, the audiences of the Radio City movie houses in New York enjoyed “all 
the sensations of primitive terror and fascination within the scientifically air-cooled 
temple of baroque modernism that is Mr. Rockefeller’s contribution to contemporary 
culture” (Quoted in Erb 21).  
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 Peter Jackson’s remake of King Kong (2005) indicates that the early-20th-century 
looking relations of ethnographic cinema, and, in particular, the triangular constellation 
of the original Kong, were an active cinematic paradigm in the years preceding Avatar. 
First, the 2005 film reproduces the process by which Kong is both a primitive, diegetic 
spectacle for a diegetic, modern other, and a primitive counterpart to the cinematic 
technology which produces him. The reproduction of the theater scene’s shot-reverse-
shot sequence emphasizes the endurance of the original film’s super-diegetic gazing 
relations (Figure 38).  
Moreover, this scene posits a temporal relationship between the diegetic audience 
of 1933 and their 21st-century counterparts. Significantly, Kong (2005) presents 1930s 
New York as a computer-generated spectacle (Figure 39).13 The relationship between the 
diegetic spectator and her extra-diegetic counterpart generates another super-diegetic 
relationship: the juxtaposition of 1930s 
cinema technology with the film’s own 
computer generated imagery (Figure 40). 
Just as Bazin emphasizes that the 
knowledge of the photograph’s means of 
production is crucial to the psychological effect of the photograph and the motion picture 
Figure 38. The Super-Diegetic Kong, Redux. 
Figure 39. New York as Object. 
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image, so too is the knowledge of King Kong’s computer generated imagery an extra-
diegetic factor in the construction of time for the cinematic spectator in 2005.14 As the 
first remake of King Kong to render the film’s drama with computer graphics, the 2005 
remake explicitly complicates the triangular constellation of the 1933 film because it 
juxtaposes manual, hand-crank camera technology with computer generated imagery. 
Moreover, this juxtaposition is energized with the primitive : modern binary because the 
primitive other is the diegetic object of these temporally disparate visual technologies. 
As both Kong and the diegetic camera are juxtaposed with the film’s own visual 
technology, the film’s computer generated images imply a parallel between Kong and the 
Figure 40. Primitive, Diegetic Visual Technology.  
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antique cameras which capture him in the film’s diegesis. Both Kong and the film’s 
diegetic cameras are in an oppositional relationship to Kong’s own visual technology. 
While Cooper and Shoedsack’s King Kong was set in present-day 1933, Peter Jackson’s 
film is set in the 1933 of the cinematic past. As such, the film draws attention to the now-
antiquated visual technology through its juxtaposition with the visual technology of 2005. 
As its new rendering of Kong may be said to depend on advances in CGI technology, 
King Kong (2005) constructs a temporal trajectory of film technology which is 
superimposed on its rendering of the primitive : modern binary. As Dan North writes, this 
is a result of the process by which Peter Jackson’s film positioned itself against its 
predecessor “as a source of comparative wonder” (North 180-181). Following North, 
Lisa Purse writes; “Both films enthusiastically engage with the special effects 
technologies at their disposal, but the Jackson film’s deployment of the state of the art 
digital technologies functions partly as an assertion of its technological distance from its 
1933 forebear” (83). The final consequence of this technological upstaging is that Kong 
is all the more irrevocably doomed to a position in the past. Kong (2005) weaves its ape 
into a compounded matrix of overlapping temporal oppositions, all of which have to do 
with cinematic technology and the rendering of the primitive body for a modern 
audience. 
  Both versions of King Kong are precedents for Avatar. Like Kong, Avatar is a 
colonial adventure about the movement of Anglo-Americans in a colonial space and their 
observation of primitive people within that space. More importantly, Avatar features a 
super-diegetic management of the primitive : modern binary. The film’s protagonist (Sam 
Worthington) engages in a diegetic discovery of Pandora and its native peoples. By virtue 
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of the film’s cinematography, its 3D exhibition technology, and the process by which the 
film’s protagonist functions as the cinematic spectator’s own avatar, the protagonist’s 
visual discovery of Pandora is doubled by the cinematic spectator’s own immersion in a 
neo-colonial paradise. Avatar replicates the triangular constellation of early ethnographic 
cinema because its cinematic technology manifests a diegetic avatar, the protagonist’s 
own avatar program, which serves as a technology of observation and mastery. Finally, 
just as King Kong (2005) placed itself in a dialectical relationship with both its diegetic 
ape and the antique cinematic technology of the 1933 original, Avatar was considered to 
have been a progressive advance in 3D exhibition technology. 
The Colonizer’s Gaze, Movement, and 3D Exhibition Technology 
 Avatar’s 3D technology allowed for the immersion of the cinematic spectator into 
the three-dimensional space of the film’s diegesis. The spectator’s movement from the 
theater into the film’s diegetic world is an extra-diegetic metaphor for Jake Sully’s own 
movement into a colonial space. By virtue of this extra-diegetic metaphor, theater is to 
diegesis as metropolis is to colony. The terms of this analogy are infused with the 
trajectory of temporal elitism because Avatar’s 3D exhibition technology was received as 
the evolution of a film aesthetic. Because of this analogy and its temporal energy, 
Avatar’s 3D exhibition solicits the spectator with the colonizer’s gaze and the denial of 
coevalness. 
 As the movement of the spectator into its diegetic world so spectacularly 
underscores, Avatar is a movie about movement. It is about the movement of a colonial 
force to a primordial world. It is about the rehabilitation of a paraplegic veteran and his 
personal recovery of bodily mobility. It is about the pleasure this man experiences as he 
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literally moves through a beautiful, exotic world. It is about the protagonist’s spiritual 
journey from a state of transcendental homelessness to the heart of an integrated 
civilization. It is about his spectacular movement through space on the back of winged 
beasts. Avatar is also, primarily, a film about the movement of the audience. The 
cinematic spectator moves with Jake Sully in his flights over Pandora. The spectator is 
emotionally moved by the film’s melodramatic rendering of ecological catastrophe and 
colonial violence. As a spectacular, visual-effects-laden blockbuster, and as a melodrama 
about a white-savior who gets his literal and metaphorical wings, Avatar is about many 
forms of movement. It is no surprise, then, that Avatar’s most spectacular visual 
innovation, an innovation which has everything to do with the immersion of the 
cinematic spectator in a neo-colonial paradise, has everything to do with movement.  
 Before Avatar, which is to say, in the “primitive” era of such technology, 3D 
exhibition was primarily characterized by negative parallax or “the pop-out effect.”  The 
sign of Avatar’s progress was its total revision of this aesthetic norm. In contradistinction 
to negative parallax, 3D exhibition in Avatar depended on the illusion of spatial depth 
and the sensation of movement into this depth of field; “Avatar set a standard in terms of 
depth-realism, paying much attention to extending depth planes away from the viewer” 
(Ross 382). These depth planes encouraged the cinematic spectator to feel that he or she 
was immersed in Avatar’s diegetic and colonial worlds. With Jake Sully as their avatar, 
audience members experienced movement into the pleasurably rendered space of 
Avatar’s fictional world. 
 This sense of spectatorial movement seems to have been the explicit goal of the 
film’s creator, James Cameron. In a review of an early screening of the film at which 
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Cameron spoke, both the diction of the director and the commentary of the reviewer 
foreground the possibility of spectatorial transportation and the power of the cinematic 
apparatus: 
“Welcome to Avatar.” 
 The director James Cameron had materialized, as if by digital magic, 
before an early screening audience here of his latest blockbuster-in-waiting. But 
it’s not quite clear what the director was inviting them into this day in early 
December. The little $230 million picture he had just finished? The “world” 
created by his production’s advanced digital techniques? (Anderson 20)  
First, an audience which is meant to identify with the viewing position of a white male 
protagonist is explicitly invited to move into colonial space. Second, this space is 
considered to have been constructed by and for the colonizer’s gaze. Lastly, the primitive 
and its world are the acceptable and pleasurable arena of white mobility as a function of 
advanced technology. Avatar interpellates the cinematic spectator into the terms of the 
colonizer’s gaze as a function of its 3D exhibition technology. 
While the colonizer’s gaze has structured the viewing relationships of previous 
films, Avatar’s 3D exhibition technology is a new dimension in the interpellation of the 
spectator into the structure of the colonizer’s gaze. As Richard C. Hawkins writes; “In the 
realm of true stereoscopic films, a control of depth relationships and of the position of the 
image in space may bring audiences into a new and intriguing relation with the picture” 
(333). In her discussion of the “new haptic effects” of the 3D exhibition technologies of 
Avatar, Mirriam Ross writes that this “new and intriguing relation with the picture” 
  
200 
involves a hyper-haptic, tactile viewing which collapses the distance between subject and 
object and produces an immersive effect: 
Stereoscopic images may at first seem to continue the dependence on optical 
vision … but once the moving images are brought to life, so to speak, the 
abundance of depth planes provokes an immersive effect through which the body 
is located within and in relation to, rather than at a fixed distance from, the 
content. (Ross 383) 
Distinguishing between the traditional 2D screen, the haptic cinema screen, and 
the hyper-haptic 3D screen, Ross argues for a series of ontological and experiential 
consequences of 3D exhibition. For Ross, the traditional 2D screen is experienced by the 
terms of optical vision. Basically, “the viewer is offered a separate screen space, set apart 
from themselves, which has a structured intelligibility. In turn, this separation allows for 
a distance-based contemplation of the action, and there is a potential for mastery over and 
possession of the content” (Ross 385).  Drawing on Laura Marks’s definition of the 
haptic cinema screen, Ross writes that this cinema is distinct from the traditional visual 
space of 2D film because it challenges the visual mastery of the spectator; “[haptic 
cinema refuses] to position clear signs and relations between objects on its surface, which 
in turn draws attention to the images’ textured and tactile quality. The screen speaks out 
to the audience and invites participation by showing and frustrating our understanding of 
its content” (Ross 385).  
Ross argues that 3D cinema frustrates visual mastery even further: 3D cinema is 
“hyper-haptic.” Noting that movement beyond the frame depends on a sense of the stable 
screen and its violation, Ross argues that “3-D is the only format to suggest the 
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impossibility of a stable surface for the moving images…by making the framing of the 
screen violable and open to play, the 3-D film allows the potential for a fundamental 
haptic effect the sense of ‘touching not mastering’” (384). Finally, she argues that “3-D 
cinema asserts an uncontrollable, infinite depth in its image, producing a hyperphatic 
visuality” (384).  
In sum, Ross considers 3D exhibition technology to dismantle the mastery of the 
cinematic spectator, going so far as to invoke Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror; “the 
proximity of objects in the field screen threatens to engulf the audience” (386). I must 
disagree with Ross in the case of Avatar. Avatar’s 3D technology offers the cinematic 
spectator a “new and intriguing relation with the picture” which is one of colonial 
mastery and the privilege of movement. Indeed, Ross describes 3D technology in 
resolutely temporal and spatial terms which, when considered in the context of Avatar’s 
narrative, suggest that 3D technology is as much about the mastery of the colonial subject 
as it is about threats to the colonizer’s gaze. For Ross, the hyperhaptic 3D field-screen is 
an “evolution of” the traditional haptic screen. Furthermore, the function of this 
“evolution” is the movement of the spectator through “infinite depth planes” (385-386).  
In sum, the stereoscopic advance in cinematic technology allows the spectator to literally 
move through a “habitable geographic space” (Bruno 250).  
 As such, Avatar’s technological advance is the crucial means by which Jake 
Sully’s fantasy of colonial mastery is a vicarious pleasure for the film’s viewer:  
When discussing Avatar, Cameron expressed his determination to move his film 
away from the supposedly gimmicky effects created by [the] use of repeated 
negative parallax. He made it clear in interviews that depth construction was his 
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major aesthetic concern. This emphasis is evident in many of the landscape shots 
of … Pandora in which the viewer is taken “through the screen.” In these shots, 
the visual world’s endless and infinite quality becomes enhanced by the sensation 
that the landscapes could be indefinitely traversed through an extended journey 
into the background. (Ross 390) 
For Ross, the film’s own metaphorical “move away” from negative parallax is reinforced 
by the spectators’ movement through the screen, Jake Sully’s movement through 
Avatar’s diegetic space, and the spectator’s own literal and vicarious traversal of both the 
diegetic dimension and Pandora’s diegetic space. Moreover, this movement is always 
either a function of, or a metaphor for, the “evolution” of cinematic exhibition 
technology. In this way, movement through colonial space, and this movement’s 
pleasure, are linked to a colonial discourse of evolutionary time.  
It is not merely that the film produces the denial of coevalness as a function of its 
3D exhibition. Rather, Jake Sully’s journey into the wild reiterates a turn-of-the-20th-
century psychoanalytic trope. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Totem and Taboo, and 
The Uncanny, Freud reiterates the recapitulation hypothesis common to anthropological 
thought of the 19th-century. This hypothesis maintained that the racial evolution of the 
human species could be observed in the maturation of a civilized individual. As an 
extension of this hypothesis, Freud argued that the psychology of civilized children was 
analogous to the psychology of primitive adults because children are recapitulating the 
primitive stage in human psychic development.15  In both Totem and Taboo and “The 
Uncanny,” Freud complicates this thesis with his theory of the “omnipotence of thought.” 
His theory holds that civilized children, adult neurotics, and primitive peoples are 
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incapable of distinguishing their desires from external reality. When a neurotic, civilized 
adult imagines the satisfaction of his desire through the process of a hallucination, this 
represents a regression to a previous state of human evolution. Freud describes this stage 
of human development as a state of primitive, infantile narcissism. As he writes in The 
Uncanny: 
The analysis of cases of the uncanny has led us back to the old animistic view of 
the universe, a view characterized by the idea that the world was peopled with 
human spirits, by the narcissistic overrating of one’s own mental processes, by the 
omnipotence of thoughts and the technique of magic that relied on it, by the 
attribution of carefully graded magical powers (mana) to alien persons and things, 
and by all the inventions with which the unbounded narcissism of that period of 
development sought to defend itself against the unmistakable sanctions of reality. 
It appears that we have all, in the course of our individual development, been 
through a phase corresponding to the animistic phase in the development of 
primitive peoples, that this phase did not pass without leaving behind in us 
residual traces that can still make themselves felt, and that everything we find 
‘uncanny’ meets the criterion that it is linked with these remnants of animistic 
mental activity and prompts them to express themselves. (Freud 147)  
In preparation for the film's final battle, Jake prays to the all-hearing “All Mother” of the 
Na'vi religion. Miraculously, his prayers are answered when the fauna of Pandora come 
to his aid in the film’s melodramatic conclusion; “When Jake projects his desires and 
thoughts onto the external world, and the external world responds by mirroring the desire 
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of the protagonist, Jake enjoys a regression to an infantile state characterized by 
omnipotence of thought” (Norton 4-5). 
 Of course, Avatar reiterates Freud’s recapitulation hypothesis with a distinctly 
post-modern twist. While omnipotence of thought continues to characterize the primitive 
stage of human evolution, this state is by no means considered a neurotic or pathological 
one. Rather, this is a utopian state set in contradistinction to a post-apocalyptic techno-
nightmare. This is Avatar’s temporal paradox. On a cinematic level, the film is 
technologically advanced and was celebrated as such. On a diegetic level, the primitive is 
celebrated for its integration with the divine. In the broadest sense, this paradox in Avatar 
is representative of the trend observed by Morris Ginsberg in The Idea of Progress. 
Writing that the belief in progress was strongest at the turn of the 20th-century, Ginsberg 
writes: 
In more recent times the belief in progress has been further weakened by the 
growing recognition that advances in technical knowledge are by no means 
sufficient to ensure social and moral progress, and the fear that the use of 
scientific knowledge for destructive purposes may outpace and arrest the growth 
of its powers for good[.] … However, [the idea of progress] is so deeply rooted in 
the modern mind that its critics never entirely reject it and consciously or 
unconsciously leave a loophole for escape. (10-12) 
Indeed, the capacity for technology to wreak material and moral havoc is showcased in 
one of Avatar’s most spectacular set pieces, the destruction of the Na’vi Home Tree by 
the sinister Colonel Quaritch.  
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The destruction of this tree by technologically advanced forces is only one 
instance of the film’s construction of a civilization past its prime. In her analysis of 
sentimentalism and the appropriation of the indigenous body, Kyla Schuller writes that 
the stillness of Jake Sully’s paralyzed legs is a metaphor for a culture in an epoch of 
dystopian stasis. Schuller argues that Avatar’s construction of a static culture is the 
cinematic expression of real-world fears. Schuller writes that fears of environmental 
catastrophe have “dampened the teleological fantasy that moving forward through time 
and accelerating technological mastery necessarily will bring about progress” (183). This 
disenchantment has carried the fear that “modernity [has become] toxic to the bodies of 
its seemingly rightful inheritors” (183).  
 Avatar relieves the pressure of techno-dystopia with its super-diegetic 
management of indigenous identity. As Jake’s experience demonstrates, the bodies of the 
Na’vi are “an important resource for colonists fleeing [the] destructive march of time” 
(Schuller 179). In an ironic resolution of techno-dystopia, Avatar makes the primitive 
body available to modern subjects through diegetic and extra-diegetic technological 
achievement. Whereas the terms of the recapitulation hypothesis lock the Na’vi in a 
primitive past, the film’s protagonist achieves therapeutic progress when high technology 
allows him to appropriate an indigenous body. Moreover, the appropriation of the 
primitive body is a privilege extended to the cinematic spectator through the device of the 
film’s 3D exhibition technology:  
Particularly in its 3D versions … Avatar enacts the sentimental dynamic in which 
the audience experiences sensory movements that are similar to those of the 
protagonists. The viewer not only watches Sully don the perceptual apparatus of 
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[the avatar program]; through the 3-D lenses, the viewer too is offered an avatar 
[and, by extension, an indigenous] body. (Schuller 184 [I have added comments 
in brackets]) 
Of course, the political consequences of this appropriation are contradictory. On the one 
hand, this appropriation encourages a shift in the protagonist’s point of view so that he 
“switches allegiance to what the film constructs as sanctified indigenous life in utter 
harmony with the forces of life itself” (Schuller 186). On the other hand, the film 
reiterates the 19th-century logic of temporal elitism when it allows for the progressive 
movement of a white male vis-à-vis the stasis of a primitive other (Schuller 186).  Avatar 
attempts to negotiate this ambiguity in a politically acceptable manner by presenting 
Sully’s inhabitation of a primitive body “as redemption rather than colonization on 
account of the emotional sympathy and political allegiance he has demonstrated for 
Pandora’s residents” (Schuller 187).  
 This shift in point of view is crucial for an understanding of Avatar’s deployment 
of the sentimental mode. In his discussion of the sentimental mode, James Chandler 
writes that “the sentimental spectator [who functions both as part of the plot and as a 
witness to the plot] proves to be a figure in motion. Able to assume multiple locations in 
narrative space, this figure is defined in no small part by his capacity to pass virtually into 
other points of view” (Quoted in Schuller 179). In Avatar, the construction of a 
sentimental viewing position is synonymous with the colonizer’s gaze and the 
technological advance of 3D technology. Here, access to different points of view is 
synonymous with white access to a continuum of racial identity. Moreover, access to 
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different points of view is metaphorized as the literal capacity of the colonizer’s gaze to 
move into the film’s diegetic, colonial space.  
Indeed, there is a structural parallel between the sentimental spectator’s ability to 
move between points of view and the cinematic spectator’s ability to move between the 
theater and the diegesis. Just as Jake Sully’s colonial and sentimental point of view is 
backwardly mobile, able to sympathize with the primitive through the appropriation of 
emotional, ethical, and racial perspectives, the cinematic spectator is vertically mobile in 
his or her point of view, able to transcend the diegetic world of the film to appreciate the 
cinematic technology which allows this sympathetic rendering of the Na’vi. This 
movement of the cinematic spectator is a product of the film’s spectacular technology.  
Specifically, the film’s 3D exhibition encourages emersion into the film’s diegetic world 
and an appreciation of the apparatus which renders that world. As Stephen Prince writes 
in Digital Visual Effects in Cinema; “visual effects at times can be disruptive; they can 
extend themselves as a spectacular dialectic. Viewers may see them simultaneously as a 
technological achievement and as an authentic part of the imaginary narrative world” 
(Price 189).  
In his analysis of “post-Avatar-depression,” Jonathan Mulrooney writes that, as a 
function of its 3-D exhibition technology, “Avatar at once courts audience desire for 
immersion in an alternative universe and leaves that desire conspicuously unfulfilled” 
(201). Ambiguously alluding to visual, spiritual, and emotional perspectives, James 
Cameron has said that Jake Sully’s journey into the wilderness was a “journey of 
perceptual change” (Quoted in Mulrooney 201). Mulrooney writes; “For Cameron, the 
success of Avatar is measured in the way the film approximates that perceptual journey 
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for viewers” (201). This perceptual journey of the cinematic spectator is figural and 
literal. It is figural because it involves the shift in emotional allegiance and sentimental 
identification with the Na’vi. It is literal because Avatar is a spectacular visual journey 
from the mundane to the sublime for both protagonist and cinematic spectator. This 
perspectival shift and spectatorial movement are facilitated by the nature of Avatar’s 3D 
exhibition technology, its construction of the illusion of depth of field.  
However, immersion in the diegetic dimension is always coupled with an 
alienation from the diegetic as a function of the spectacle of the cinematic apparatus. 
According to Cameron, 3D technology offers an immersive experience of a 
“supercharged” reality, and yet, he suggests a level of alienation from this immersive 
world when he says that “watching a stero[scopic] movie is looking into an alternate 
reality though a window” (Quoted in Mulrooney 202). Mulrooney observes: 
Mediation in cinema is ever present: the viewer looks into an “alternate” reality 
“through a window.” What makes the reality “alternate” is the viewer’s awareness 
of that reality as a framed thing, an awareness of the medium that makes 
cinematic seeing possible. By this means the spectator’s gaze is at once within 
and without the scene the movie depicts (Mulrooney 202).  
Mulrooney argues that “post-Avatar-depression” results from the impossibility of total 
filmic immersion and that Avatar demands a viewing subject divided from herself; “the 
three-dimensional virtuosity of Avatar is always … on display; the irresistible attractions 
of cinematic immersion disrupt rather than empower viewers’ sensation of specular 
mastery” (202).  
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While it is clear that spectacular visual effects, and particularly 3D exhibition 
technology, can produce the sense of being in two places at once, it is not altogether clear 
that such an experience is a threat to the mastery of the cinematic spectator. Post-Avatar- 
depression was only one of many emotional responses to the film. While some viewers 
experienced the Avatar blues, the film moved many viewers to states of political, 
environmental or philosophical ecstasy. Biologist and science writer Carol Yoon writes: 
When watching a Hollywood movie that has robed itself in the themes and 
paraphernalia of science, a scientist expects to feel anything from annoyance to 
infuriation at facts misconstrued or processes misrepresented. What a scientist 
does not expect is to enter into a state of ecstatic wonderment, to have the urge to 
leap up and shout: “Yes! That’s exactly what it’s like!” So it is time for all the 
biologists who have not yet done so to shut their laptops and run from their 
laboratories directly to the movie theaters, put on 3-D glasses and watch the film 
“Avatar.” … James Cameron’s otherworldly tale of romance and battle, aliens 
and armadas, has somehow managed to do what no other film has done. It has 
recreated what is the heart of biology: the naked, heart-stopping wonder of really 
seeing the living world. (Quoted in Elsaesser 219) 
As this biologist’s ecstasy is a function of her immersion into a 3D environment, we must 
conclude that the film’s exhibition technology is not essentially a threat to mastery or a 
source of depression. In fact, this excerpt highlights the potential for liberation, 
professional rejuvenation, and spiritual rebirth made possible by the difference between 
2D visual technology (the laptop) and the immersion of 3D. As such, the film’s 3D 
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exhibition is as much an emotional resource for the cinematic spectator as the primitivist 
narrative is for the film’s white protagonist.  
The Colonizer’s Gaze: In the Theater and on the Screen 
 First, the simultaneous immersion and alienation of the 3D spectator is 
diegetically reproduced by a narrative of colonial mastery. To wit, the diegetic apparatus 
of the film’s avatar program allows a colonial agent to exist in two places at once. For 
Avatar’s protagonist, mastery of this technology is tantamount to dominance over the 
primitive other and its landscape. Second, Avatar’s reception constructed the film’s 3D 
technology as a scientific achievement. This context indirectly engages the film’s diegetic 
primitive in a vertical dialectic. Third, when we consider that the particular nature of 
3D’s maturation was the process by which the spectator is afforded movement into a 
colonial space, it becomes impossible to separate an evaluation of Avatar’s diegetic 
technology from its exhibition technology, and an evaluation of its protagonist’s diegetic 
mobility from the mobility of the cinematic spectator. Just as Jake moves through 
colonial space by virtue of his diegetic technology, so too does the cinematic spectator 
move into the colonial world as a function of the film’s 3D exhibition technology. 
But the structural parallel between extra-diegetic immersion and the film’s 
diegetic colonial mobility is not the only factor which implicates 3D exhibition 
technology in a colonial dialectic. In a diegetic representation of this very parallel, the 
film explicitly and consistently renders diegetic 3D imaging technology as a tool of 
colonial surveillance. In almost all of the scenes which take place from the point of view 
of colonial scientists, military agents, and corporate executives, futuristic visual 
technologies allow mastery of Pandora. In no ambiguous terms, Avatar represents an 
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avatar of its own 3D exhibition technology in the diegetic devises which human 
characters use as instruments of colonial control. At Thomas Elsaesser writes, this 
diegetic use of 3D technology is nothing less than a virtual endorsement of 3D 
technology in real-life medical, industrial, and military operations (299).   
In a sequence of images which diegetically reproduce the film’s own exhibition 
technology, Jake Sully, his military commander, and a corporate executive command a 
3D hologram (Figure 41). In this scene, diegetic surveillance technology serves as a 
surrogate for two other locations of the colonizer’s movement. The first is Jake Sully’s 
movement in Pandora’s wilderness space. Through the immersive technology of the 
avatar program, Jake enjoys movement in a diegetically literal, yet digitally constructed, 
3D environment. The rendering of the diegetic hologram in this expositional sequence 
mimics Jakes interaction with this 3D space while replicating the experience of the 
cinematic spectator: as Jake sits casually on the perimeter of the hologram, his arms 
overlap with the image. This image diegetically renders the experience of the cinematic 
spectator who is free to reach into the field-screen of the 3D image, passing her hands 
through the phantom of the image in the motion picture theater.  
Figure 41. Jake and a Super-Diegetic Hologram. 
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Next, the cinematic spectator watches with the film’s protagonist as a technician 
scrolls effortlessly over some fifty or sixty kilometers of geographic space which have 
been rendered in the 3D hologram. Because it is a spectacle for both diegetic viewers and 
the cinematic spectator, this 3D hologram is a super-diegetic icon of colonial mastery. As 
it is super-diegetic, this hologram stands to endorse the film’s own 3D exhibition as a 
technology of colonial surveillance and mastery. As a result, this super-diegetic hologram 
must always remind the audience that “actual” space in the film’s diegesis is always a 
space which is a product of digital, 3D rendering. As this hologram is an image which 
confers mastery to diegetic users, it suggests that the 3D spaces which comprise the 
film’s many flight sequences are diegetic 3D spaces which may be mastered by the film’s 
protagonist and by the cinematic spectator. 
Significantly, it is not merely the malevolent agents who enjoy access to diegetic 
3D technology. In a botanical mission conducted by the film’s benevolent scientist 
(Sigourney Weaver), colonial agents in indigenous bodies use hand-held 3D devices in 
their observation of the colonial space and its organisms. In this scene, the spectacle of 
the primitive body and the spectacle of Pandora’s computer generated landscape are 
thrown into juxtaposition with a diegetic icon of the very technology which renders these 
images (Figure 42). The primitive body finds itself in both vertical and horizontal 






These super-diegetic relationships are structured according to the super-diegetic 
colonizer’s gaze in King Kong. However, Avatar introduces a significant twist to the 
super-diegetic gaze, and this twist has to do with the nature (or is it the artifice?) of the 
primitive object so doubly perceived. In King Kong (2005), Kong’s body is set in 
juxtaposition to 1930s cinematic technology, his diegetic spectators, the 21st-century 
spectator, and 21st-century film technology. This juxtaposition is deepened by the fact 
that, unlike in The Bushman Speaking into the Phonograph and Nanook of the North, the 
primitive body becomes an icon of modernity’s capacity to produce visual wonder. 
Avatar replicates many of these relationships, but it is a further departure from the super-
diegetic gaze in early ethnographic cinema. Whereas the primitive body in King Kong is 
a product of extra-diegetic technology, in Avatar, the primitive body is diegetically 
constructed by the achievements of high technology.        
Avatar is part of a cycle of films, starting with Jurassic Park (1990), which 
surpass King Kong’s super-diegetic complexity. Jurassic Park is about the gaze of the 
modern human on the anachronistic dinosaur, but it is also about the construction of this 
relationship as a super-diegetic gazing relationship. Just as the film’s human characters 
Figure 42. Diegetic Visual Technology in Avatar. 
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gaze in awe at the creatures of the diegesis, the cinematic spectator gazes in awe at the 
film’s own cinematic spectacle (Figure 43). Geoff King writes: 
The first sight of the dinosaurs leaves the principals [played by Sam Neill and 
Laura Dern], in the characteristic blockbuster-movie state of open-mouthed 
amazement. The sequence is worth closer analysis. It plays an important part in 
the establishment of audience identification with the characters, at this point 
specifically as viewers of the on-screen spectacle, but also highlights our own 
experience of the spectacle of the movie itself. (42-43)  
In Jurassic Park, the technological achievement of the film’s diegesis, the ability 
of scientists to produce the primitive body for the viewing pleasure of a diegetic 
audience, is a dramatization of the process by which the film’s own technical wizards 
produced a spectacle for the cinematic spectator. As such, the film compounds the 
temporal looking relations of King Kong by infusing the diegetic body of the primitive 
other with the energy of scientific progress. Whereas Kong’s body is always about the 
difference between the primitive object and the technology of the colonizer’s gaze, 
Jurassic Park complicates this relationship because both the cinematic spectator and the 
diegetic spectator gaze on the primitive body as a spectacle of technological wonder. 
Figure 43. The Super-Diegetic and Jurassic Park. 
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This super-diegetic viewing dynamic is crucial to James Cameron’s own oeuvre. 
Terminator 2: Judgment Day is famous for the 3D morphing technology so crucial for its 
plot and the characterization of its antagonist. Like the dinosaurs of Jurassic Park, the T-
1000 is a threatening monster whose danger is a function of scientific progress. Like the 
dinosaurs of JP, the T-1000 is a diegetic spectacle for the film’s other characters and a 
cinematic spectacle for the audience (Figure 44). Again, the technological sophistication 
of the T-1000 is a reproduction of the film’s own technological sophistication. In a film 
with such distinctly techno-phobic themes, it is highly ironic that the film should have 
been enjoyed, and critically lauded, for its technological progress. 
Avatar synthesizes the looking relationships of King Kong with the looking 
relationships of Jurassic Park and Terminator 2. In Avatar, the super-diegetic gaze falls 
on primitive bodies which are diegetically natural and diegetically manufactured by high 
technology. Like JP and T2, Avatar features super-diegetic gazing in one of the film’s 
expositional scenes. When the film’s scientists introduce Jake to his avatar, a shot-
reverse-shot sequence explicitly coordinates the gaze of the cinematic spectator with the 
gaze of the protagonist on a super-diegetic spectacle of scientific progress (Figure 45).  









The super-diegetic engagement of protagonist, spectator, and diegetic object is 
more like the viewing relationship of Jurassic Park than King Kong because this body, 
like the bodies of the dinosaurs in JP, is both a primitive body and a product of diegetic 
technology. This body is an emblem of progressive time: it represents the fusion of the 
the primitive and the modern. Moreover, this icon of time is a vehicle for the super-
diegetic gaze and super-diegetic mobility. This body serves as a visual technology for a 
white protagonist in a primordial landscape. Therefore, it replicates the relationship of the 
motion picture camera to spectacular primitive objects in King Kong.  
 In Jake Sully’s first expedition in his avatar, a spectacular sequence which is also 
the cinematic spectator’s first introduction to Pandora, a shot-reverse-shot between Jake 
and a flying creature emphasizes the primitive : modern binary, super-diegetic gazing, 
and an artifact of high-technology as a tool of colonial mobility (Figure 46). On a 
narrative and emotional level, this is a scene which dramatizes the ability of the white 




colonist (qua humanity) to enjoy movement in a primeval wilderness space. The high-
technology of the helicopter is set in juxtaposition to the primeval quality of winged 
flight, while foreshadowing Jake Sully’s mastery of this primitive mode of locomotion. 
This diegetic juxtaposition is compounded by two factors: 1) the diegetic presence of 
visual technology in the form of Jake’s avatar, and 2) the super-diegetic presence of 
techno-sophisticated and primordial signifiers. As a helicopter ride, the scene emphasizes 
movement through three-dimensional space and serves as a reminder of the 3D exhibition 
technology enjoyed by the cinematic spectator. Of course, this parallel does more than 
simply reinforce the super-diegetic.  




Sully’s introduction to his avatar is punctuated with his smile. His smile explicitly 
indexes super-diegetic gazing to pleasure. The film’s first flight sequence reinforces this 
index. In this sequence, a long action shot renders a vertiginous aerial maneuver of the 
helicopter over a waterfall. This shot foreshadows vertical movement in the film’s many 
flight sequences, while capitalizing on the film’s 3D exhibition technology. Indeed, the 
terrain’s vertical drop is as precipitous as its rendering is picturesque, emphasizing the 
consanguinity of visual beauty and the sensation of motion for both spectator and 
protagonist. In a diegetic expression of the spectator’s pleasure, Sully emits a shout of 
boyish glee. As if to endorse enjoyment of this colonial paradise, Jake’s own expression 
is echoed by the hearty chortling and infectious grin of the helicopter’s pilot, the sexy, 
feisty, and ultimately benevolent Trudy (Michelle Rodriguez) (Figure 47).   
 




While technology allows Sully to move in and out of an indigenous body, part of 
the film’s drama is generated by Jake’s inability to control this movement. This is a 
diegetic acknowledgement of the alienation effect of Avatar’s 3D exhibition. Just as Jake 
is vulnerable to unforeseen extractions from his avatar, the spectator may find himself 
spontaneously alienated from his immersion experience by his admiration of some 
particular visual effect or the discomfort of 3D glasses. While Sully’s spontaneous 
extraction from his avatar is a threat to his mastery, the celebration of the film’s 3D 
technology is bound to constitute analogous movement by the cinematic spectator as part 
of the film’s pleasure.  
Because the alienation effect of 3D technology is the final indicator of the 
colonizer’s mobility, the cinematic spectator enjoys a position over and above any 
character in the diegesis. The spectator may enjoy the wonders of Pandora while 
simultaneously enjoying the knowledge of the production of this spectacle.16 As Miriam 
Ross writes in her essay on hyperphatic visuality; “Certain pleasures result from the 
sensation that occurs in all cinematic experience whereby ‘we are doubly situated. We 
have a distinct feeling of being in two places at once, even if we never literally leave our 
seats’” (395). In her discussion of the spectator’s enjoyment of depth of field, Ross 
figures this pleasure in terms which highlight the movement of the spectator, her dual 
location, and her alienation. Writing that the 3D field screen forces the spectator to 
choose where to focus her attention, Ross writes that “this interaction with the field 
screen is complicated by the awareness that the stereoscopic perspective process is not 
the same as the practice of looking in our everyday visual world. Instead it recalls the 
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potential offered by deep focus to explore the space created in the mise-en-scène” (395). 
Further, Ross describes the 3D field as a natural extension of depth of field photography, 
in the sense that it allows audiences to “actively … scan and explore the film’s diegesis” 
(395).  
Just as Jake and company explore Pandora, so too is the cinematic spectator 
invited to explore the film’s diegetic dimension. This diegetic dimension is always also 
an erotically rendered colonial paradise. Access to this paradise is afforded by Cameron’s 
3D technology, itself a triumphant telos of technology and aesthetics. I reject the notion 
that 3D technology challenges mastery of the visual field. Because the spectator may 
move from a position within the diegesis to an extra-diegetic position, the primitive 
object of the diegetic gaze and the movement of the film’s protagonist in and out of the 
primitive body become metaphors for the cinematic apparatus as an object of the 
spectator’s gaze. As a function of the compound mobility afforded by the film’s 
sentimentalism and its 3D exhibition technology, the cinematic spectator is free to 
identify with the Na’vi, the white protagonist, and also with the technology which renders 
them. If the cinematic spectator is free to inhabit a primitive body and, in the next 
instance, celebrate the technology that renders this body, the spectator enjoys a mobility 
which benefits from a privileged relationship to futurity. In a manner which preserves 
futurity as the exclusive privilege of the colonizer, the spectator is free to move out of the 
past, out of the diegesis, and out of the theater in a way unimaginable for the film’s 
primitive characters.  
The spectator is free to move among the points of Avatar’s super-diegetic 
constellation, identify with these various points, or, as my own analysis demonstrates, 
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take up a position outside this triangulation. As a function of the sentimental viewing 
position, the cinematic spectator is free to sympathize with both the Na’vi and with the 
white protagonist. This is surely a position of mastery and security, for, from this flexible 
vantage point, the spectator may experience “the relief of an emotional catharsis, the 
munificence of an affective rescue, and the gratification of a newfound position of status 
vis-à-vis the abject position of the object of viewer sympathy” (Schuller 178). The 
position of the sentimental spectator vis-à-vis the abject, primitive object is compounded 
by the very flexibility enforced by the film’s 3D exhibition technology. Just as this 
technology knocks the spectator out of the film’s diegesis, it is a reminder to the audience 
that they are free to leave the theater. This freedom is a function of the spectator’s 
mobility every bit as significant as the spectator’s prerogative to move into sympathy 




1 Noting that Avatar has been lambasted by intellectuals as disparate as David Brooks and Slavoj Žižek for 
being a white savior film, that the film was celebrated by indigenous president Evo Morales of Bolivia as 
an anti-imperialist melodrama, and that the film was appropriated by Palestinian protesters as a means of 
generating sympathy for their cause in their struggle against Israel, Thomas Elsaesser argues that one of 
Avatar’s defining features is that it offers a plurality of readings based on a profound narrative hybridity 
and thematic ambiguity. The benefit of this plurality of meanings is that the film increases its marketability 
through the exploitation of “multiple access points” to a wide variety of viewers (293). Instead of labeling 
this plurality of readings and access points as a bundle of ideological contradictions, Elsaesser prefers to 
read Avatar as a “textually coherent ambiguity” (293). He writes: 
while not predicating or privileging any one in particular … the Na’vi blue became the new red (of 
left-wing politics, in the case of the Palestinians) and the new green (of environmental causes in 
India and China). The point, therefore, is not that the film proved controversial, and that 
professional critics as well as web users had many different views (which, of course, happens all 
the time). Rather the claim is that these divergences and seeming contradictions were programmed 
into the film from the beginning, as part of the Cameron concept. “Access for all” in the internet 
era has become a complex, multi-level, multi-cultural process of mediation and appropriation, 
which presupposes in the fabric of the film’s political and emotional texture not only a planned 
degree of pluralism of signs, regarding its story, ideology and effective registers, but a new way of 





2 For an example of a critic who understood Avatar’s 3-D exhibition as the crux of its narrative mode, see 
Cohen 22. For an example of a critic who felt the film’s dialogue and narrative groaned under the weight of 
its special effects, see Zacharek.  For a book-length discussion of the tension between spectacle and 
narrative in the recent Hollywood blockbuster, see Geoff King. King’s broadest thesis is that the 
spectacular elements of blockbuster cinema have not detracted from structurally classical plots in 
contemporary Hollywood cinema (1-2). 
 
3 In a review of Avatar for The New Yorker, David Benby writes: 
Science is good, but technology is bad. Community is great, but corporations are evil. “Avatar” 
gives off more than a whiff of nineteen-sixties counterculture, by way of environmentalism and 
current antiwar sentiment. “What have we got to offer them—lite beer and bluejeans?” Jake asks. 
Well, actually, life among the Na’vi, for all its physical glories, looks a little dull. True, there’s no 
reality TV or fast food, but there’s no tennis or Raymond Chandler or Ella Fitzgerald, either. But 
let’s not dwell on the sentimentality of Cameron’s notion of aboriginal life—the movie is striking 
enough to make it irrelevant. Nor is there much point in lingering over the irony that this anti-
technology message is delivered by an example of advanced technology that cost nearly two 
hundred and fifty million dollars to produce; or that this anti-imperialist spectacle will invade 
every available theatre in the world. Relish, instead, the pterodactyls, or the flying velociraptors, 
or whatever they are—large beaky beasts, green with yellow reptile patches—and the bright-red 
flying monster with jaws that could snap an oak. Jake, like a Western hero breaking a wild horse, 
has to tame one of these creatures in order to prove his manhood, and the scene has a barbaric 
splendor. The movie’s story may be a little trite, and the big battle at the end between ugly 
mechanical force and the gorgeous natural world goes on forever, but what a show Cameron puts 
on! The continuity of dynamized space that he has achieved with 3-D gloriously supports his 
trippy belief that all living things are one. Zahelu! (Benby) 
 
4  For another instance of the popular press celebrating Avatar’s technological progress, see Ebert. 
 
5  As Toril Jensen writes in Behind The Eye: 
The empirical trend of the Enlightenment later to be known as positivism had already introduced 
the criterion of the visible. We know only what we see. Reality is of a material nature to which we 
have access through the sight. Right from the beginning, photography was regarded as a medium 
capable of rendering precise, mechanical and impersonal representation of an object. The 
culmination of modernity was marked by the invention of a tool to represent, dominate, research 
and change the world through the technology of vision. (27)  
 
6 Allakariallak’s contribution to Flaherty’s film is well known, and Flaherty’s collaboration with the Inuit 
greatly enhanced Flaherty’s credibility. As Fatimah Tobing Rony writes: 
Because Flaherty showed rushes to his Inuit crew, and because Inuit contributed to all aspects of 
the filmmaking (from acting, to the repair of his cameras, to the printing and developing of the 
film, to the suggestion of scenes to film), critics from the art world as well as anthropology have 
claimed that Nanook represents true collaboration, the native acting out his or her own self-
conception. (118)   
  
7 As Rony writes: 
Nanook touches the gramaphone; intertitles explain that he does not understand where or how the 
sound is made. He then is shown biting the record three times while laughing at the camera. This 
conceit of the indigenous person who does not understand Western technology allows for 
voyeuristic pleasure and reassures the viewer of the contrast between the Primitive and the 
Modern: it ingrains the notion that the people are not really acting. ... This conceit, of course, 
obscured the Inuit’s own appropriation of the new technology, their participation in the production 
of the film. (112-113) 
8 Citing Peter Jackson’s remake of King Kong in 2005, Bliss Cua Lim argues that contemporary films 
“powerfully insist on the contemporaneity of the savage and highlight the durability of the nineteenth-





9 As Rony writes: 
The lineage of King Kong should be obvious: the filming, capture, exhibition, photographing, and 
finally murder of Kong takes its cue from the historic exploitation of native peoples as freakish 
“ethnographic” specimens by science, cinema, and popular culture. Critics have consistently 
passed lightly over the fact that, in the 1920s, Cooper and Schoedsack were well-known 
ethnographic filmmakers, producing and directing both Grass (1925) and Chang (1927). King 
Kong, moreover, begins with an expedition, fully equipped with film camera, to a remote tropical 
island: King Kong is literally a film about the making of ethnographic film. (Rony 159) 
 
10 The auto-biographical element of King Kong is documented by Rony and many others. For an account of 
Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Shoedsack’s pre-Kong exploits, see Morton 5-9, Haver 14-23. 
 
11 Morduant Hall praised the film for its “camera wizardry” (C12). 
 
12 King Kong (1933) employs an impressive array of special effects.  Kong’s body was a composite of an 
eighteen inch, stop-motion figure and full-scale versions of his head, hands, and legs. In addition, the film 
used split-screen matting, soft-edged matting, rear-screen projection, glass painting, foregrounded 
miniatures and rotoscoping (Morton 33-44). Writing of the significance of technological advances in the  
production of King Kong, Morton writes: 
  
Just as work began on the log scene, a technological breakthrough was announced that would turn 
out to be of enormous benefit to the production. Dispensing with glass, Sidney Saunders, the head 
of RKO’s paint department, had constructed a new kind of rear-projection screen by stretching a 
sheet of acetate across a large wooden frame and then painting it with a layer of cellulose. At 16 x 
20 ft., Saunder’s screen was bigger than previous rear screens had been and generated a much 
better image, reproducing a full range of tones from the deepest black to the brightest white. 
Because the acetate was flexible, it could also be adjusted to minimize both hot spots and fall off. 
Suddenly, rear-screen projection had become a viable option after all. Impressed with Saunder’s 
tests, Cooper and O’Brien immediately began using it on Kong. (43) 
 
13 Robert Cashill discusses the film’s representation of New York qua spectacle: 
 The decision to keep the film a period piece, after the humiliating attempt to update the story in 
1976, was sensible… the design of New York is awesome, so good you wish Kong would get out 
of the way (even if I have a few qualms about the expenditure of so much capital to recreate 
poverty, as in Gangs of New York) (39).  
 
14 While not only highlighting the difference between Kong (1933) and Kong (2005), the computer graphics 
of the 2005 film were regarded as a technical advance in special effects technology. Cashill writes; “The 
fluidity of effects technology today allows [Naomi Watts and Andy Serkis] to interact believably, unlike 
thirty years ago, where Jessica Lange can clearly be seen positioning herself in Kong’s stiffly mechanical 
arm, and Jeff Bridges, in pursuit of her and Kong, actually says that the search team isn’t looking for “some 
guy in an ape suit” (40).  Later, when he argues that the realism of Kong’s (2005) computer generated 
imagery detracts from the mythical quality of the film, Cashill refers to Jackson as a “master of the digital 
world” (43). In doing so, Cashill draws a parallel between Kong’s diegetic technology of mastery and the 
film’s own cinematic mastery of the primitive body.  
   
15 The Interpretation of Dreams handily exemplifies Freud’s application of the recapitulation hypothesis to 
psychoanalysis: 
… dreaming is on the whole an example of regression to the dreamer’s earliest condition, a revival 
of his childhood, of the instinctual impulses which dominated it and of the methods of expression 
which were then available to him. Behind this childhood of the individual we are promised a 
picture of a phylogenetic childhood – a picture of the development of the human race, of which the 
individual’s development is in fact an abbreviated recapitulation influenced by the chance 




knowledge of man’s archaic heritage, of what is psychically innate in him. Dreams and neurosis 
seem to have preserved more mental antiquities than we could have imagined possible; so that 
psycho-analysis may claim a high place among the sciences which are concerned with the 














 In conclusion, I say that the classical Hollywood style is an enduring trend in 
American and world cinemas and that this style continues to be structured according to 
the racial and temporal logics which constituted this aesthetic in its classical period. 
While contemporary popular cinema demonstrates a racial and temporal constitution, I 
should clarify the relationship between the classical Hollywood studio era and the 
lingering legacy of classical Hollywood style. The classical Hollywood studio system, 
which enjoyed preeminence from approximately 1930-1960, was characterized by an 
industrial mode of production, a standardized product, and an aesthetic regularity that we 
have come to know as the classical Hollywood style.1 While the vertical integration, 
industrial hegemony, and industrial regularity of the classical studio period ended with 
the Paramount Decrees of the late 1940s, the narrative linearity, romantic subplots, and 
omnipotent spectator of this period survived to become the aesthetic foundations of the 
New Hollywood. The New Hollywood was an industrial, aesthetic, and commercial 
model that emerged in the 1970s with films such as Jaws, Star Wars, and Raiders of the 
Lost Ark.2 This form of cinema was characterized by its large form and its spectacle. 
Throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, the American film industry suffered reduced 
revenues due to the popularity of television and the suburbanization of the movie-going 
public. With an increased emphasis on spectacle, color, and the widescreen format, the 
film industry hoped to cope with the changing landscape of motion picture viewership.3 
As film scholars have argued, contemporary popular cinema can be understood as the 
infusion of the classical Hollywood aesthetic with epic spectacle.4 As such, the 
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spectacular films of the New Hollywood are the most proximate aesthetic and industrial 
models for contemporary blockbusters such as Avatar and King Kong. These later 
blockbusters, in particular, have synthesized the racial constitution of the classical 
Hollywood style with the aesthetic and industrial norms of the New Hollywood. As 
contemporary primitivist blockbusters, Avatar and King Kong synthesize their 
spectacular visual styles with the racial logic of the classical Hollywood style in such a 
way as to emphasize the visual logic of the colonizer’s gaze. In other words, the visual 
exceptionalism of these recent films glamourizes the colonizer’s gaze as never before 
while investing that gaze with the enduring temporal logic of the classical Hollywood 
style. 
My goal has been to understand how recent popular cinema expresses 
primitivism. In The Gods Must Be Crazy, I found temporal elitism to be tied to the legacy 
of classical Hollywood style. In Dances with Wolves, settler futurity is reinforced through 
a complex structure of imperialist and generic nostalgia. In The Last Samurai, we saw 
colonial anxiety over the techno-sophisticated terrorist to be ameliorated by constructions 
of the Oriental as ethnotopic object. In Avatar, I demonstrated that the denial of 
coevalness is achieved through the futurity of the film’s 3D exhibition technology. In 
each film, the specific technique of temporal elitism is distinctly cinematic. Primitivism 
in contemporary popular film works through cinematic style, genre, ethnotopia, and 
technology. However, it is not simply that cinematic style, genre, ethnotopia and 
technology work exclusively for the films which I have analyzed as local expressions of 
these aesthetic forms. If I were to revise this dissertation with the intent to publish as an 
  
227 
academic monograph, I would deepen my analysis in any given chapter by infusing it 
with the methodology of the dissertation’s other chapters.  
 For instance, the super-diegetic construction of temporal privilege that I identify 
in Avatar is also active in The Last Samurai. In a montage before the film’s final battle 
sequence, the British translator Mr. Graham takes a photograph of a group of stone-faced 
samurai. He is motivated by concerns for posterity or, more specifically, the imperatives 
of salvage ethnography. This shot-reverse-shot sequence of cameraman and samurai 
dramatizes the colonizer’s gaze while simultaneously constructing a super-diegetic 
gazing paradigm. Moreover, the shooting of the samurai by Mr. Graham’s camera 
replicates the shooting of the samurai with the machine gun. Just as the machine gun 
excludes the samurai from settler-colonial futurity, the super-diegetic constellation of 
samurai, diegetic camera, and the cinematic apparatus allows the cinematic spectator to 
assume a temporally privileged subject position vis-à-vis the samurai as an object of the 








While this methodological cross-pollination might serve as a global revision 
strategy, an academic monograph would also allow for a deeper analysis of this 
dissertation’s individual films and those films’ problematics. Taking The Gods as a 
theoretical model, I would examine the extent to which other colonial cinemas have 
adopted and recirculated the lingering influence of the classical Hollywood style. For 
instance, an aesthetic analysis of The Gods Must Be Funny in China would determine the 
extent to which classical Hollywood aesthetics and ethnotopic gazing have circulated in 
popular Hong Kong cinema. Thinking in inverse terms, it would be interesting to 
compare The Gods Must Be Crazy with those postcolonial cinemas that reject the legacy 
of the classical Hollywood aesthetic. For instance, Touki Bouki (1973) lampoons the 
colonizer’s gaze while simultaneously refusing both an omnipotent viewing position and 
the linear narrative of the classical Hollywood style. Indeed, Touki Bouki seems to reject 
the colonizer’s gaze by means of a decentered viewing position and a non-linear narrative 
structure.  
While Touki Bouki is an important example of the ways in which an indigenous 
art cinema has rejected the temporal paradigms of the classical Hollywood aesthetic, it 
does not stand to exert the same influence on popular cinema culture as other, more 
widely-viewed films. With that in mind, it may be particularly important to investigate 
the work of popular indigenous filmmakers who have achieved a wider audience. If I 
were to expand this project into an academic monograph, I might ask how Chris Eyre’s 
Smoke Signals (1998) works as indigenous popular cinema to appropriate or subvert the 
Enlightenment historiography of the classical Hollywood aesthetic. To what extent does 
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such a film reject the legacy of the classical Hollywood style in its presentation of 
indigenous protagonists? As a movie about a road trip that is also preoccupied with death, 
memory, and identity, how does Smoke Signals rework the linearity of the Hollywood 
movie? With the characters’ movements both backwards and forwards, how and where 
do the film’s aesthetics locate mastery, time, and racial identity? 
Expansion of the corpus aside, there are other intellectual and aesthetic questions 
particular to The Gods which previous scholarship has left unexplored. For instance, how 
does The Gods interact with filmic ethnography, and, in particular, renderings of the 
indigenous peoples of southern Africa?  Does The Gods construct the signifier 
“Bushman” in the same way as non-fiction films? If so, does the film reinforce temporal 
elitism and a colonizer’s worldview because the film functioned as a documentary?  Do 
the aesthetics of film ethnography before and after The Gods reflect the legacy of 
classical Hollywood aesthetics? If so, how do these aesthetics contribute to the 
construction of time and viewing position in documentary film?  
In revising my treatment of Dances with Wolves, I might inform my reading of 
imperialist nostalgia with an analysis of the idea of authenticity. In its portrayal of the 
Lakota as psychologically complex individuals, DWW garnered acclaim for its rejection 
of the Hollywood Indian and its efforts to portray Native Americans authentically. This 
perception of authenticity would have infused the film’s adoption narrative with the 
inertia of an American tradition, as European settlers have always appropriated 
indigeneity as a means of establishing authentically American identities. Indeed, the film 
would have been a timely activation of this tradition, paralleling the process by which the 
mythopoetic men played Indian in an effort to restore what they understood to be 
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authentic masculinity. Because feelings of authenticity are so central to Dances with 
Wolves, it is worth asking whether the film functioned as a documentary. Like The Gods 
Must Be Crazy, there is a chance that audiences read the film’s representation of 
Indianness according to the codes of visual ethnography. While this may seem ridiculous, 
it is important to remember that Nanook of the North is a significant precedent for this 
reception practice. Even though audiences and critics knew that Robert Flaherty had 
staged many of the film’s scenes, they still regarded the film as a vehicle for poetic or 
metaphysical truths about the human condition. 
In revising my analysis of The Last Samurai, I would make both descriptive and 
theoretical distinctions between the temporal elitism of this film and that of the other 
films in this corpus. While The Last Samurai represents the Japanese as feudal, medieval, 
or a people in epochal transition, The Gods and Avatar seem to locate the primitive other 
in an antediluvian stage of human development. In theoretical terms, this difference could 
be accounted for in the distinction between shades of temporal elitism in which 
primitivism proper is reserved for those peoples perceived to totally antedate Western 
civilization. While the samurai of The Last Samurai are certainly denied coevalness, it 
may not be entirely accurate to say that the film characterizes these people as “primitive.” 
I hypothesize that the denial of coevalness which manages representations of cultures that 
are not totally antediluvian may be prevalent when the represented culture is apprehended 
as a cultural rival. In the case of The Last Samurai, the medievalism of the samurai 
manages American and British anxieties about perceived medievalism in the Muslim 
world. In considering revisions of this project for an academic monograph, it would be 
interesting to see whether other films conform to the dynamic of The Last Samurai. 
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Inversely, it would be worth investigating whether primitivism as it appears in The Gods 
Must Be Crazy is always more or less associated with representations of colonial 
otherness that are not perceived to threaten European or American supremacy. 
In considering an expansion of Chapter V and, in turn, the dissertation as a whole, 
I would include an analysis of films which challenge the utopian identification of the 
cinematic spectator with the techno-sophistication of the cinematic apparatus. In Avatar, 
the techno-sophistication of the cinematic apparatus is a vehicle for the pleasure of the 
cinematic spectator. In turn, this cinematic pleasure manages the spectacle of colonial 
space in such a way as to endorse a fantasy of colonial omnipotence. However, it is 
important to note that a pleasurable identification with cinematic futurity, and, in turn, a 
pleasurable identification with the colonizer’s gaze, only characterize one particular 
mode of contemporary moviegoing. Whereas primitivism is defined by these pleasurable 
identifications, there certainly exist other modes of popular cinema which operate 
according to a rejection of this pleasure. 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) and Gravity 
(2013) are films which foreground the impotence of white explorer-protagonists while 
simultaneously confounding the pleasure of the cinematic spectator.  
Like Avatar, 2001: A Space Odyssey addresses extra-planetary colonization, 
technological progress, and the relationship of white explorers to technology. Indeed, the 
film self-consciously foregrounds the idea of human technological achievement with the 
legendary juxtaposition of bone and spacecraft. However, 2001 denies the 
commensurability of technology with human progress through the character of HAL 
9000, an insane, homicidal computer. In the face of this technological menace, the film’s 
human protagonists experience terrifying incompetence. In stark contrast to the 
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omnipotent mobility of Avatar, one of 2001’s most horrifying scenes portrays a human 
figure falling frantically into the abyss of deep space.  
This diegetic portrayal of human helplessness is reinforced through the aesthetics 
of the film’s conclusion. A confounding rejection of the classical Hollywood 
denouement, the final sequence of 2001 is a disorienting, surrealist montage. First, an 
abstract rendering of hyperspace travel assaults the spectator: color and light fill the 
motion picture screen for several minutes. Next, the film dramatizes the decentering of 
the explorer protagonist: his ego is split to such an extent that he catches himself viewing 
himself in the third person. In the conclusion’s final image, human agency and 
progressive time are displaced by the transubstantiation of the dying protagonist into an 
inter-stellar fetus. Whereas the classical Hollywood paradigm guarantees its spectator the 
pleasure of total knowledge, the conclusion to 2001 is beyond the capacity of rational 
thought. Rather than delivering a narrative resolution, the sequence openly confounds 
spectatorial mastery, defying teleological imaginings of human life. In sum, 2001 
discourages the pleasurable identification of the cinematic spectator with the technologies 
of exploration and cinema because the diegetic disorientation of the film’s protagonist is 
reproduced in the spectator’s relationship to the film’s surrealist montage.   
Like 2001, Gravity is a rendering of extra-planetary exploration that emphasizes 
the impotence of a white explorer-protagonist. Like both Avatar and 2001, the spatial and 
visual conditions of Gravity’s protagonist are replicated in the relationship of the 
cinematic spectator to the film’s diegetic space. While this is a pleasurable experience in 
Avatar, Gravity’s protagonist experiences a constant state of terror and motor 
incompetence. Through a series of extremely disorienting long takes and vertiginous, 
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360-degree camera movements, the cinematic spectator is encouraged to identify with the 
spatial and visual impotence of the explorer-protagonist. This protagonist experiences a 
horrific lack of mastery in relation to diegetic icons of mobility and technological 
progress, the spaceships which eventually carry her to Earth. In a manner similar to 
Avatar, these diegetic icons are replicated in the visual wonder of Gravity’s own 
impossible cinematography. Unlike Avatar, this super-diegetic relationship produces 
feelings of anxiety and disorientation for the cinematic spectator. Whereas Jake Sully 
enjoys mastery over colonial space, Sandra Bullock sums up an entirely different 
perspective in the film’s only line of comic relief: “I hate space.”  
I include this cursory analysis to demonstrate that Avatar’s constructions of 
cinematic futurity are far from hegemonic. Primitivism, as it exists in Avatar and films of 
its ilk, is only one expression of the human experience of technology and time. While 
some films warrant postcolonial deconstruction, other films may promote models of time 
which reject temporal elitism. I call for the funding, promotion and analysis of films and 
cinema cultures which actively reject the aesthetic legacy of classical Hollywood style 
and its omnipotent spectator. While it has not been within the purview of this dissertation 
to analyze these cinemas, productive work remains to be done in which the lingering 
influence of the classical Hollywood style is analyzed with regard to cinemas that explore 
different models of time and different aesthetic forms.  
In addition to this comparative analysis, more work remains to be done 
concerning the racial politics of films that sustain the legacy of the classical Hollywood 
style. Because films from The Birth of a Nation to Avatar so readily confess to a racial 
constitution, and because this racial constitution assumes an omnipotent, progressive, 
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white-supremacist viewing position, I argue that even a film not ostensibly concerned 
with colonialism or race will reaffirm the futurity of whiteness if it employs either the 
temporal aesthetic of progressive time or the spatial aesthetic of visual and motor 
omnipotence. In films which feature actors or characters of different colors or cultures, 
these structures of the classical Hollywood aesthetic promote the idea of empire by 
structuring difference as primitivism. The presence of these aesthetic structures in films 
which do not directly address ideas of race or colonization will still propagate the ideas of 
empire, white omnipotence, and white futurity. I argue for the postcolonial analysis of 
any film that engages in the omnipotent gazing of the classical Hollywood style because 




1 For an analysis of classical Hollywood style and its mode of production, see Bordwell, 
Thompson, and Straiger, chapters 1, 2, and 7.   
 
2 For a description of the New Hollywood, see Schatz 15-44. 
 
3 For a description of the historical context of the rise of the blockbuster, see Neale 47-60. 
 
4 For an analysis of the relationship of classical Hollywood style to film spectacle in 







Avatar. Dir. James Cameron. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 2009. 20th Century Fox 
Home Entertainment, 2010. DVD. 
 
Berkhofer, Robert F. The White Man’s Indian. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Print. 
 
The Birth of a Nation. Dir. D.W. Griffith. Biograph Company, 1915. Kino on Video, 
2002. DVD. 
 
Brooks, Peter. The Melodramatic Imagination. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 
Print. 
 
Courtney, Susan. Hollywood Fantasies of Miscegenation. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2005. Print. 
 
Crazy Hong Kong. Dir. Wellson Chin. EDKO Communications, 1993. Televista, 2007. 
DVD. 
 
Crazy Safari. Dir. Billy Chan. Win’s Movie Productions Ltd, 1991. Diskovery Video and 
Laser, 1991. DVD. 
 
Dances with Wolves. Dir. Kevin Costner. TIG Productions, 1990. Twentieth Century Fox 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2010. DVD.  
 
Doane, Mary Ann. The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the 
Archive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. Print. 
 
Dyer, Richard. White. London; New York: Routledge, 1997. Print. 
 
Fabian, Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983. Print. 
 
The Gods Must Be Crazy. Dir. Jamie Uys. CAT Films, 1980. Columbia TriStar Home 
Entertainment, 2004. DVD. 
 
The Gods Must Be Crazy II. Dir. Jamie Uys. Elrina Investment, 1989. Columbia TriStar 
Home Entertainment, 2004. DVD. 
 
The Gods Must Be Funny in China. Dir. Kin-Nam Cho. Hong Kong Film Entertainment 




The Jewel of the Gods. Dir. Robert Van der Coolwijk. Focus Films, 1989. Madacy 
Entertainment Group, 2004. DVD. 
 
King Kong. Dirs. Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Shoedsack. RKO-Pathé Studios, 1933. 
Warner Home Video, 2006. DVD. 
 
The Last Samurai. Dir. Edward Zwick. Warner Bros, 2003. Warner Home Video, 2004. 
DVD. 
 
Lim, Bliss Cua. Translating Time: Cinema, The Fantastic, and Temporal Critique. 
Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2009. Print. 
 
Moberg, Mark. Engaging Anthropological Theory: A Social and Political History. 
London; New York: Routledge, 2013. Print. 
 
Moore, Jerry D. Visions of Culture: An Annotated Reader. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 
2009. Print. 
 
Moore, Jerry D. Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and 
Theorists. London: AltaMira Press, 1997. Print. 
 
Nanook of the North. Dir. Robert Flaherty. Les Frères Revillon, 1922. Criterion 
Collection, 1998. DVD.  
 
Pearce, Roy Harvey. Savagism and Civilization: The Study of the Indian in the American 
Mind. Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988. Print. 
 
Quigley, William J. International Motion Picture Almanac. Groton, MA: Quigley 
Publishing Company, 2011. Print. 
 
Rony, Fatimah Tobing. The Third Eye: Race, Cinema, and the Ethnographic Spectacle. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996. Print. 
 
Rosaldo, Renato. “Imperialist Nostalgia.” Representations. 26 (1989): 107-122. Online. 
 
Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. Print. 
 
Shohat, Ella. “Gender and Culture of Empire: Toward a Feminist Ethnology of the 
Cinema.” Visions of the East: Orientalism in Film. Eds. Matthew Bernstein and 
Gaylen Studlar. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1997. 19-68. Print. 
 
Tabu: A Story of the South Seas. Dir. F.W. Murnau. Murnau-Flaherty Productions, 1931. 
Milestone Film and Video, 1992. Videocassette.  
 





Tuck, Eve., K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization is not a metaphor.” Decolonization: 
Indigeneity, Education and Society. 1.1 (2012): 1-40. Online. 
 
Williams, Linda. “Melodrama Revisited.” Refiguring American Film Genres: History 




Avatar. Dir. James Cameron. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 2009. 20th Century Fox 
Home Entertainment, 2010. DVD. 
 
Baines, Gary. “Representing the Apartheid City: South African Cinema in the 1950s and 
Jamie Uys’s The Urgent Queue.” Cinema and the City. Eds. Mark Shiel and Tony 
Fitzmaurice. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. 185-194. Print. 
 
Baudry, Jean-Louis “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus.” Film 
Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, Fifth Edition. Eds. Gerald Mast, 
Marshal Cohen, Leo Braudy. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
345-355. Print. 
 
Beautiful People. Dir. Jamie Uys. Mimosa Films, 1974. Animals Are Beautiful People. 
Warner Home Video, 1985. Videocassette.  
 
Beck, Roger B. The History of South Africa. Westport, Connecticut; London: Greenwood 
Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Beynon, John. Masculinities and Culture. Buckingham; Philadelphia: Open University 
Press, 2002. Print. 
 
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London; New York: Routledge, 2004. Print. 
 
The Birth of a Nation. Dir. D.W. Griffith. Biograph Company, 1915. Kino on Video, 
2002. DVD. 
 
Bordwell, David. “Classical Hollywood Cinema: Narrational Principles and Procedures.” 
Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader. Ed. Philip Rosen. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 17-34. Print. 
 
Botha, K. and Cameron, E. “South Africa.” Sociolegal Control of Homosexuality: A 
Multinational Comparison. Eds. D.J. West and R. Green. New York; London: 
Plenum Press, 1997. 5-42. Print. 
 
Botha, Martin. South African Cinema 1896-2010. Chicago: The University of Chicago 




Bringing Up Baby. Dir. Haward Hawks. RKO Radio Pictures, 1938. Tuner Home 
Entertainment, 1996. Videocassette. 
 
Casablanca. Dir. Michael Curtiz. Warner Bros, 1942. Warner Home Video, 1999. DVD. 
 
Come Back, Africa. Dir. Lionel Rogosin, 1959. Mystic Fire Video, 1987. Videocassette.  
 
The Condemned Are Happy. Dir. Jamie Uys. South African Information Service, Jamie 
Uys Film Productions, South African Information Service, 1958. Villon Films 
Distribution, 199?. Videocassette. 
 
Connell, R.W. Gender and Power. North Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin Australia 
Pty Ltd, 1987. Print. 
 
--- Masculinities. Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995. Print. 
 
Conway, Daniel. “The Masculine State in Crisis: State Response to War Resistance in 
Apartheid South Africa.” Men and Masculinities. 10 (2008): 422-439. Online. 
 
Courtney, Susan. Hollywood Fantasies of Miscegenation. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2005. Print. 
 
The Cruise. Dir. Bennett Miller. Charter Films Inc, 1998.  Lions Gate Home 
Entertainment, 2006. DVD. 
 
Cry, the Beloved Country. Dir. Zoltan Korda. London Films, British Lion Studio 
Company, Canal+ Image UK Ltd, 1951. London Films, British Lion Studio 
Company, Canal+ Image UK Ltd, 2010. DVD. 
 
Dances with Wolves. Dir. Kevin Costner. TIG Productions, 1990. Twentieth Century Fox 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2010. DVD.  
 
Davis, Peter. In Darkest Hollywood: Exploring the Jungles of Cinema’s South Africa. 
Randburg, South Africa: Raven Press, 1996. Print. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement Image. Minneapolis, MI: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986. Print. 
 
Dirkie. Dir. Jamie Uys. Mimosa Films, 1969. Mimosa Films, 2005. DVD.  
 
Doane, Mary Ann. The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the 
Archive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. Print. 
 




Elder, G. “Of Moffies, Kaffirs and Perverts: Male Homosexuality and the Discourse of 
Moral Order in the Apartheid State.” Mapping Desire: Geographies of 
Sexualities. Eds. D. Bell and G. Valentine. London; New York: Routledge, 1995. 
50-58. Print. 
 
Eng, David L. Racial Castration. Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2001. Print. 
 
Fabian, Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983. Print. 
 
Farber, Allen. “Ideology of Discovery.” ARTH 200 Language of the Visual Arts: Spring 
2014. SUNY Oneonta School of Arts and Humanities, 2014. Web. Accessed 14 
October 2014.  
 
Ferngully: The Last Rainforest. Dir. Bill Kroyer. FAI Films, 1992. Twentieth Century 
Fox Home Entertainment, 2005. DVD. 
 
The Fox Has Four Eyes. Dir. Jamie Uys. Jamie Uys Film Productions, South African 
Information Service, 1959. Villon Films Distribution, 199?. Videocassette.  
 
Freed, L.S. “Medico-Sociological Data in the therapy of Homosexuality.” South African 
Medical Journal. 28.48 (1954): 1022-1023. Online. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. The Uncanny. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. Print.  
 
---. Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics. A.A. Brill, Trans. Amherst; New York: Prometheus Books, 2000. 
Print. 
 
Funny People. Dir. Jamie Uys. Mimosa Films, 1980. Televista, 2007. DVD. 
The Gods Must Be Crazy. Dir. Jamie Uys. CAT Films, 1980. Columbia TriStar Home 
Entertainment, 2004. DVD. 
 
 “The Gods’ Smile on Jamie.”  Screen International 16 May 1981: 41. Entertainment 
Industry Magazine Archive. Accessed 7 May 2015. 
Gordon, Robert., Stuart Sholto Douglas. The Bushman Myth: The Making of a Namibian 
Underclass. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000. Print. 
Gugler, Joseph. African Film: Reimagining a Continent. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2003. Print. 
Hughey, Matthew W. “The (dis)Similarities of White Racial identities: the conceptual 




“Jamie Uys Delighted” Advertisement. Variety 8 October 1980: 33. Entertainment 
Industry Magazine Archive. Accessed 7 May 2015. 
“Jamie Uys Presents!” Advertisement. Variety 16 May 1979: 81. Entertainment Industry 
Magazine Archive. Accessed 7 May 2015. 
Johns, Timothy. “Laughing Off Apartheid: Comedy at the Twilight of White Minority 
Rule.” Journal of Narrative Theory. 39.2 (2009): 211-240. Online. 
 
Jones, Tiffany. “Averting White Male (Ab)normality: Psychiatric Representations and 
Treatment of ‘Homosexuality’ in 1960’s South Africa.” Journal of Southern 
African Studies. 34.2 (2008): 397-410. Online. 
 
Kaufman. C.E. “Reproductive Control in Apartheid South Africa.” Population Studies. 
54 (2000): 105-14. Online. 
 
King Kong. Dirs. Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Shoedsack. RKO-Pathé Studios, 1933. 
Warner Home Video, 2006. DVD. 
 
King Kong. Dir. Peter Jackson. Universal Pictures, 2006. Universal Studios Home 
Entertainment, 2006. DVD.  
Lacan, Jacques. “The Mirror State as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience.” Ecrits: A Selection. Ed. Bruce Fink. Bruce Fink, 
Trans. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. 3-9. Print. 
 
The Last Samurai. Dir. Edward Zwick. Warner Bros, 2003. Warner Home Video, 2004. 
DVD. 
 
Lim, Bliss Cua. Translating Time: Cinema, The Fantastic, and the Temporal Critique. 
Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2009. Print. 
 
“The Little Kicks” Seinfeld: The Complete 8th Season. Larry David. Andy Ackerman. 
Shapiro/West Productions, 1996. DVD. 
 
Lor. “The Gods Must Be Crazy.” Variety 4 July 1984: 18. The Entertainment Industry 
Magazine Archive. Accessed 7 May 2015. 
 
Maingard, Jacqueline. South African National Cinema. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Print. 
McClintlock, Ann. Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest. New York: Routledge,  1995. Print. 
Moran, Shane. Representing Bushmen: South Africa and the Origin of Language. 




Mulvey, Laura. Visual and Other Pleasures. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Print. 
 
N!ai, The Story of a !Kung Woman. Dir. John Marshall. Documentary Educational 
Resources, 1980. Documentary Educational Resources, 2007. DVD. 
New York Times. “N!xau, Bushman Who Starred in ‘The Gods Must Be Crazy’.” New 
York Times 8 July 2003: B8. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York 
Times (1851-2010). 
 
Nichols, Bill. Representing Reality. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991. 
Print. 
 
Norton, Steven. “How the Other is Not Allowed to Be: Elision and Condensation in 
Avatar.” Arizona Quarterly. 69.2 (2013): 131-144. Print. 
 
Pocahontas. Dir. Mike Gabriel and Eric Goldberg. Walt Disney Feature Animation, 
1995. Buena Vista Home Video, 2000. DVD. 
 
Remnants of the Stone Age People. A Union of South Africa Information Office 
Production. South African Propaganda Films of Apartheid, Villon Films, 2008. 
DVD.  
 
Retief, G. “Keeping Sodom Out of the Laager.” Defiant Desires. Eds. M. Gevisser and E. 
Cameron. Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1994. 99-111. Print. 
 
Robinson, Sally. Marked Men. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Rony, Fatimah Tobing. The Third Eye: Race, Cinema, and the Ethnographic Spectacle. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996. Print. 
 
Shohat, Ella. “Gender and Culture of Empire: Toward a Feminist Ethnology of the 
Cinema.” Visions of the East: Orientalism in Film. Eds. Matthew Bernstein and 
Gaylen Studlar. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1997. 19-68. Print.  
 
Stasch, Rupert.  “Primitivist tourism and romantic individualism: On the values in exotic 
stereotypy about cultural others.” Anthropological Theory. 14.2 (2014): 191-214. 
Online. 
 
Thompson, Leonard. A History of South Africa: New Haven; London: Yale University 
Press, 2001. Print. 
 
Tomaselli, Keyan G. “Annoying Anthropologists: Jamie Uys’s Films on “Bushmen” And 
Animals.” Society for Visual Anthropology. Spring (1990): 75-80. Online. 
 





---. “Rereading the Gods Must be Crazy films.” Visual Anthropology. 19 (2006): 171-
200. Online. 
 
“La Venus Hottentote.” The Royal Museums Greenwich: The Collection. The Royal 
Museums Greenwich, 2015. Web. Accessed 8 August 2015.  
 
Yekani, Elahe Haschemi. The Privilege of Crisis. Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, 
2011. Print. 
 





Aldred, Lisa. “Plastic Shamans and Astroturf Sun Dances: New Age Commercialization 
of Native American Spirituality.” The American Indian Quarterly. 24.3 (2000): 
329-352. Online. 
 
Aleiss, Angela. Making the White Man’s Indian: Native Americans and Hollywood 
Movies. Westport, Connecticut; London: Praeger Publishers, 2005. Print. 
 
Apocalypse Now. Dir. Francis Ford Coppola. Zoetrope Studios, 1979. Paramount, 2001. 
DVD. 
 
Back to the Future. Dir. Robert Zemeckis. Universal Pictures and Amblin Entertainment, 
1985. Universal Studios Home Entertainment, 2009. DVD. 
 
Back to the Future Part III. Dir. Robert Zemeckis. Universal Pictures and Amblin 
Entertainment, 1990. Universal Studios, 2002. DVD. 
 
Bandy, Mary Lea., Keven Stoehr. Ride Boldly Ride: The Evolution of the American 
Western. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: The University of California Press, 
2012. Print. 
 
Bapis, Elaine M. “Easy Rider (1969): Landscaping the Modern Western.” The Landscape 
of Hollywood Westerns: Ecocriticism in an American Film Genre. Ed. Deborah 
A. Carmichael. Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 2006. 157-181.  
Print. 
 
Barton, Edward Read. Mythopoetic Perspectives of Men’s Healing Work. Westport, 
Connecticut; London: Bergin & Garvey, 2000. Print. 
 
Beaver, Frank Eugene. Dictionary of Film Terms: The Aesthetic Companion to Film Art. 




Bell, Katherine M. “Raising Africa?: Celebrity and the Rhetoric of the White Savior.” 
Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies. 10.1 (2013): 1-24. Online. 
 
Berg, Chuck. “Fade out in the West: The Western’s Last Stand.” Film Genre 2000. Ed. 
Wheeler Winston Dixon. Albany, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2000. 211-225. Print. 
 
Berkhofer, Robert F. The White Man’s Indian. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. Print. 
 
Brooks, Peter. The Melodramatic Imagination. New Haven; London: Yale University 
Press, 1976. Print. 
 
Brown, Royal S. Overtones and Undertones: Reading Film Music. Berkeley; Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1994. Print. 
 
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid. Dir. George Roy Hill. 20th Century Fox Film 
Corporation, 1969. CBS/Fox Video, 1990. Videocassette.  
 
Cahir, Linda Costanzo. “Narratological Parallels in Joseph Conrad’s Heart Of Darkness 
and Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now.” Literature/Film Quarterly. 20.3 
(January 1992):  181-187. Online. 
 
Carmichael, Deborah A. “Introduction.” The Landscape of Hollywood Westerns. Ed. 
Deborah A. Carmichael. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006. 1-
18. Print. 
 
Cheyenne Autumn. Dir. John Ford. Warner Bros, 1964. Warner Home Video, 1990. 
Videocassette. 
 
City Slickers. Dir. Ron Underwood. Castle Rock Entertainment, 1990. MGM Home 
Entertainment, 2001. DVD. 
 
Cole, Teju. “The White Savior Industrial Complex is not about justice. It is about having 
a big emotional experience which validates privilege.” 8 March 2012, 9:37 a.m. 
Tweet.  
 
Collins, Jim. “Genericity in the Nineties: Eclectic Irony and the New Sincerity.” Film 
Theory Goes to the Movies. Eds. Jim Collins, Hilary Radner, Ava Preacher 
Collins. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993. 242-262. Print. 
 
Cooke, Mervyn. A History of Film Music. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Print. 
 
Dances with Wolves. Dir. Kevin Costner. TIG Productions, 1990. Twentieth Century Fox 




The Deer Hunter. Dir. Michael Cimino. EMI Films and Universal Studios, 1978. MCA 
Home Video, 1991. Videocassette. 
 
Deloria, Philip. Playing Indian. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Print. 
 
Easy Rider. Dir. Dennis Hopper. Columbia Pictures Corporation, 1969. Criterion 
Collection, 2010. DVD. 
 
Evans, Greg. “Finance: MARKETING – Orion creates epic pitch for ‘Dances With 
Wolves.” Variety 5 Nov 1990: 97. Entertainment Industry Magazine Archive. 
Accessed 12 February 2015. 
 
Fabian, Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983. Print. 
 
Ferber, Michael. Romanticism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. Print. 
 
Flinn, Caryl. Strains of Utopia: Gender, Nostalgia, and Hollywood Film Music. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Print. 
 
Full Metal Jacket. Dir. Stanley Kubrick. Natant, Stanley Kubrick Productions, 1987. 
Warner Home Video 1988. Videocassette. 
 
Gallagher, Mark. “I Married Rambo: Spectacle and Melodrama in the Hollywood Action 
Film.”  Mythologies of Violence in Postmodern Media. Ed. Christopher Sharrett. 
Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1999. 199-225. Print. 
 
The Gods Must Be Crazy. Dir. Jamie Uys. CAT Films, 1980. Columbia TriStar Home 
Entertainment, 2004. DVD. 
 
Golub, Mark. “History Dies for Our Sins: Guilt and Responsibility in Hollywood 
Redemption Histories.” Journal of American Culture. 21.3 (1998): 23-45. Online. 
 
Gorbman, Claudia. “The State of Film Music Criticism.” Cineaste. 21.1/2 (1995): 72-76. 
Online. 
 
---. Unheard Melodies. Bloomington; Indianapolis: BFI Publishing; Indiana University 
Press, 1987. Print. 
 
---. “drums along the l.a. river: scoring the indian.” Westerns: Films Through History. Ed. 
Janet Walker. New York; London: Routledge, 2001. 177-196. Print. 
 
Griffiths, Alison. “Playing at Being Indian: Spectatorship and the Early Western.” 
Westerns: The Essential ‘Journal of Popular Film and Television’ Collection. Eds 
  
245 
Gary R Edgerton and Michael T. Marsden. London; New York: Routledge, 2012. 
121-141. Print. 
Hayward, Susan. Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts. New York, NY: Routledge, 2000. 
Print. 
 
Heaven’s Gate. Dir. Michael Cimino. Partisan Productions, 1980. MGM Home 
Entertainment, 2000. DVD. 
 
Hellman, John. "Vietnam and the Hollywood Genre Film: Inversions of American 
Mythology in The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now." American Quarterly. 34. 
4 (1982): 418-439. Online. 
 
Holden, Stephen. “The Pop Life: Movie music for Kevin Costner, not the Indians.”  The 
New York Times 5 Dec 1990: C 20. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New 
York Times (1851-2010).  
 
Hughley, Matthew W. The White Savior Film: Content, Critics, Consumption. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 2014. Print.  
 
Indick, William. The Psychology of the Western: How the American Psyche Plays Out on 
Screen. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2008. Print. 
 
Jaws. Dir. Steven Spielberg. Zanuck/Brown Productions, Universal Pictures, 1975. 
Universal, 2005. DVD. 
 
Kalinak, Kathryn. Settling the Score: Music and the Classical Hollywood Film. Madison, 
WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. Print. 
 
King Kong. Dirs. Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Shoedsack. RKO Pictures, 1933. 
Warner Home Entertainment, 2006. DVD.  
Little Big Man. Dir Arthur Penn. Cinema Center Films, 1970. Paramount, 2000. 
Videocassette.  
 
Lukács, Georg. The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms 
of Great Epic Literature. Anna Bostock, Trans. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1971. Print.  
 
Matteo, Steve. “A Life in Music, From Bond Films to ‘Dances With Wolves’.” The New 
York Times 24 Sept 2000: LI 15. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York 
Times (1851-2010). 
 
Matthews, Tom. “Dances With Wolves.” Boxoffice Dec 1 1990: 42. Entertainment 




McQuillan, Gene. “ ’Exterminate the Varlets!’: The Reconstruction of Captivity 
Narratives in Dances With Wolves.” Popular Culture Review. 6.2 (1995): 71-82. 
Online. 
 
Metz, Christian. The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema. Celia Britton, 
et al., Trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Print. 
 
Midnight Cowboy. Dir. John Schlesinger. Jerome Hellman Productions, 1969. MGM/UA 
Home Video, 1994. LaserDisc. 
 
Million, Dian. Therapeutic Nations: Healing in an Age of Indigenous Human Rights. 
Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2013. Print. 
 
Mulvey, Laura. Visual and Other Pleasures: Second Edition. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009. Print.  
 
My Darling Clementine. Dir. John Ford. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 1946. Fox 
Video, 1992. Videocassette. 
 
Natali, Maurizia. “The Sublime Excess of the American Landscape: Dances with Wolves 
and Sunchaser as Healing Landscpaes.” Journal of Film Studies. 12:1 (2001): 
105-125. Online. 
 
Neal, Steve. Genre and Hollywood. London; New York: Routledge, 2000. Print. 
 
Newman, Kim. “Film: Dances With Wolves.” New Musical Express 9 February 1991. 
Entertainment Industry Magazine Archive. Accessed 15 February 2015.   
 
Nolley, Ken. “The Representation of Conquest: John Ford and the Hollywood Indian.” 
Hollywood’s Indian. Eds. Peter C. Rollins and John E. O’Connor. Lexington, KY: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1998. 73-90. Print. 
 
Ostwalt, Conrad. “Dances with Wolves: An American Heart of Darkness.” 
Literature/Film Quarterly.  24.3 (1996): 209-216. Online. 
 
Pearce, Roy Harvey. Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American 
Mind. Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988. Print. 
 
The Plainsman. Dir. Cecil B. Demille. Paramount Pictures, 1936. Universal Pictures, 
2004. DVD. 
 
Platoon. Dir. Oliver Stone. Hemdale Film and Cinema 86, 1986.  Vestron Video, 1988. 
Videocassette. 
 
Raiders of the Lost Ark. Dir. Steven Spielberg. Paramount Pictures, Lucasfilm, 1981. 




Rasmussen, Karen., Sharon D. Downey. “Dialectical Disorientation in Vietnam War 
Films: Subversion of the Mythology of War.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. 77 
(1991): 176-195. Online. 
 
Red River. Dir. Howard Hawks. Charles K. Feldman Group, 1948. The Criterion 
Collection, 2004. DVD.  
 
Riding In, James. “Dances With Wolves” Seeing Red: American Indians On Film. Eds. 
LeAnne Howe, Harvey Markowitz, Denise Cummings. East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 2013. 89-98. Print.  
 
Rifkin, Mark. Manifesting America: The Imperial Construction of US National Space. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.  
Riley, Michael J. “Trapped in the History of Film: Racial Conflict and Allure in The 
Vanishing American.” Hollywood’s Indian. Eds. Peter C Rollins and John E. 
O’Connor. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998. 58-72. 
Print. 
Robinson, Sally. Marked Men. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Rosaldo, Renato. “Imperialist Nostalgia.” Representations. 26 (1989): 107-122. Online. 
 
Russell, James. “ ‘A Most Historic Period of Change’: The Western, The Epic, and 
Dances With Wolves.” The Shifting Definitions of Genre. Eds. Lincoln Geraghty, 
Mark Jancovich. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2008.  
142-158. Print. 
 
Salisbury, Mark. “Im Media: ‘Dances With Wolves’.” Melody Maker 2 February 1991. 
Entertainment Industry Magazine Archive. Accessed 15 February 2015.   
 
Schwalbe, Michael. Unlocking the Iron Cage: The Men’s Movement, Gender Politics, 
and American Culture. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print. 
 
The Searchers. Dir. John Ford. Warner Bros, 1956. Warner Home Video, 1984. 
LaserDisc.  
 
Simmon, Scott. The Invention of the Western Film: A Cultural History of the Genre’s 
First Half-Century. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 2003. Print. 
 
Slotkin, Richard. Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. Print. 
 
Smith, Amanda. “Mythic Descent in Dances With Wolves.” Literature/Film Quarterly. 




Soldier Blue. Dir. Ralph Nelson. AVCO Embassy Pictures, 1970. Lions Gate, 2006. 
DVD.  
 
Stagecoach. Dir. John Ford. Walter Wanger Productions, 1939. Warner Home Video, 
1997. DVD.  
 
Star Wars. Dir. George Lucas. Lucas Film, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 1977. 
Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, 1995. LaserDisc. 
 
Telotte, J.P. “A Fate Worse Than Death: Racism, Transgression, and Westerns.” 
Westerns: The Essential ‘Journal of Popular Film and Television’ Collection. 
Eds. Gary R. Edgerton and Michael T Marsden. New York; London: Routledge, 
2012. 142-154. Print. 
 
Tuck, Eve., K Wayne Yang. “Decolonization is not a metaphor.” Decolonization: 
Indigeneity, Education and Society. 1.1 (2012): 1-40. Online. 
 
Union Pacific. Dir. Cecil B. Demille. Paramount Pictures, 1939. Universal Studios Home 
Entertainment, 2006. DVD.  
 
The Vanishing American. Dir. George B Seitz. Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, 1925. 
Image Entertainment, 1999. DVD. 
 
Vera, Hernana., Andrew M Gordon. Screen Saviors: Hollywood Fictions of Whiteness. 
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. Print. 
 
Walker, Janet. “Introduction: westerns through history.” Westerns: Films Through 
History. Ed. Janet Walker. New York; London: Routledge, 2001. 1-24. Print. 
 
Whitlock, Gillian. “Active rememberance: testimony, memoir and the work of 
reconciliation.” Rethinking Settler Colonialism. Ed. Annie E. Coombes 
Manchester, UK; New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 2006. 24-44   
Print. 
 
Whitt, Laurie Ann. “Cultural Imperialism and the Marketing of Native America.” 
American Indian Culture and Research Journal. 19.3 (1995): 1-31. Online. 
 
Williams, Linda. “Melodrama Revisited.” Refiguring American Film Genres: History 
and Theory. Ed. Nick Browne. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 42-
88. Print. 
 
Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the elimination of the native.” Journal of 





Braveheart. Dir. Mel Gibson. Icon Entertainment International, 1995. Paramount Home 
Entertainment, 2007. DVD. 
Brewer, Susan A. Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda From the 
Philippines to Iraq. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print. 
Byrd, Jodi. The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011. Print. 
Callimachi, Rukmini., Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura. “ISIS Releases Video of Execution of 
British Aid Worker.” The New York Times 3 Oct 2014. Web. Accessed 6 May 
2015. 
Carr, David. “With Videos of Killings, ISIS Sends Medieval Message by Modern 
Method.” The New York Times 7 Sept 2014. Web. Accessed 6 May 2015. 
Cobbs Hoffman. All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998. Print. 
Dances with Wolves. Dir. Kevin Costner. TIG Productions, 1990. Twentieth Century Fox 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2010. DVD.  
 
Deloria, Philip. Playing Indian. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Print. 
Erb, Cynthia. Tracking King Kong: A Hollywood Icon in World Culture, 2nd Edition. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009. Print. 
Freidman, Thomas. “Foreign Affairs: Somking or Non-Smoking?” The New York Times 
14 September 2001. Web. Accessed 6 May 2015.    
Ginneken, Jaap Van. Screening Difference: How Hollywood’s Blockbuster Films Imagine 
Race, Ethnicity, and Culture. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2007. Print. 
Gladiator. Dir. Ridley Scott. Dreamworks SKG, 2000. Dreamworks Home 
Entertainment, 2000. DVD. 
Glory. Edward Zwick. TriStar Pictures, 1989. Columbia TriStar Home Video, 2006. 
DVD. 
Golub, Mark. “History Dies for Our Sins: Guilt and Responsibility in Hollywood 
Redemption Histories.” Journal of American Culture. 21.3 (1998): 23-45. Online. 
Hall, Alice. “Film Reviews and the Public’s Perception of Stereotypes: Movie Critics’ 
Discourse about The Siege.” Communication Quarterly. 49.4 (Fall 2001): 399-
423. Online. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 




King, Homay. Lost in Translation: Orientalism, Cinema, and the Enigmatic Signifier. 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010. Print. 
King Kong. Dirs. Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Shoedsack. RKO Pictures, 1933. 
Warner Home Entertainment, 2006. DVD.  
 
King Kong. Dir. Peter Jackson. Universal Pictures, 2005. Universal Studios Home 
Entertainment, 2006. DVD.  
 
Lally, Kevin. “Samurai Code.” Film Journal International. 106.12 (2003): no pagination. 
Online.  
 
The Last Samurai. Dir. Edward Zwick. Warner Bros, 2003. Warner Home Video, 2004. 
DVD. 
 
Lim, Bliss Cua. Translating Time: Cinema, The Fantastic, and Temporal Critique. 
Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2009. Print. 
Littlewood, Ian. The Idea of Japan. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996. Print. 
 
Mitchell, Elvis. “From the Wild West to the Honorable East.” The New York Times 5 Dec 
2003: E1-E13. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-
2010). 
 
Morey, Peter., Amina Yaqin. Framing Muslims. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2011. Print. 
Nichols, Bill. Representing Reality. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991. 
Print. 
 
The Patriot. Dir Roland Emmerich. Columbia Pictures Corporation, 2000. Columbia 
TriStar Home Video, 2000. DVD. 
Ravina, Mark. “Fantasies of Valor: Legends of the Samurai in Japan and the United 
States.” ASIANetwork Exchange. 13.1 (2010): 80-99. Online. 
Riley, Michael J. “Trapped in the History of Film: Racial Conflict and Allure in The 
Vanishing American.” Hollywood’s Indian. Eds. Peter C Rollins and John E. 
O’Connor. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998. 58-72. 
Print. 
Rony, Fatimah Tobing. The Third Eye: Race, Cinema, and Ethnographic Spectacle. 
Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1996. Print. 




Roy, Olivier., Antoine Sfeir. The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007. Print. 
Shane, Scott., Ben Hubbard. “ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media.” The 
New York Times 8 August 2014. Web. Accessed 3 May 2015.  
Sharp, David. “Obama Says Beheading Videos Won’t Intimidate US.” The New York 
Times 3 Sept 2014. Web. Accessed 6 May 2015.  
Sheehi, Stephen. Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign Against Muslims. Atlanta, 
GA: Clarity Press, Inc., 2001. Print. 
Shin, Mina. “Making a Samurai Western: Japan and the White Samurai Fantasy in The 
Last Samurai.” The Journal of Popular Culture. 43.5 (2010): 1065-1080. Online. 
Shohat, Ella., Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media. 
London; New York: Routledge, 1994. Print. 
Slotkin, Richard. Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. Print. 
Spencer, Alexander. “The Social construction of terrorism: media, metaphors and policy 
implications.” Journal of International Relations and Development. 15 (2012): 
393-419. Online. 
Stevens, Laura M. “The Christian Origins of the Vanishing Indian.” Mortal Remains. Eds 
Nancy Isenberg and Andrew Burstein. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2003. 17-30. Print.  
Taher, Abul. “Exclusive: Got Him! Jihadi John is ‘wounded in US airstrike that killed 10 
top ISIS commanders at secret bunker meeting in Iraq.” The DailyMail.Com 15 
November 2014.  Web. Accessed 15 March 2015.   
 
Terrorism: Essential Primary Sources. Eds. K. Lee Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth. Farmington 
Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2006. Print. 
 
Tierney, Sean M. “Themes of Whiteness in Bulletproof Monk, Kill Bill, and The Last 
Samurai.” Journal of Communication. 56 (2006): 607-624. Online. 
Tripathy, Jyotirmaya., Dharmabrata Mohapatra. “Does Development Exist Outside of 
Representation?” Journal of Developing Societies. 27.2 (2011): 93-118. Online. 
Van Ginneken,  Jaap. Screening Difference: How Hollywood’s Blockbuster Films 
Imagine Race, Ethnicity, and Culture. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2007. Print. 
Vera, Hernan., Andrew M. Gordon. “The Beautiful American: Sincere Fictions of the 
White Messiah in Hollywood Movies.” White Out: The Continuing Significance 
of Racism. Eds. Ashley “Woody” Doane and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. New York; 
London: Routledge, 2003. 113-128. Print.  
  
252 
Wolfe, Patrick.  “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native.” Journal of 
Genocide Research. 8.4 (2006): 387-409. Online. 
Wright, Marie. “Technology and Terrorism: How the internet facilitates radicalization.” 
The Forensic Examiner. 17.4 (Winter 2008): 14-20. Online.  
Chapter V 
“A 50 Foot Ape.” The New York Times 5 March 1933: X3. ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010). 
 
Anderson, John. “Alternate World, Alternate Technology.” New York Times 13 
December 2009: AR20. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times 
(1851-2010). 
 
Avatar. Dir. James Cameron. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 2009. 20th Century Fox 
Home Entertainment, 2010. DVD. 
 
Bazin, André. “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema.”  Film Theory and Criticism: 
Introductory Readings, Fifth Edition. Eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen. New 
York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 43-56. Print. 
 
---. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory 
Readings, Fifth Edition. Eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen. New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 195-198. Print. 
 
Benby, David. “Going Native.” The New Yorker 4 January 2010. Web. Accessed 12 April 
2015.  
 
Bige. “Film Reviews: King Kong.” Variety 7 March 1933: 14. Entertainment Industry 
Magazine Archive. Accessed 7 May 2015. 
 
Bruno, Giuliana. Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture and Film. New York: 
Verso, 2002. Print. 
 
Bushman Speaking Into a Phonograph. Dir. Rudolf Pöch, 1908. YouTube. Accessed 30 
November 2014.  
 
Cashill, Robert. “ALL THINGS KONG-SIDERED.” Cineaste. Spring (2006): 39-43. 
Online. 
 
Cohen, Adam. “Next-Generation 3-D Medium of ‘Avatar’ Underscores Its Message.” 
The New York Times 26 December 2009: A22.  ProQuest Historical Newspapers: 
The New York Times (1851-2010). 
 
Ebert, Roger. “Avatar.” Film Review. www.rogerebert.com 11 December 2009. Web. 




Elsaesser, Thomas. The Persistence of Hollywood. New York: Routledge, 2012. Print. 
 
Erb, Cynthia. Tracking King Kong: A Hollywood Icon in World Culture, 2nd Edition. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009. Print. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation of Dreams. James Strachey, Trans. New York: Avon 
Books, 1967. Print. 
 
---. Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics. A.A. Brill, Trans. Amherst; New York: Prometheus Books, 2000. 
Print. 
 
---. The Uncanny. Nicholas Royle, Trans. New York: Routledge, 2003. Print. 
 
Ginsberg, Morris. The Idea of Progress: A Revaluation. London: Methuen, 1953. Print. 
 
Hall, Morduant. “A fantastic film in which a monstrous ape uses automobiles for missles 
and climbs a skyscraper.” The New York Times 3 March 1933: C12. ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010). 
 
Haver, Ron. “Merian C. Cooper: First King of Kong.” American Film. 11.3 (1976): 14-
23. Online. 
 
Hawkins, Richard C. “Perspectives on ‘3-D’.” The Quarterly of Film, Radio and 
Television. 7.4 (1953): 325-334. Online. 
 
Jensen, Toril., Peter Ian Crawford. Behind the Eye: Reflexive Methods in Culture Studies, 
Ethnographic Film, and Visual Media. Højbjerg: Intervention Press, 2009. Print. 
Jurassic Park. Dir. Steven Spielberg. Universal Pictures, 1993. Universal, 2000. DVD. 
 
King, Geoff. Spectacular Narratives: Hollywood in the Age of the Blockbuster. London; 
New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2009.  Print. 
 
King Kong. Dirs. Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Shoedsack. RKO Pictures, 1933. 
Warner Home Entertainment, 2006. DVD.  
King Kong. Dir. Peter Jackson. Universal Pictures, 2005. Universal Studios Home 
Entertainment, 2006. DVD. 
 
Lim, Bliss Cua. Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantasitic, and Temporal Critique. 
Durham; London:  Duke University Press, 2009. Print. 
 





Morton, Ray. King Kong: The History of a Movie Icon From Fay Wray to Peter Jackson. 
New York: Applause Theatre & Cinema Books, 2005. Print. 
 
Mulrooney, Jonathan. “The Sadness of Avatar.” Wordsworth Circle. 42.3 (2011): 201-
204. Online. 
 
Nanook of the North. Dir. Robert Flaherty. Les Frères Revillon, 1922. Criterion 
Collection, 1998. DVD.  
 
North, Dan. Performing Illusions: Cinema, Special Effects, and the Visual Actor. 
London: Wallflower Press, 2008. Print. 
Norton, Steven. “How the Other is Not allowed to Be: Ellison and Condensation in 
Avatar.” Arizona Quarterly. 69:2 (2013): 131:144. Print. 
Oksiloff, Assenka. Picturing the Primitive: Visual Culture, Ethnography, and Early 
German Cinema.  New York: Palgrave, 2001. Print. 
 
Prince, Stephen. Digital Visual Effects in Cinema: The Seduction of Reality. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers, 2012. Print. 
 
Purse, Lisa. Digital Imaging in Popular Cinema. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2013. Print. 
  
Rony, Fatimah Tobing. The Third Eye: Race, Cinema, and Ethnographic Spectacle. 
Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1996. Print. 
Ross, Mirriam. “The 3-D aesthetic: Avatar and hyperphatic visuality.” Screen. 53:4 
(2012): 381-397. Online. 
Schuller, Kyla. “Avatar and the Movements of Neocolonial Sentimental Cinema.” 
Discourse. 35.2 (2013): 177-193. Online. 
 
Terminator 2: Judgment Day. Dir. James Cameron. Carolco Pictures, 1991. Lions Gate, 
2007. DVD.  
 
Zacharek, Stephanie. “‘Avatar’: Dances With Aliens.” Salon.com 17 December 2009. 





Bordwell, David., Janet Staiger, Kristen Thompson. The Classical Hollywood Cinema: 
Film Style & Mode of Production to 1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 




2001: A Space Odyssey. Dir Stanley Kubrick. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Stanley Kubrick 
Productions, 1968.  Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD. 
 
Avatar. Dir. James Cameron. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 2009. 20th Century Fox 
Home Entertainment, 2010. DVD. 
 
The Birth of a Nation. Dir. D.W. Griffith. Biograph Company, 1915. Kino on Video, 
2002. DVD.  
 
Dances with Wolves. Dir. Kevin Costner. TIG Productions, 1990. Twentieth Century Fox 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2010. DVD.  
 
The Gods Must Be Crazy. Dir. Jamie Uys. CAT Films, 1980. Columbia TriStar Home 
Entertainment, 2004. DVD. 
 
The Gods Must Be Funny in China. Kin-Nam Cho. Hong Kong Film Entertainment 
Production, 1994. 
 
Gravity. Dir. Alfonso Cuarón. Warner Bros, 2013. Warner Home Video, 2014. DVD.  
 
King, Geoff. Spectacular Narratives: Hollywood in the Age of the Blockbuster. London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2008. Print.  
 
The Last Samurai. Dir. Edward Zwick. Warner Bros, 2003. Warner Home Video, 2004. 
DVD. 
 
Neale, Steve. “Hollywood Blockbusters: Historical Dimensions.” Movie Blockbusters. 
Ed. Julian Stringer. London; New York: Routledge, 2003. 47-60. Print.  
 
Nanook of the North. Dir. Robert Flaherty. Les Frères Revillon, 1922. Criterion 
Collection, 1998. DVD.  
 
Schatz, Thomas. “The New Hollywood.” Movie Blockbusters. Movie Blockbusters. Ed. 
Julian Stringer. London; New York: Routledge, 2003. 15-44. Print. 
 
Smoke Signals. Dir. Chris Eyre. ShadowCatcher Entertainment, 1998. Buena Vista Home 
Entertainment, 1999. Videocassette. 
 
Touki Bouki. Dir. Djibril Diop Mambéty. Cinegrit, 1973. Kino on Video, 2005. DVD. 
 
 
 
 
